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him that he didn't-he had it in the wrong place")) The State did not believe the anal 
sexual assault took place, however. The State in fact had dismissed the forcible anal sex 
charge because the State did not believe it had happened. 16 The fact that the State 
originally charged Petitioner with forcible anal and vaginal rape, indicates that Petitioner 
was charged based upon Ms. Oliver's statements. The fact that the State dropped the anal 
rape charge indicates they did not find that allegation credible. This is supported by the 
fact that the State does not mention forcible anal rape in its opening sentencing statement, 
even though the State does discuss why the charges were reduced from forcible to 
statutory rape. (Tr., p. 4736, Ls. 12-16 (oral and vaginal sex); Tr., p. 4738, L. 24 - p. 
4739, L. 4) Ms. Oliver herself believed that Petitioner had only been charged with 
statutory rape (Tr., p. 4776, L. 9), the charge Petitioner ultimately pled guilty to. Despite 
that, the State elicited testimony from Ms. Oliver regarding anal rape. 
Ms. Oliver never even testified that there was a vaginal forcible rape. (Tr., p. 
4767, Ls. 2-7 (the witness "thinks" Petitioner had sexual intercourse with her)) It was 
only in response to a leading question that the witness acknowledged nonconsensual 
sexual intercourse and that was only in response to a leading question. (Tr., p. 4775, Ls. 
15-19 (witness responds "no" to State's leading question whether she wanted to have 
sexual intercourse with Petitioner)) 
The State also had reason to believe that Ms. Oliver was incompetent to testify. 
Ms. Oliver was "too distraught to even talk to" trial counsel, a fact brought out prior to 
her testimony. (Tr., pp. 4755-4756) Ms. Oliver had been on medication but was not on 
16 Petitioner will offer further support of this fact when the Court allows discovery on the 
issue. The limited information Petitioner has access to indicates that no anal rape 
occurred. 
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medication at the time she testified, even though she admitted having a chemical 
imbalance. (Tr., p. 4777, Ls. 2-7, p. 4783, Ls. 17-18) On direct, Ms. Oliver could not 
recall critical events relating to the rape. (Tr., p. 4760, L.15 ("I only remember bits and 
pieces"); p. 4761, L.18 ("I can't remember"); p. 4762, Ls. 4-5 (she met Petitioner at 
Mountain Billiards "I think, but I'm not sure"); p. 4762, L. 18 (she's "not quite sure" 
whether they sat around in the trailer at all); p. 4763, L. 24-25 ("I closed my eyes - I 
don't' know [what happened]. I can't remember"); p. 4764, L. 12 ("I can't remember [if 
she couldn't talk because Petitioner was strangling her]. I don't think I could."); p. 4764, 
L. 14 ("I don't know [if I was scared]."); p. 4765, L. 3 ("I can't remember [what it was 
like what I woke up.]"); p. 4765, L. 21 ("I can't remember"); p. 4766, L. 3 ("I can't 
remember), L. 6 ("I can't remember), L. 9 ("I don't know. I'm sorry"), L. 17 ("I'm not 
sure."); p. 4768, L. 1 ("I don't know."), L. 10 ("I don't remember); p. 4769, L. 7 ("I can't 
remember"), L.l3 (witness does "not really" remember getting up the next morning); p. 
4771, L. 3 (witness "can't really remember" being arrested at the Sands Motel); p. 4771, 
L. 6 (witness "can't really remember" getting put into back seat of police car at Sands 
Motel); p. 4771, L. 9 (witness "doesn't know" if she wound up at the juvenile detention 
jail); p. 4771, L. 21 (witness "can't remember" meeting with police officer at 
Intermountain Hospital because "it's a blur")) On cross-examination, Ms. Oliver 
explained that she was on SSI because she has a chemical imbalance and is unable to 
keep ajob. (Tr., p. 4780, Ls. 6-18) 
In a statement made to a federal investigator in West Virginia, Ms. Oliver 
admitted that she's been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and was not medicated when she testified. (Exhibit 16.) 
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She recalls fleeing from Petitioner and jumping into "a yard filled with dogs, I think they 
bit me." There was no evidence of dog bites when Ms. Oliver spoke to Detective Hess, 
and no indications of dog bites in the emergency room report of Dr. Vickman. (Exhibit 
2, Exhibit 17.) Ms. Oliver further reported that she "pretty much lived" at Intermountain 
Hospital, had been hospitalized at Intermountain two or three times, and had been there 
for a year at one time. Ms. Oliver "passed out" before the rape trial. Ms. Oliver's most 
recent statement is filled with inconsistencies regarding the events surrounding the 
purported rape. 
Wendy Levy disputes Ms. Oliver's version of the 1991 events. Ms. Levy states 
that she saw Ms. Oliver come out of the shower that following day, and "saw no marks, 
scratches, bruises, or injuries of any kind on her face, neck, shoulders, arms or hands." 
(Exhibit 7.) Ms. Levy states that she asked Petitioner to ask Ms. Oliver to leave the 
property because she believed "there was something wrong with Ms. Oliver." Ms. Levy 
was interviewed by the prosecutor's office. See Claim D.1, supra. 
Not only did the State put on an incompetent witness as part of its sentencing case 
against Petitioner, it attempted to explain away the reduction in the 1991 rape charges 
against Petitioner to statutory rape by putting other state officials on the witness stand to 
bolster Ms. Oliver's credibility, when those witnesses had every reason to know that Ms. 
Oliver was in fact incompetent to testify. See (Patrick) Hall, supra, (stating that 
corroboration by other testimony does not establish that the testimony by the incompetent 
witness is based on his own perception rather than on information acquired from others). 
The next witness called by the State was Detective Daniel Hess, whose testimony was 
nothing more than a substitute for the testimony of Norma Jean Oliver, and was rife with 
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inadmissible hearsay that violated the Confrontation Clause. (Tr., pp. 4784-4813). The 
State's examination was especially misleading when, after the Detective stated on 
recross-examination that he did not know whether a competency evaluation had been 
conducted on Ms. Oliver, the State followed up with questions designed to allow the 
Detective to testify that Ms. Oliver was competent. (Tr., p. 4811, Ls. 21-23 (Detective 
did not know whether competency evaluation had been conducted); Tr., p. 4812, Ls. 9-13 
(prosecutor questioning whether Detective was able to carry on a conversation with Ms. 
Oliver, and whether Ms. Oliver "tracked and gave appropriate answers")) If in fact Ms. 
Oliver was legally incompetent to testify at that time, then the State's questioning was 
highly misleading. 
The State also elicited materially false testimony from Detective Hess. From a 
photograph from which the State admits is "difficult" to discern injuries, Detective Hess 
testified that there was swelling on the neck and throat just under Ms. Oliver's jaw line. 
(Tr., p. 4793, L. 22 - p. 4794, L. 1.) His report, however, does not note this injury, and 
Dr. Vickman's report does not note swelling and specifically states that there were 
external signs of bruising on neck. The State also elicited testimony of significant facial 
bruising: 
Q. Start, Detective with No. 148. It's difficult on a photo I know, but 
if you could tell us what we're seeing, what that photo was taken 
for and what it's meant to show? 
A. On the left side of her face in the area of the left side of her nose 
was bruising on the cheek bone. There was bruising right in this 
area here (indicating) was significant bruising on the cheek bone 
and the jaw line on this side of her face." 
(Tr., p. 4793, Ls. 16-21.) The photographs do not support this testimony. Dr. Vickman's 
report contradicts this testimony. (See Report, noting "minimal bruising on the left cheek 
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of her face.)17 The State further elicited testimony from Det. Hess that Ms. Oliver had 
scratches and bruises on her left hand. (Tr., p. 4794, Ls. 5-17.) However, Dr. Vickman's 
report states her examined Ms. Oliver's hands when she claimed she had discomfort, but 
that he "could not see any sign of external injury." (Exhibit 17.) 
Shortly after Detective Hess' testimony, the State then called Jay Rosenthal, the 
former county prosecutor assigned to the Norma Jean Oliver rape case,18 to explain why 
the State had reduced the forcible rape charges to statutory rape charges. Mr. Rosenthal's 
testimony essentially bolstered Ms. Oliver's credibility in the instant trial, while at the 
same time misleading the jury as to Ms. Oliver's competency in the original rape case. 
Mr. Rosenthal testified that the forcible rape charges were reduced to statutory rape 
because Ms. Oliver was "vulnerable," "fragile," "terrified," and "unable to effectively go 
on with the case in front of a jury" or withstand cross-examination based in part on the 
recommendation of her treatment providers. (Tr., pp. 4952-4954) If in fact, however, the 
charges were reduced because Ms. Oliver was not legally competent to testify, as 
suggested by Mr. Rosenthal's claim that his decision to reduce charges rested in part on 
the recommendation of Ms. Oliver's psychiatrist and case worker (Tr., p. 5953, Ls. 12-
25), then his testimony was extremely misleading, and irreparably prejudiced Petitioner's 
sentencing trial. 
In addition to prosecutorial misconduct, on this record, the Court had an 
independent duty to inquire into Ms. Oliver's competency, and move to strike her 
testimony sua sponte. I.R.E. 602 (witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
17 Given that the State turned over a copy of Dr. Vickman's report in discovery, they too 
had possession of that report. 
18 Mr. Rosenthal is now a Deputy Attorney General, as is juror McNeese's husband, 
Timothy McNeese. 
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introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the 
matter); State v. Johnson, 92 Idaho 533, 447 P.2d 10 (1968)(holding where a witness said 
he remembered nothing about a certain time period, he effectively declared himself 
incompetent to answer questions relating to that period); State v. (Patrick) Hall, 111 
Idaho 827, 727 P .2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1986)(holding trial judge erred in allowing testimony 
of victim who expressed uncertainty as to whether his testimony was based on actual 
memories; corroboration by other testimony does not establish that the testimony by the 
witness is based on his own perception rather than on information acquired from others). 
The admission of this testimony violated the Sixth Amendment, and because this 
was a capital sentencing proceeding, the admission of this testimony violated the Eighth 
Amendment and the Due Process. There is a reasonable likelihood that the false and 
misleading testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. 
5. The Prosecutor Deliberately Injected Extra-Record And Materially 
Misleading Evidence Through Leading Questions To Detective Daniel 
Hess. 
In cross-examining Detective Hess, the prosecutor asked: 
Q. All right. And to your knowledge, and looking at your police 
report, was that rape kit done and ultimately examined by the State 
Forensic Laboratory? 
A. It was. 
Q. It's kind of in the days before DNA testing, but did the laboratory 
tell you whether or not there was any sperm found in the sex 
crimes kit? 
A Yes, there -
MR. MYSHIN: Objection. Foundation, confrontation. 
THE COURT: Well, I think you can lay more foundation. I'll sustain the 
objection to that part. Back up for a moment. 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 52 
00206 
Q. BY MR. BOURNE: Did you -- after you knew that the sex crimes kit 
had been taken, did you know that it had been submitted to the -- would be 
the -- in those days it was the Department of Law Enforcement Forensic 
Lab,lthink? 
A. I delivered it. 
Q. Okay. And at some point thereafter, did you speak to Criminalist 
Pam Marcum who gave you -- just yes or no, who gave you some 
information about her findings on the sex crimes kit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And after she gave you information about the sex crimes kit, did 
you write down in your police report what it was that she had told 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you see that's still there in your report that you've read in 
preparation for this? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. What did Pam Marcum tell you? 
MR. MYSHIN: Judge, objection. Confrontation. 
THE COURT: I'll note your objection. 
Overruled and allow the witness to respond. 
THE WITNESS: She indicated that there was sperm found on the swabs. 
MR. BOURNE: All right. One second. (Brief delay.) Thank you. No 
further questions of the witness. 
(Tr., p. 4804, L. 20 - p. 4806, L. 11.) The question suggested that DNA testing was not 
available in 1991. This is materially misleading, as DNA testing was certainly available 
in 1991. Moreover, the prosecutor injected evidence into the testimony by asking the 
question itself Through the leading question, the prosecutor essentially testified that the 
rape kit results were reliable evidence of sexual assault, and the only reason they didn't 
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conduct DNA testing was because it was unavailable and thus suggesting that the DNA 
testing would merely confirm what was already known. There is a reasonable likelihood 
that the false and misleading testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. 
6. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Misrepresenting Conclusions 
That Could Be Drawn From The DNA Test Results Taken From 
Christian Johnson. 
The prosecution misrepresented the test results by stating that DNA testing 
excluded Christian Johnson as killer. (Tr., p. 3423, Ls. 11-12.) The prosecution made this 
assertion knowing that the defense considered presenting Mr. Johnson as a potential 
alternate perpetrator at trial. Further, the prosecution made this assertion knowing it to be 
false; at most, the lack of Christian Johnson's DNA found on the victim only established 
that he did not leave any semen. Thus, he could have been a co-perpetrator of rape. 
Moreover, the lack of DNA does not exclude Mr. Johnson as the actual killer. Trial 
counsel made this very point outside the presence of the jury, but failed to object. (Tr., p. 
3682, Ls. 5-10.) 
F. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT FOR USING TECHNIQUES TO 
DISSUADE MITIGATION WITNESSES FROM TESTIFYING OR 
PREDISPOSE THEM TO DISREGARD OR DOWNPLAY VALID 
MITIGATING EVIDENCE. 
During the course of Petitioner's reinvestigation of this case, he has learned that 
the State, either acting through its prosecuting attorneys, or their agents, committed 
misconduct when interviewing potential mitigation witnesses. Specifically, 
• Jean McCracken, Erick's mother, states that on September 27, 
2004, a man working with the prosecution contacted her. He told 
her that the defense team was going to say at trial that Frank, 
Erick's father, and her had raised Erick to be a killer and that they 
were responsible for what Erick had become. The prosecution also 
asked her if she thought Erick's drug use excused his behavior. 
Jean did not testify at the sentencing. 
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• Tamara McCracken, Erick's older half-sister, was also contacted 
by the prosecution. She was asked whether she was a good 
Christian and believed that someone did something wrong 
shouldn't they be held accountable for it. They asked if she had 
ever killed anyone. They suggested that since she had the same 
childhood but hadn't killed anyone that the defense team should 
not based a defense upon Erick's childhood. Tamara resented the 
insinuations and attempts to trivialize the trauma Erick and she had 
experienced. Tamara testified at the sentencing. 
Based on these two incidents alone, Petitioner has reason to believe that the State 
committed other acts of misconduct. Petitioner asserts that the State's conduct violated 
Petitioner's First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and based on 
the evidence to date, warrants reversal of his sentencing. Petitioner needs additional time 
to finish his investigation and to determine whether the State's misconduct extended to 
guilt-phase witnesses. 
G. ADMISSION OF TESTIMONIAL AND OTHER HEARSAY VIOLATIONS 
VIOAL TED PETITIONER'S SIXTH AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS 
Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was 
violated when witnesses testified to hearsay without a showing that the hearsay declarants 
were unavailable, and without prior opportunity for Petitioner to have cross-examined 
those declarants. Admission of testimonial statements without both unavailability and 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant, violates the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 26, 59 (2004). 
Among statements considered testimonial are those statements obtained with the 
"involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward 
trial." ld. at 56 n.7. 
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For example, Detective Hess' testimony violated the Confrontation Clause when 
he testified about hearsay statements purportedly made to him by Ms. Oliver. Clearly 
Ms. Oliver was not an "unavailable" witness in the Crawford sense, given that she 
testified, therefore any hearsay statements were inadmissible. Detective Hess testified as 
follows on redirect examination by the State: 
Q. All right. And when you were speaking with Norma Jean, did she tell you 
whether or not the defendant had tied her up with her clothing during this 
rape? 
A. Yes, she told me that. 
Q. What did she tell you about that? 
A. She explained that she had been unconscious a couple of times and woke up 
undressed and was bound with her clothing, her pants and her shirt. 
Q. Did she say whether or not she had been gaged (sic) with something? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. Did she say at some point that the defendant wanted her to perform oral sex on 
him but she couldn't because she was gaged (sic)? 
A. That's what she told me. 
Q. And that she was able to spit the gag out and talk to him about what he was 
doing to her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she tell you whether or not she was frightened or that she thought that he 
was going to kill her? 
A. She told me that, yes. 
Q. And at one point when she woke up did she tell you that, in so many towards 
at least, that she thought she might be dead because she couldn't feel 
anything? 
A. Yes, that's what she said. 
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MR. BOURNE: Good, thank you. That's all. 
(Tr., p. 4810, L. 5 - p. 4811, L. 16)(sic added). Norma Jean Oliver's statements were 
inadmissible through Detective Hess, and their admission violated Crawford and the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights 
were also violated when Detective Hess testified about results of the rape kit conducted 
on Ms. Oliver. (Tr., p. 4804, L. 10 - p. 4806, L. 8.) 
Petitioner requires additional time to assess all confrontation, Crawford, and 
hearsay violations. 
H. THE PROSECUTION COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY ASKING THE 
JURY TO SPECULATE THE WORST SCENARIO, BY PRESENTING 
ARGUMENT INCONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE, AND BY 
ALLUDING TO EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER MURDER. 
To prove murder of the first degree, the State had to prove the element of 
premeditation or prove that the murder was committed during the perpetration of a rape 
or kidnapping. To prove premeditation, the State had to prove that Petitioner made the 
conscious decision to kill. In support of their argument that Petitioner had plenty of 
opportunity to premeditate, the State asserted that the victim was not rendered 
unconscious from an initial blow to her head, but rather was screaming19 and struggling 
against her perpetrator for at least three minutes, during which time the decision to kill 
was made. (Tr., p. 4657, L. 18 - 4661, L. 24.) Roger Bourne, argued in part, 
Now, I'll bet she didn't go easy. That's why her purse is 200 feet away 
from her shoe. That's why she had to be tied up to control her. If the first 
blow knocked her out why did he have to tie her up? She'd be 
unconscIOUS. 
19 Mr. Bourne's argument is a continuation of his opening statement and earlier portions 
of his closing argument in which he encouraged the jury to speculate that the victim was 
screaming based on the premise that she was abducted in an area where her screams 
would not be heard. (Tr., p. 3430, L. 21 - p. 3421, L. 2; p. 4655, Ls. 11-16.) 
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She's flailing around so he has to tie her up. Not just tie her up, he's able 
to remember a double overhand knot on each of her arms. Is that goal 
directed behavior? Or does he try to bury her with sand to control her? 
Obviously he's doing the obvious thing. Well, to kill her is he tying a knot 
around her ankle trying to choke her to death by her foot? Chokes her to 
death by her neck, doesn't he. That's because he's thinking. He knows 
how to kill somebody the same as we all know. If you tighten this up it 
will kill her. 
(Tr., p. 4660, Ls. 1-5; p. 4663, Ls. 9-20) (emphasis added). 
The State's argument that Ms. Henneman was conscious when strangled to death 
impermissibly called for speculation. The State's proffered theory was that Ms. 
Henneman was alive and conscious when tied up and hogtied, and then strangled to death 
by tightening the ligatures. However, the only evidence presented that the victim was 
hogtied at all was evidence that can only occur post-mortem. In other words, the 
argument that the victim was alive when hogtied was inconsistent with the State's own 
expert's opinion. (Tr., p. 4030, Ls. 10-12; p. 4008, Ls. 3-7 (Q. Are you suggesting that 
this occurred when the person was alive? A. No. I believe they were strangled and then 
placed on her stomach when this was done.) Finally, the State inexplicably makes 
rhetorical reference to Petitioner burying his victim in sand to control her. This is a clear 
reference to the Cheryl Hanlon case intended to prejudice Petitioner with evidence of 
another highly publicized murder he was charged with committing. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still investigating facts that will 
show that the State's misconduct cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
For example, Petitioner still does not know exactly what the jury heard from his multiple 
police interrogations. Petitioner is aware however that in one unredacted videotaped 
interrogation, Petitioner apparently purports to have buried Cheryl Hanlon in sand. 
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I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN SENTENCING-PHASE CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS 
While counsel for the prosecution has traditionally been afforded latitude in 
closing argument, see e.g., State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 
(Ct.App.1995), there are limits that, if exceeded, can constitute reversible error. For 
instance, it is improper for a prosecutor to make misstatements of the evidence during 
argument, State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 37 P.3d 18 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that 
cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct, including improper closing argument, was 
not harmless error); to express a personal belief as to the credibility of witnesses, State v. 
Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); and to make personal attacks on 
trial counsel. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1,9 & n. 7 (1985); State v. Page, 135 
Idaho 214, 223, 16 P.3d 890, 899 (2000).20 In the capital context, prosecutorial 
20 The ABA Standards Relating To Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.8, further 
provides: 
(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue all reasonable 
inferences from evidence in the record. The prosecutor should not intentionally 
misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw. 
(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to 
the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt ofthe defendant. 
(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the 
prejudices of the jury. 
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury 
from its duty to decide the case on the evidence. 
Standard 3-5.9 provides: 
The prosecutor should not intentionally refer to or argue on the basis of facts 
outside the record whether at trial or on appeal, unless such facts are matters of 
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misconduct during closing arguments is given heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, it may 
constitute reversible error for the prosecutor to impede the jury's consideration of 
mitigation through improper argument. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 326 (1989). 
1. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Improper 
Closing Argument Regarding The Definition Of Mitigation By Asserting 
That Mitigation Evidence Is Limited To Evidence That Is Causally 
Linked To The Defendant's Criminal Conduct, Evidence That Excuses 
The Defendant's Criminal Conduct, And Evidence That Prevented The 
Defendant From Choosing Not To Kill. 
An individual juror must be free to consider a mitigating factor, regardless of 
whether other members of the jury agree as to its existence. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 
367 (1988); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) ("each juror [must] be 
permitted to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence"). It is not enough "simply to 
allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer," rather there must not 
be any impediment, through evidentiary rules, jury instructions, Hitchcock v. Dugger, 
481 U.S. 393 (1987), or prosecutorial argument. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 326 
(1989). 
In this case, the State's closing argument impeded the jury's consideration of 
valid mitigating evidence by mischaracterizing the law. Specifically, the State argued 
that mitigating circumstances are limited to circumstances that excuse a defendant's 
criminal conduct or circumstances causally connected to the defendant's conduct. 
In early 2004, the United States Supreme Court, applying the "low threshold for 
relevance," specifically rejected the view that mitigating evidence is only relevant if it is 
causally connected to the crime. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,284 (2004). Later that 
common public knowledge based on ordinary human experience or matters of 
which the court may take judicial notice. 
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year, the Court revisited the issue and characterized the "nexus" requirement as "a test we 
never countenanced and now have unequivocally rejected." Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 
45 (2004). Thus, trial counsel, as well as the prosecutor, both having tried capital cases 
previously, and both preparing for their first capital jury sentencing, should have been 
well aware that there is no nexus requirement for the definition of, and consideration of, 
mitigating circumstances. Indeed, the rationale for these decisions was well established 
prior to Petitioner's sentencing. 
Nearly thirty years ago, the Supreme Court released its opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion). In Lockett, the Court defined a mitigating 
circumstance as "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death." Id., at 604. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Supreme Court 
applied the rule in Lockett. The facts and outcome in Eddings are instructive when 
judging the State's argument in the case at bar. 
In Eddings, in the course of imposing and affirming the defendant's death 
sentence, the trial judge and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had respectively 
found that evidence of Eddings' young age and violent family history was not valid 
mitigating evidence because it did not tend to provide an excuse from criminal 
responsibility. Id., at 113-14.21 In reversing, the Supreme Court found that the evidence 
was relevant mitigating evidence, noting that "[ e ]vidence of a difficult family history and 
of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. Id., at 115 
(citation omitted). Lest there be any confusion about the different between legal excuses 
21 While the Court of Criminal Appeals found the evidence of Eddings' family history 
"useful in explaining" his behavior, the court found that it did not "excuse" it. Id., at 114. 
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to criminal responsibility and mitigating circumstances reducing moral culpability, the 
Court clarified: 
Id. 
All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of 
murder, deliberately committed in this case. Rather, it is to say that just as 
the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of 
great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional 
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing. 
Idaho has adopted the broadest definition of mitigation. State v. Osborn, 102 
Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981). 
We generally note that the concept of mitigation is broad. Mitigating 
circumstances have been defined as: "Such as do not constitute a 
justification or excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness 
and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of 
moral culpability." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at 903. 
!d. at 415, 631 P.2d at 197. The Osborn Court stated that mitigating circumstances 
include the defendant's "background, his age, upbringing and environment or any other 
matter appropriate to a determination of the degree of culpability." Id. This "open ended 
allowance of mitigating evidence provides the defendant with the opportunity to present 
every possible justification for a sentence of less than death." State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 
362, 369, 670 P.2d 463, 470 (1983), reversed in part on other grounds by Arave v. 
Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1986). As the 
Court stated in Sivak, "[b loth Lockett and Eddings established the vital importance of 
requiring the sentencer to consider any evidence proffered by the defendant which tends 
to mitigate against the justness or appropriateness of the death penalty for this particular 
defendant." Id., at 201, 731 P.2d at 196. Such evidence need not be related to any degree 
of culpability for the crime. 
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In Sivak, the Idaho Supreme Court held that evidence of a defendant's post-crime 
conduct in prison, must be considered if offered in mitigation of punishment. Id. at 201-
02, 731 P.2d at 196-97 (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 6 (1986)("[A] 
defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison 
is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing 
determination.") In Skipper, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mitigation does not have to 
relate specifically to culpability. Id. Addressing a capital defendant's attempt to use his 
post-crime good behavior as evidence in mitigation of punishment, the Court stated: 
The State does not contest that the witnesses petitioner attempted to place 
on the stand would have testified that petitioner had been a well-behaved 
and well-adjusted prisoner, nor does the State dispute that the jury could 
have drawn favorable inferences from this testimony regarding petitioner's 
character and his probable future conduct if sentenced to life in prison. 
Although it is true that any such inferences would not relate specifically to 
petitioner's culpability for the crime he committed, see Koon I, supra, 278 
S.c., at 536, 298 S.E.2d, at 774, there is no question but that such 
inferences would be "mitigating" in the sense that they might serve "as a 
basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett, supra, 438 U.S., at 604, 98 
S.Ct., at 2965. 
Skipper v. South Carolina, at 5 (emphasis added). Thus, both the State and trial counsel 
were on notice that the definition of mitigation is broad and that a jury's ability to 
consider all possible evidence that might serve as a basis for a sentence of less than death 
cannot be impeded by improper argument. Penry v. Lynaugh, at 326. Nevertheless, 
without objection, the State made the following arguments:22 
The issue in this case that deals with the propensity factor, and that is the 
issue that makes mitigation relevant or not relevant, is the issue of choice 
to kill, right? That's what we're talking about here is the choice to kill. 
22 Nearly the entirety of the prosecutor's argument is improper for the reasons stated 
above; however, to save space, Petitioner only cites to portions of the argument. 
Petitioner moves this Court to take judicial notice of the entirety of the Reporter's 
Transcript and Clerk's Record for purposes ofthis post-conviction case. 
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That's at the core of this thing, is the choice to kill or not to kill. Not 
whether he had a bad background, or not whether he would choose to 
marry the same person I would or that you would, or the choice to have 
the same kind of a home or not, or the same kind of a job or not. The core 
issue here is choice. And don't kid yourself that there's a difference 
between moral culpability and criminal responsibility. 
(Tr., p. 5491, Ls. 3-17.) 
But the reason we didn't cross examine [Drs. Cunningham and Pettis] 
beyond the few relevant questions was because what they are saying is not 
relevant to the question at hand. That what they have to say about the 
defendant's background doesn't help you decide that mitigation, 
aggravation issue. Because the issue, as I see it, at rock bottom is the 
choice to kill or not to kill. And so if he had a bad background -- well, let 
me put it a different way. If the defendant could choose to kill or not to 
kill Lynn Henneman in September of 2000, then he is as responsible for 
his actions as we are responsible for our actions. And it doesn't matter 
what his background was like, whether it was a good background or bad 
background if he could choose to kill or not to kill. If he couldn't choose 
to kill or not to kill, he couldn't make that choice, then similarly it doesn't 
matter what his background is. For instance if he was delusional, if he 
was hallucinating, if he was psychotic, if he thought that by pulling that 
thing tight around Lynn's neck he was really just wringing out the clothes 
from the washing machine, then he's not responsible because he can't 
make a choice, he's psychotic. And it doesn't matter whether he comes 
from a good background or bad background, does it -- I mean it's not like 
we hold people responsible for their actions if they're psychotic, if they 
come from good background but not from bad ones. It's not like we only 
prosecute people from the -- that have good families for murder when they 
make choices or we don't prosecute people from bad backgrounds for 
murder when they commit choices. That's why I didn't cross examine 
those doctors, besides asking them "Could the defendant make a choice? 
Did he know right from wrong? Did he understand the consequences? 
Did he have a mental illness? Was he delusional or psychotic or for some 
other reason couldn't make the mental connection that he had to make?" 
The doctors both said he could make choices. He knew right from wrong. 
He understood consequences. He's not psychotic. Now, if none of those 
things apply and the defendant could make a choice then he's responsible 
for the choice that he made the same as we are. We all come from a 
background that influences our choice. But don" get confused on choices 
how to live our life versus choices of kill or not to kill. The defendant's 
choices on how to live his life are influenced by his background the same 
as ours are, where to live, how to live, who to marry, what job to do, how 
to spend our day. But the choice. to kill or not to kill is an entirely 
diffet:ent thing and nothing you heard from these people tell you that the 
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defendant doesn't know the difference between right and wrong, doesn't 
understand consequences, couldn't make the choice ... 
(Tr., p. 5493, L. 11 - p. 5495, L. 17.) 
Counsel did it again today. He says that the doctors talked about head 
injury, and being hit on the head by his brothers and such. Did the 
Harvard medical doctor and a Ph.D. forensic psychologist give you one 
reason to think that the defendant has somehow been injured in his head 
by being hit on head when he was a kid? Did he say we gave the 
following psychological tests and they clearly show that the defendant 
can't understand consequences, cause and effect, the relation of A to B? 
No. Why didn't they? It's because they're not trying to help you find the 
truth here. They said, well, there's all kind of serotonin uptake inhibitors 
that do all this. Did the Harvard medical doctor tell you that he did a test 
on the defendant to show that the defendant needs a serotonin uptake 
inhibitor or that he was lacking in serotonin or anything else? He didn't. 
Why not? It's because he doesn't. There's not the cause and effect 
relationship that they want. 
(Tr., p. 5496, L. 21 - p. 5497, L. 15.) 
I say what these good men say is interesting background, but it doesn't 
help you with the core issue, which is could the defendant choose to kill 
Lynn Henneman in September or choose not to kill her? And you know 
that he can choose to kill her because he did. And you know that he could 
choose not to kill her because he chose not to kill her. He could have. 
That's what turns this mitigation into mitigation or not. This is the 
difference between mitigation and an abuse excuse. I didn't think about it, 
they thought of it. They said not abuse excuse. We want to tell you that 
right up front. The heck it isn't. That's just exactly what it is. This is a 
sympathy and I have sympathy for the defendant and I'll bet all of you do 
too if half the stuff that we heard about his childhood is true, then I have 
sympathy for him. But it's an excuse, because they cannot make the cause 
and effect relationship. 
(Tr., p. 5503, Ls. 1-19.) 
We told you to begin with that the business here is the question of whether 
or not the aggravation outweighs the mitigation. And to understand that 
you have to understand whether it's really mitigation or not. And that's 
why I wanted to spend the time with you to help you understand that the 
defendant could make choices. Because if he can make a choice then the 
things you heard about his background is not mitigating. It's sad but it's 
not mitigating. And there's nothing about that that somehow indicates that 
he couldn't choose to kill. 
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(Tr., p. 5504, L. 16 - p. 5505, L. 2.) 
The State's argument impeded the jury's ability to consider valid mitigation by 
informing them that mitigation is limited to that evidence which has a causal relation to 
the defendant's criminal conduct. The State did not argue that the jury should afford little 
weight to the mitigation evidence presented. Instead, the State argued that there was 
absolutely no mitigating evidence presented based on the improper standard that they 
promulgated for the jury. The State's argument was flagrant intentional misconduct and 
prejudiced Petitioner. Because of the State's misrepresentation of the law governing the 
consideration of, and the definition of, mitigating circumstances, the jury failed to 
consider relevant mitigating evidence and Petitioner's death sentence must be vacated. 
2. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Improper 
Closing Argument Regarding The Manner In Which Mitigation Is 
Weighed Against The Aggravation. 
While arguing their view of mitigation, the State presented a slide that depicted 
the weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances. The 
illustration was that of a scale, likened to the scales of justice, with the term "mitigation" 
on one side weighed against all four aggravating circumstances the State sought to prove 
to the jury: "HAC," "Propensity," "Utter disregard," and "In perpetration." The 
illustration resembled the following: 
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As shown above, the prosecution drew a scale leaning heavily in favor of the four 
aggravating circumstances weighed aggregately against the mitigation. Drawing upon the 
scale in its argument, the prosecution asserted that Petitioner deserved the death penalty. 
The State's argument and illustration is a grossly simplified and misleading 
characterization of the weighing process required under I.e. § 19-2515(8)(a)(ii). The 
statute requires that all of the mitigation presented by the defense be weighed against 
each ofthe statutory aggravators it has found as proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State 
v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989). The scale depicted by the 
prosecution misstates the requirements under the law and constitutes gross misconduct. 
This misconduct requires this Court to vacate Petitioner's death sentence. 
3. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing That The Defense 
Experts Were Hired Guns. 
During their closing argument, the prosecution encouraged the jury to view 
Petitioner's experts as hired gunS.23 
23 The prosecution also dropped the occasional remark suggesting that the jury should not 
listen to "big city" (Dallas and San Francisco) "Harvard" educated, (Tr., p. 5496, L. 23 -
p. 5497, L. 2), boys like Petitioner's experts. This is part of the "don't trust these 
strangers" appeal to regional bias taken by the State that trial counsel had seen in other 
cases, yet did nothing to preclude such improper attacks on their experts. 
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These men you heard from San Francisco and Dallas yesterday, experts. 
You heard a full day of it. Couple of things you don't want to forget. 
They're in the business of supplying criminal defendants with excuses. 
You heard hours about poor Erick. And yet the first time you heard that 
he can decide what he did, that he was accountable, that he wasn't 
schizophrenic, that he wasn't psychotic was when Mr. Bourne raised his 
hand and in the three or four questions he asked got that out of him and 
forgot that part. Most of what they told you doesn't have anything to do 
with this case. It just doesn't. The show you saw cost $100,000. 
$100,000. And did it tell you anything that you didn't already know about 
human nature? I don't think it did. And ask yourself a couple of things, 
are they neutral observers of the evidence or are they hired to try to 
convince you to spare the defendant? Was that testimony you heard from 
the witness stand and from the podium or was it a performance? I suggest 
to you that that's what it was. It was a performance and it is done 
frequently enough by Dr. Cunningham that he is good at it. He could be 
preaching on Sunday. He has done -- does this 15 times a year and he's 
got it down. Coat yourself with the skepticism that protects you from that 
sort of thing. 
(Tr., p. 5460, L. 25 - p. 5462, L. 2.) This argument is a constitutionally improper 
personal attack on the credibility of Petitioner's witnesses and seeks to penalize Petitioner 
for exercising his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, 
to present a defense, to counsel, and to fairness and reliability in death penalty cases. 
A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense that includes the right 
to expert assistance. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that "the Constitution requires that an indigent defendant have access to the 
psychiatric examination and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on 
his mental condition." Id. at 70. The prosecution cannot attack a defendant for exercising 
his constitutional rights. 
A defendant's right to counsel can be violated by a prosecutor's improper 
examination of a witness or argument that seeks to penalize the defendant for exercising 
his constitutional right. State v. Masters, No. M2003-00305-CCA-R3-CD, 2004WL 
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1208872, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jun. 2, 2004). In Masters, the court held that the 
defendant's rights were not violated during cross-examination of his experts when the 
prosecutor sought to attack "the reliability and impartiality of the witnesses in part 
because of their attitudes toward capital punishment. Id. However, when the prosecution 
goes beyond attacking the reliability and impartiality of a witness, the risk of depriving 
the defendant of a fair trial increases significantly. One such instance is where the state 
suggests that because the defense experts were paid hefty fees, their testimony would 
weigh heavily in favor of the defense. State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 185,770 A.2d 255, 
272 (N.J. 2001); see also State v. Schneider, 402 N.W.2d 779, 788 (Minn.1987) 
("Experts are not the paid harlots of either side in a criminal case and should not be 
portrayed in such a light."). 
Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor's argument in his case went beyond attacking 
the reliability and impartiality of his experts, and thus deprived him of his right to a fair 
trial and his right to present a defense in mitigation of punishment. This misconduct 
requires this Court to vacate Petitioner's death sentence. 
4. The Prosecution Committed Doyle Error By Eliciting Through Dr. Mark 
Cunningham Testimony That Petitioner Did Not Speak To Him About 
The Crimes For Which He Had Been Charged. 
A Doyle violation only occurs when the State attempts to elicit evidence at trial of 
an accused's post-Miranda silence as evidence against him. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 
(1976). "Doyle rests on the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that 
his silence will not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an 
explanation subsequently offered at trial." Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756,763 (1987) 
(citations and internal quotes omitted). 
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Q. Okay. I believe that you didn't ask the defendant anything about 
the murder ofLynn Henneman when you spoke to him. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So you didn't hear any of the details about the murder from his 
lips. 
A. That's correct. 
(Tr., p. 5387, Ls. 1-17.) Here, it appears the State elicited Petitioner's post-arrest silence 
in an attempt to insinuate a lack of remorse and to undermine his experts' opinions based 
on his childhood. This violated Doyle and requires, alone, and in conjunction with all 
other claims of error listed herein, a new sentencing. 
5. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Misrepresenting The 
Testimony Of Michelle Deen And Evelyn Dunaway. 
The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument III 
mischaracterizing Michelle Deen's and Evelyn Dunaway's testimony to establish that 
Petitioner choked them during sex: 
So, as we talk, as you look at this record and we think and talk about 
propensity, let's talk for a moment about the defendant's prior conduct and 
his appetite. 
So has he exhibited by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the 
murder at hand a propensity to commit murder which will probably 
constitute a continuing threat to society? I think you know the answer to 
this. Let's talk for a moment about the women you met, I guess it was last 
Saturday. Evelyn Dunaway, choked, beaten. Do you remember when she 
told you about how the defendant pulled her out through a window of the 
car and bit her in the fact? She left that night. It became clear to her what 
- where this was leading. She left that night. Michelle Deen. Michelle 
Deen told you after she had been choked, beaten, sexually abused, that 
she snuck out at two o'clock in the morning with the clothes on her back 
to get away from the defendant. And you remember we didn't pick these 
people. The defendant picked them. 
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(Tr., p. 5456, L. 16 - p. 5458, L. 4) (emphasis added). In the State's rebuttal 
closing argument, the prosecutor argued: 
And the last one propensity. Has he shown a propensity to commit murder 
and probably constitute a continuing threat? Well, you've looked at the 
evidence. You know, do we start to see a pattern going on here? Well, 
what - you know what he did to Norma Jean. You know what he did to 
Lynn. You know what he did to Michelle. You know what he did to 
Evelyn. It's all pretty much the same, except he only killed once so far 
in that group. 
(Tr., p. 5507, Ls. 9 - 17)(emphasis added). 
Ms. Deen did not testify that Petitioner choked her while having sex. Nor did Ms. 
Dunaway. Yet the State mischaracterized their testimony to draw a prejudicial parallel 
between Petitioner's prior behavior with women and the facts alleged in the Henneman 
homicide for the purpose of establishing the propensity aggravator. 
6. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Encouraging The Jury To 
Speculate In The Course Of Determining Whether The Propensity 
Aggravator Existed Beyond A Reasonable Doubt. 
In closing argument, the prosecution impermissibly characterized as fact matters 
based on pure speculation. 
Well, let me ask you this one other question that will maybe kind of state 
the obvious. Did he have to kill her? Did he have to kill Lynn or did he do 
it for fun? Say that he grabs Lynn at the ambush point at the edge of the 
bridge like he told you about and drags her down there and he's got her 
under the bridge, he's got a knife. You know, he's got a knife if not that 
one some knife because he has to cut through the hem of her parents too 
thick to rip. He has to cut that and tear the rest. You know he's got a knife 
you think he could have put the knife to Lynn's throat and said "give me 
your purse, lady. Give me your wedding ring." Now, Lynn's a smart 
woman. What do you think she would have said, "cut my throat, I'm not 
going to give you my purse." Of course not. She would have given him 
the purse. She would have given him the ring. She's a smart woman. 
She's experienced, she's been around people. 
What happens if he said "Now give me sex or I'm going to cut your 
throat." Do you think she'd have given him sex to save her life? I think 
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she would have. Not going to die over that. So why does he kill her? 
Doesn't have to kill her. He kills her because he wants to, because he's 
sadistic and brutal towards women. He doesn't have to kill her. 
What does the instruction tell you that it's a person who likes to kill, who 
kills without the normal amount of provocation who kills because they 
have an affinity. What's their affinity? They like it. That's what it is. 
That's what we're talking about here. He doesn't have to do that to her. 
He does it because he likes it. 
Does he kill Lynn with the normal amount of provocation? Man, there 
was no provocation. He doesn't have to do anything to her. She's walking 
down -- she's walking horne thinking of the kids that are going to like stuff 
she's bought that she's carrying in her purse. There's no provocation for 
that. She tries to get away from him and he chases her down. That's the 
only logical conclusion you can draw from the way that crime scene looks. 
She apparently dropped her purse as she was running. He catches her 
down there and that's where she was found 250 feet away. 
(Tr., p. 5507, L. 21 - 5509, L. 16.) 
7. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Argument 
Inconsistent with Evidence Outside The Record. 
The prosecution had the opportunity to rebut the testimony of the defense experts 
during the penalty phase of the trial, yet they called no expert witness. Indeed, the 
prosecution had their own professional witnesses, Dr. Michael Estess and Dr. Robert 
Engle, who they no doubt had to compensate to review Petitioner's experts' opinions as 
well as their testimony. Dr. Estess was even present in the courtroom to view the defense 
expert testimony at the sentencing. Nevertheless, the prosecution, after consultation 
during a recess, chose not to call either doctor as a witness, presumably because they 
could not rebut the defense experts' opinions. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as Dr. Estess has refused to discuss his 
findings or opinions of the defense testimony with Petitioner. Further, Petitioner is still 
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awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006, in 
which he made several requests relevant to this claim. 
8. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct In Arguing For Imposition Of 
The Death Penalty To Deter Future Crimes By Other Would-Be 
Criminals And As Retribution For The Victim's Family. 
While the potential for mistakes in the determination of punishment may be 
tolerable in other areas of the criminal law, "in capital cases the fundamental respect for 
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character 
and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as 
a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)(emphasis added). The Supreme 
Court elaborated on the principle of individualized sentencing in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), wherein the Court held that, to be fair, a capital 
sentencing scheme must treat each person convicted of a capital offense with that "degree 
of respect due the uniqueness ofthe individual." Id., at 605. The plurality concluded: 
Id. 
Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly 
different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an 
individualized decision is essential in capital cases. The need for treating 
each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the 
uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital 
cases .... The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with 
respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for 
individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing 
the death sentence. 
It follows that consideration of general deterrence, as a factor supporting the 
imposition of the death penalty, is fundamentally inconsistent with individualized 
sentencing. Chief Justice Burger contrasted noncapital cases, stating, "in [such] cases, 
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the established practice of individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, 
but on public policy enacted into statutes." Id., at 604-05. Accordingly, where 
noncapital defendants later claimed that their rights were violated by consideration of 
general deterrence at sentencing, courts rejected their claims. See e.g., United States v. 
Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1009-10 (3rd Cir.l988); United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 
1368-1369 (9th Cir.1985) (same); us. v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1989) (same). 
From an oft-quoted passage from the Third Circuit opinion in Frank, 
the recognition of a substantive liberty interest in individualized treatment 
in sentencing would be inconsistent with the generally accepted notion 
that both retribution, which focuses on the interests of the victim rather 
than the status of the defendant, and general deterrence, which focuses on 
the interests of society at large rather than the status of the defendant, are 
appropriate societal versions for imposing sanctions. 
United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d at 1009-10. Accordingly, because a capital defendant 
does have constitutional right to individualized sentencing treatment, consideration of 
general deterrence in determination of punishment is impermissible. See e.g., People v. 
Love, 366 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1961) (holding that it was improper for the prosecution during 
closing argument to argue that the death penalty was a more effective deterrent than life 
imprisonment), overruled on other grounds by People v. Morse, 388 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1964). 
An argument made, or evidence presented, of general deterrence is a constitutional 
violation no matter how clothed. Accordingly, inviting the jury to "send a message" to 
other would-be criminals is equally improper because it may tip the scales in favor of a 
death sentence. See Com. v. Baker, 511 A.2d 777 (Pa. 1986). In Baker, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court noted, 
Even when a sentencing jury is unconvinced that death is the appropriate 
punishment, it might nevertheless wish to "send a message" of extreme 
disapproval for the defendant's acts. '" A defendant might thus be 
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executed, although no sentencer had ever made a determination that death 
was the appropriate sentence. 
Id., at 788. 
General deterrence arguments are intended to dissuade the jury from granting 
mercy by"distracting them from the individual defendant by encouraging them to consider 
a legitimate, but irrelevant, societal interest in preventing others from commiting crime. 
See Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621 (11th Cir. 1985). In Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed the defendant's death sentence, holding that the prosecutor's argument regarding 
deterrent effects and society's greater good swayed the focus of the jury away from the 
consideration of mitigating evidence in favor of evidence irrelevant to its consideration. 
Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d at 624. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized that general deterrence is not a 
legitimate consideration in death penalty sentencing. See State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 
873 P.2d 800 (1993). In Pratt, the district court had referenced deterrence in its findings 
when imposing the death penalty. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the district 
court's comments about deterrence were made after it had already properly made all the 
required findings for imposition of the death penalty. Therefore, the Court was able to 
determine with certainty, and as a matter of law, that any consideration of deterrence did 
not affect the district court's findings and constituted mere surplusage, which, by itself, 
would not invalidate the death sentence. No such assurances exist in Petitioner's case. 
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the jury considered general deterrence when 
making its findings.24 
24 Petitioner does not assert that the societal goal of deterring crime is not a valid 
consideration in determining whether a state should adopt the death penalty -- that is a 
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During closing arguments, the Ada County Prosecutor, Greg Bower, argued that 
the jury should consider the community's interest in deterring future cnmes as 
justification for imposing the death penalty. Specifically, Mr. Bower argued, 
A few last thoughts: If your verdict for death, saves just one person in the 
future, saves just one person in the future your sacrifice and your time will 
not have been in vain. 
(Tr., p. 5462, Ls. 3-6.) Mr. Bower further argued, 
For the last year and a halfMr. Bourne and I have done our job. And now 
it's time to end this and hand the baton to you. How many times have you 
sat? How many times have you sat at the breakfast table reading the 
newspaper and read about a horrible crime and said to your suppose [sic], 
"Why don't they do something about this? This is our town. Why don't 
they do something about this?" Well the reversal of that is, now you are 
they. You are they. There is in your hands. Trust each other. You've run a 
long path together. Trust each other. Remember last week to. Take your 
common sense and your skepticism back into the jury room with you. 
Don't forget it. And finally the law is only as strong -- the law is only as 
strong as the weakest part on this jury which is heart. 
(Tr., p. 5462, L. 24 - p. 5463, L. 15.)(sic added). Here, Mr. Bower is telling the jury that 
the societal function of the jury is law enforcement. Specifically, by imposing the death 
penalty, the jury ("they"), will reduce instances of "horrible crime[ s]" in the future that 
they have all read about in the past. Mr. Bower is also stating that a jury, by listening to 
their heart and granting mercy, is weakening the law. See also Tr., p.5512, L.24 -
p.5513, L.14 (suggesting to jurors that they have civic and patriotic duty to impose death 
penalty in this case). 
The State continued this line of argument in its rebuttal. Specifically, Deputy Ada 
County Prosecutor, Roger Bourne argued, 
matter solely for legislative consideration. It nevertheless remains improper for a jury to 
consider alleged deterrent effects of the death penalty in deciding whether it should be 
imposed. See People v. Love, supra. 
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Is Lynn's life worth nothing? Is a loss (sic) worth nothing? Did we go 
through all this for nothing? What about retribution to her family? 
What about the protection of society? What about deterrence of 
others? 
(Tr., p. 5510, L. 22 -po 551, L. 2) (sic added) 
The State's argument drew persuasive support, not from evidence presented, i.e., 
evidence that the death penalty actually deters future crime, but from the beliefs and 
opinions expressed by various members of the jury in their written questionnaires and 
their oral testimony during voir dire. Indeed, in stark contrast to trial counsel who did not 
weave its overall theory of defense into voir dire, the State began prepping the jury for a 
death sentence during voir dire. The following jurors testified that they believed the death 
penalty generally deters crime: Elizabeth Ann Keeney, John Basil Jasper, Ann McNeese, 
and James David Kennedy. The State's questioning of Juror James David Kennedy 
included the following colloquy. 
Q. [Mr. Bourne] Well, let's talk about the death penalty just for a minute. 
You've told us that you are ofthe view that the death penalty is a deterrent 
and that it is appropriate in some murder cases and that you could assess it 
under the proper circumstances. Is that still your view today? 
A. Yeah, a little bit of qualification there I guess. It is -- any form of 
punishment is more deterrent, that's kind of legal for speeding and 
whatever. Death penalty with carrying it out 30 years later may not be as 
much deterrent as one sooner. It can be a deterrent in some cases and 
whether people get it or not depends on all kinds of situations, so. 
Q. Do you think society sends a message by assessing the death penalty --
I mean you think that a jury sends a message to the community and to 
the defendant and others by assessing the death penalty even if it takes 
several years before it's carried out? 
A. If that's a possibility, it's -- if there's a possibility of a death penalty I 
think that should be a consideration of somebody making a choice or 
decision, yeah, I think it would still work. 
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(Tr., p. 3029, L. 15 - p. 3030, L. 14)(emphasis added). Here the State deftly primed Mr. 
Kennedy for their closing argument. Trial counsel, with no experience in capital jury 
sentencing, apparently ignorant of State's slight of hand and the constitutional grounds 
for precluding this tactic, did not even notice they were already losing their case. The 
difference between life and death should not come down to a prosecutor out lawyering 
trial counsel. Through trial counsel's questioning, it became apparent that the juror's 
beliefs about the death penalty deterring crime was not a passing belief but one forged 
through experience with working with inmates at a correctional institution. (Tr., p. 3045, 
L. 24 p. 3047, L. 21.) 
Another juror, Ann McNeese, responded to questioning by the State as follows: 
Q. [Roger Bourne] Yeah. Looks like you've got some pretty strong 
opinions about why crime rates are up, whether the system is harsh 
enough or too harsh. My view is that -- or as I read your views I should 
say, I'm of the impression that you think there should be more deterrent 
effect to the criminal justice system to keep the crime rates down. Do I 
read that correctly? 
A. Yes. 
*** 
A. [Ms. McNeese] ... I mean it's -- I really don't know what makes a 
person a murderer. I can't relate to that at all. But I would say a lot of that 
does have to do with society. 
Q. It can--
A. It's too liberal a society. 
* * * 
Q. Okay. All right. You think that some kinds of conduct are so bad by 
themselves that -- that is that the crime is so heinous that the death penalty 
is society's way of expressing itself about the death penalty -- or about the 
crime I mean to say? 
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A. They probably use it as a deterrent, yes. 
Q. All right. Okay. Now, do you think that the death penalty holds the 
defendant -- well, let me ask it a different way. Do you think that life 
without parole holds a defendant as responsible for his choices as the 
death penalty holds them responsible for his choices? Or do you think one 
or the other one is more a serious message? 
A. They would be the same. 
Q. Okay. Do you think that society's telling a person that they've crossed 
the threshold and are deserving of the death penalty is a stronger statement 
about responsibility than life without parole is? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p. 2498, Ls. 7-15; p. 2501, Ls. 13-21; p. 2503, L. 16 - p. 2504, L. 11.) 
Another juror, Elizabeth Keeney, responded to questioning by trial counsel as 
follows: 
Q. Have you always been in favor ofthe death penalty? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. 
A. No. I think -- I feel like the death penalty is a deterrent to crime. It 
seems like the prison system is not a deterrent to crime, it seems to me in 
all cases. But I think that if we use the death penalty -- I mean when 
someone is convicted of -- and sentenced to death, if the evidence is clear 
and convincing --
Q. Urn-hum. 
A. -- beyond a shadow of a doubt, then do it. 
Q. Urn-hum. 
A. Because I think it's pretty well known that an person can sit on death 
row for many, many, many years. And so what's that say? You know. 
Q. And I take it that your view of it changed at some point? You didn't 
believe that in the beginning or some other time, some earlier time? 
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A. Has it changed? No, I think this opinion has solidified. I don't know 
that I'd say it's changed. I think I was probably more without opinion on 
it. 
Q. Okay. Can you pinpoint in time when you changed? 
A. Nope -- or something. 
Q. Something happen? 
A. No, I don't know. Maybe it's just get older. I don't know. 
Q. Why do you think it's a deterrent? 
A. The death penalty? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Oh, because I think if somebody that was considering committing a 
crime knew that they were going to give their life I think would be a 
deterrent. 
Q. Okay. 
A. If they knew that, that our justice system was imposing that and 
sticking with it. I think that would be a deterrent. It's just like in other 
countries where they -- you steal something they chop off your arm. 
Q. Urn-hum. 
A. I think that crime rate is much lower because people like to keep their 
. limbs. Just a personal opinion. 
Q. Okay. It's an eye for an eye kind ofthing? 
A. Yeah. 
(Tr., p. 2093, L. 14 p. 2095, L. 14.) As discussed elsewhere, Ms. Keeney attended the 
same church with, and knew a lot of information about, Angie Abdullah, the victim of 
murder in a capital case that was proceeding to trial on the same courtroom floor and at 
the same time as Ms. Keeney was giving her voir dire testimony. (Tr., 2074, Ls. 12-19.) 
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Another juror, John Jasper, responded to questioning by trial counsel as follows: 
Q. How long have you felt in support of the death penalty? 
A. As far as I can remember. I've never thOUght about it. 
Q. Okay. Has your view ever changed? 
A. No. 
Q. Been pretty consistently in support of it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. How strong are your views? 
A. Well, I tend to think they're pretty strong. It's not that they could never 
be changed if the right argument came upon it. I mean everything is 
always subject to change. But at this point that's the way I feel about it. 
That's the way it should be. 
Q. Okay. I guess I want to ask you two questions. One is, why do you 
feel the way you feel and why do you feel so strongly about it? 
A. Well, society as a whole -- I think the most deterrent -- the biggest 
deterrent we can have to keep people on the straight and narrow is a 
deterrent -- in the case of a child, to keep a child from doing things wrong 
they know that there's punishment. The punishment is not great then it's 
not going to be a big deal to them. If the punishment is severe -- I know 
as I was growing up that I would rather do the right thing so I wouldn't 
get a spanking growing up as a child because the deterrent was great 
enough. You know, it hurts I don't want that so I did the right thing. So if 
the deterrent is grate enough then it would sway more people to stay 
within the laws and the bounds of laws. 
Q. Do you mean a deterrent to crime in general or just to murder? 
A. Well, to murder. To any crime. I mean if the punishment is severe 
enough it would deter people from doing the crime. 
Q. Urn-hum. Do you think that a life sentence is a powerful punishment? 
A. It is. 
Q. Do you think it acts as a deterrent? 
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A. Somewhat. 
Q. Okay. Can you explain that for me? 
A. Well, I guess it would depend upon the person. If they were not able 
to function within society, to them serving time in jail for life they've got a 
roof over their heads, you know, they're going to have their meals, they 
can go out and exercise. And it is a deterrent in a way, but it could be 
more of a deterrent if there was more restrictions. Kind of hard to explain. 
Q. Yeah. I think I understand what you're saying. Well, if a crime is 
called life without possibility of parole, would you believe that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And if there's no hope of ever getting out of prison, do you 
think that makes it worse than the possibility of parole? 
A. Yes. Yes, that would definitely make it worse. 
(Tr., p. 2151, L. 9 p. 2153, L. 20.)25 
Despite the exercise of due diligence, it is impossible for Petitioner to fully state 
this claim as Petitioner has not yet received the juror questionnaires. These 
questionnaires likely include more information on the juror's views of the death penalty 
as a deterrent to future crime. Further, these questionnaires were critical; as the State 
noted, they were the parties' "bible" during voir dire. (Tr., p. 5445, Ls. 1-3.) Further, the 
Court has improperly precluded Petitioner from unrestricted access to jurors that would 
provide additional support for this claim. Finally, Petitioner needs additional time to 
consult with an expert in criminal justice for the purpose of showing trial counsel could 
have precluded this argument as inconsistent with evidence, or sought to rebut the 
25 Testimony regarding deterrence from jurors John Jasper and Elizabeth Keeney was 
actually elicited by trial counsel. This fact does not change the claim but only shows that 
the State cannot show that the prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
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argument with the presentation of evidence. As Justice Breyer noted in his concurring 
opinion in Ring: 
Studies of deterrence are, at most, inconclusive. See, e.g., Sorensen, 
Wrinkle, Brewer, & Marquart, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: 
Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder in Texas, 45 Crime & 
Delinquency 481 (1999) (no evidence of a deterrent effect); Bonner & 
Fessenden, Absence of Executions: A special report, States With No 
Death Penalty Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2000, 
p. Al (during last 20 years, homicide rate in death penalty States has been 
48% to 101 % higher than in non-death-penalty States); see also Radelet & 
Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 
J.Crim. L. & C. 1, 8 (1996) (over 80% of criminologists believe existing 
research fails to support deterrence justification). 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at 615. Despite the need for further investigation to fully state 
this claim, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief as stated. 
9. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Expressing Their Personal 
Opinion That The Death Penalty Was The Appropriate Punishment. 
Prosecutors are given leeway in making closing arguments. Prosecutors can 
appropriately argue the record, highlight the inconsistencies or inadequacies of the 
defense, and forcefully assert reasonable inferences from the evidence. Bates v. Bell, 402 
F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing death sentence for prosecutorial misconduct in 
making improper arguments). However, prosecutors cannot put forth their opinions as to 
credibility of a witness, guilt of a defendant, or appropriateness of capital punishment. 
Id. (emphasis added). This is because "the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the 
imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's 
judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 
470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)). 
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During closing arguments, the Ada County Prosecutor stated his opinion that the 
death penalty was the appropriate punishment for Petitioner's crimes. Specifically, Greg 
Bower argued, 
You said you could impose the death penalty in the right case, but what you 
wanted was overwhelming proof. And I think that this is the right case. And I 
think that you know this is the right case. 
(Tr., p. 5445, Ls. 14-18.) This represents an improper personal opinion of the appropriate 
punishment for this case, was improper, and warrants reversal on its own, and in 
conjunction with all other claims raised by Petitioner. 
10. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making Extra-Record 
Argument That Lethal Injections Are Painless and Humane. 
The State argued that executing Petitioner would be a humane forn1 of death, 
especially when compared to the asserted suffering of the victim. This argument had no 
support in the record, began in voir dire, and continued into closing argument where the 
State argued, 
Are those things the same? Is execution the same as what he did to Lynn 
Henneman? It's not. It's not anything like it. It's nothing like it. Being 
executed is like going into a surgery and getting put to sleep and not 
waking up. Is that what happened the Lynn? 
(Tr., p. 5511, L. 24 - p. 5512, L. 4.) 
Not only is this argument improper because based on information not III the 
record, Petitioner asserts that rather than being a humane form of execution; the drugs 
used to kill death row inmates can actually cause an excruciatingly painful and protracted 
death. According to an April 2005 report by the British journal, "The Lancet," as many as 
four often prisoners put to death by injection in the United States may receive inadequate 
anesthesia, causing them to remain conscious in tremendous pain. Therefore, Petitioner 
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claims that the State's argument was improper in two ways: (1) it was based upon an 
assertion of fact not supported by evidence in the record, and (2) it was based on the false 
assertion that Petitioner's execution will necessarily be painless. This argument violated 
Petitioner's rights to a due process, his right to a fair trial and his right to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishments as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Petitioner IS still investigating and researching for case law developments; 
information on botched, problematic, or otherwise suspicious/unusual lethal injection 
execution situations; documented cases where more than one dose of a chemical was 
administered; toxicology data available at the time of Petitioner's sentencing; and any 
other relevant data and information. Petitioner is in the process of identifying a competent 
and independent medical expert to provide an affidavit in support of this claim. Petitioner 
cannot attach such an affidavit at this time due to time constraints. 
11. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing That A Life 
Sentence Would Be Too Lenient And Otherwise Speculating As To What 
Might Happen To Petitioner If A Death Sentence Were Withheld. 
The State argued that a life sentence would be too lenient, in part by, speCUlating 
as to what might happen to petitioner if a death sentence were withheld, and by 
speculating as to what the Court might impose for Petitioner's other crimes. The 
prosecution argued: 
You heard the instructions and you know what the potential sentences are 
for these cases. You know that the defendant's given life without parole 
that he can be in general popUlation in five years. You know that in 
general population he'll have access to a number of things television, gym, 
contact visits, he'll have access to sunshine. Remember the last picture 
that -- go down. But the last picture that Mickey showed you of Lynn 
sitting in the sunshine? She won't sit in the sunshine again. You give the 
defendant life without parole, he will. 
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(Tr., p. 5460, Ls. 9-20.) This statement encourages the jury to discount a life sentence as 
easy living and violates the principle in capital cases that jurors must be able to give 
legitimate consideration to life sentences. See California v. Brown, 479 US. 538 (1987); 
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302 (1989), Mills 
v. Maryland, 486 US. 367 (1988); Simmons v. South Carolina, 111 S.Ct. 2187 (1994); 
see also Claim E.l, supra (discussing materially false and misleading testimony of 
Dennis Dean regarding conditions of confinement). 
The prosecutor then told the jury that imposing a life sentence was the equivalent 
of imposing no punishment at all: 
Counsel says give life. Here's the deal. You know that Judge Neville can 
give the defendant life on the rape, a life on the kidnapping. You know 
he's got one and so he's going to go to prison for life. He's got two rapes 
now that one prior conviction, he's going to go to prison for life. 
And so when Counsel says give him life, what he's really saying is give 
him nothing. Because the Ada County Prosecutor could stand up right 
now and say to Judge Neville, "We move to dismiss the murder charge. 
Dismiss it, we're done." And Judge Neville could give the defendant a life 
sentence for rape and a life sentence for kidnapping and the dismissal of 
the murder charge would not add a minute's time because he only has one 
life. And so when Counsel says "give the defendant life." And what he's 
really saying is give him nothing because he's already been -- going to get 
life so don't do anything else to him. Let's just let that go. Give him 
nothing. I think you ought to know that because that's the point of this. Is 
Lynn's life worth nothing? Is a loss worth nothing? Did we go through all 
this for nothing? What about retribution to her family? What about the 
protection of society? What about deterrence of others? What about the 
punishment for the defendant that he knows he deserves, that he earned, 
that he worked on, that he knew he had coming when he talked to the 
detectives back in March of 2003. What about those goals of society? 
Are we just going to give him nothing? We have talked about the 
minimum sentence and maximum sentence, but it isn't life. Giving him 
life is nothing. It's Brere Rabbit don't throw me in the brier patch because 
I'm already there. That's the deal. 
(Tr., p. 5510, L. 1 - p. 5511, L. 12.) 
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This was again, pure speculation. While the sentences for rape and kidnapping 
have a maximum of life imprisonment, they do not carry mandatory minimums. For the 
prosecutor to tell the jurors that the Court would impose life sentences for the rape and 
kidnapping was not only outrageous, it fundamentally altered the only decision properly 
before the jury-the proper sentence for murder, and only after finding at least one 
statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. It focused the jury's attention on matters 
not within their concern. The prosecutor in effect told each juror that his or her only 
moral choice was death, when the law requires each juror to make a "reasoned moral 
response." See Penry, supra; Mills, supra; Simmons, supra. Petitioner asserts that the 
prosecutor's misconduct warrants reversal of his death sentence. 
12. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing That Petitioner 
Showed A Lack Of Remorse. 
The prosecutor impermissibly argued during closing argument that Petitioner's 
silence demonstrated an apparent lack of remorse that should be considered as a factor 
weighing in favor of the death penalty: 
The family coming up here to give impact statements is enough to put a 
bronze statue on its knees for sorrow. None of us even know Lynn and I 
know the effect it had on me and what I could see from you. What effect 
did it have on the defendant? Did he weep? Did he bury his face in his 
hands and agonize over the things that he had done? Does he show you 
remorse? Did he give you confidence to think that he won't do this again, 
that he's learned his lesson, that he's repentant, that he's sorry, that he's 
willing to change his life, that he wants to make amends to Lynn's family? 
Does he do that? Is this letter that says "I'm going to offer myself as a 
sacrifice for your loss". Is that a way of showing that he's repentant? 
(Tr., p. 5506, Ls. 7 - 22)( emphasis added). 
Petitioner had the right to remain silent under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. No negative inference from Petitioner's failure to testify is permitted. 
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Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329 (1999). This rule applies at sentencing as 
well as the guilt phase. Id. Thus, just as a jury cannot infer guilt from a failure to testify, 
it cannot infer lack of remorse from a failure to testify at sentencing. allow him to do 
without adverse consequences, and his silence may not be converted by a prosecutor into 
an expression of lack of remorse. The prosecutor invited the jury to do and thereby 
violated Petitioner's right to remain silent. 
In conclusion, when ruling on all the forgoing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
III closing argument, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to review Justice 
Blackmun's dissent in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), where he, joined by 
Justices Brennan, Marshal, and Stevens, quoting in part a Second Circuit dissent, stated: 
This court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing 
government counsel for such conduct as that of the [prosecutor] here. But, 
each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an 
attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means actual 
condonation of counsel's alleged offense, coupled with verbal 
disapprobation. If we continue to do nothing practical to prevent such 
conduct, we should cease to disapprove it. For otherwise it will be as if we 
declared in effect, 'Government attorneys, without fear of reversal, may 
say just about what they please in addressing juries, for our rules on the 
subject are pretend-rules. If prosecutors win verdicts as a result of 
"disapproved" remarks, we will not deprive them of their victories; we 
will merely go through the form of expressing displeasure. The 
deprecatory words we use in our opinions on such occasions are purely 
ceremonial.' Government counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind 
who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic 
verbal spanking. The practice of this court--recalling the bitter tear shed by 
the Walrus as he ate the oysters--breeds a deplorably cynical attitude 
towards the jUdiciary (footnote omitted). 
Id., 477 U.S. at 205-206 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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J. TRIAL COUNSEL LABORED UNDER MULTIPLE AND VARIED 
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTED THEIR' 
PERFORMANCE. 
1. Trial Counsels' Competing Obligations To Attend To Other Cases 
Created A Conflict Of Interest Adversely Affecting Counsels' 
Performance. 
Petitioner's conflict claim summarized as follows: trial counsel had a duty not to 
zealously represent all clients. That duty creates an inherent conflict for counsel if their 
caseload does not permit enough time for adequate preparation. Something has got to 
give, and that, in Petitioner's case, was effective representation. 
It is common knowledge that public defenders carry heavy caseloads. See Bell v. 
Quintero, 125 S.Ct. 2240 (2005) (noting the "shuffle of a heavy caseload" carried by 
public defenders). The American Bar Association has described the problems associated 
with excessive caseloads. 
One of the most significant impediments to the furnishing of quality 
defense services for the poor is the presence of excessive workloads .... 
All too often in defender organizations[,]... attorneys are asked to 
provide representation in too many cases .... Unfortunately, not even the 
most able and industrious lawyers can provide quality representation when 
their workloads are unmanageable. Excessive workloads, moreover, lead 
to attorney frustration, disillusionment by clients, and weakening of the 
adversary system. 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 6.1 (citations, footnotes, and quotations 
omitted). 
While Petitioner is still investigating this claim, he is aware that one of his trial 
lawyers, D.C. Carr, has recently left the Ada County Public Defender's Office. Petitioner 
has reason to believe that heavy caseloads influenced Mr. Carr's decision to leave the 
office and enter private practice. Along these lines, Petitioner notes that there were times 
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during the underlying criminal proceedings that Mr. Carr was not present, presumably 
attending to his other cases.26 Further, one ofthe lead attorneys at the Ada County Public 
Defender's Office, August Cahill, has previously testified that an attorney's caseload in 
that office is not decreased if the attorney is assigned a capital case. Mr. Cahill also 
conceded that he was not familiar with the ABA Guidelines governing workload. State v. 
Michael Jauhola, Ada County case no. SPOT0100492D, (Tr., p. 4083, L. 22 - p. 4085, L. 
14); see also ABA Guidelines, Guidelines 6.1, 10.3, and accompanying Commentary. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately 
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing 
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, Petitioner 
asserts that trial counsels' duty to attend their other cases adversely affected their 
perfonnance in his case. 
2. Norma Jean Oliver 
Trial counsel had the duty to investigate or reinvestigate the Nonna Jean Oliver 
rape charges, in order to rebut the State's evidence purporting to show propensity. 
However, Amil Myshin represented Petitioner on the charges initiated by Ms. Oliver, and 
thus worked under a conflict of interest in reinvestigating that case because an adequate 
reinvestigation would have shown ineffective assistance in the previous case. 
Petitioner has reasonable grounds to believe that counsel's investigation on the 
original 1991 rape case was severely deficient. The extent to which Mr. Myshin's 
conflict of interest adversely affected his perfonnance is also being investigated. Review 
26 (y vee e.g., (Tr., p. 3682, L. 24 - p. 3683, L. 2.) 
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of the requested records is a necessary part of current counsels' investigation. Further, 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting a hearing and ruling on his 
Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006. 
3. April Sebastian 
April Sebastian testified against Petitioner at his sentencing. At the time of her 
testimony, she was actively represented by Petitioner's trial counsel, Amil Myshin, in her 
upcoming "rider" hearing in the case of State of Idaho v. April Sebastian, Ada County 
case no. H0400228. (Tr., pp. 4868-70; pp. 4875-96.) At the time of her testimony, Ms. 
Sebastian also had another active case, State of Idaho v. April Sebastian, Ada County 
case no. H0400335//M0401584. Mr. Myshin cross-examined Ms. Sebastian without ever 
receiving a waiver from her of confidential matters, including information learned 
through the attorney/client relationship or through Mr. Myshin's investigation and 
research on her behalf. 
Following her testimony, Ms. Sebastian appeared for her "rider" hearing with her 
counsel, Amil Myshin (Exhibit 18.). The district court presiding over the case granted 
her probation with recommendation from the State. The extent to which Ms. Sebastian's 
cooperation with the State assisted her in getting probation is being investigated. 
Petitioner has reasonable grounds to believe that the State offered Ms. Sebastian 
benefits in her other cases in exchange for her testimony against Petitioner. For instance, 
based on a review of court documents, Ms. Sebastian was not a good candidate for 
probation, appearing to have failed on probation twice previously (Exhibit 19, Exhibit 
20.) The extent to which Mr. Myshin's conflict of interest adversely affected his 
performance is also being investigated. Review of the requested records is a necessary 
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part of current counsels' investigation. Further, Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as 
he is still awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 
2006. 
4. Christian Johnson 
Petitioner believes that either of his trial counsel, or other members of the Ada 
County Public Defender's Office represented Christian Johnson. Petitioner is still 
investigating this claim and reserves the right to withdraw it upon completion of his 
reinvestigation of the case. 
K DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO REQUEST PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING FOR 
THE PRESENTATION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN SUPPORT OF THE 
NOTICED AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Trial counsel should have requested a pretrial evidentiary hearing for the State's 
evidence in support ofthe noticed aggravating circumstances. The purpose ofthe hearing 
would have been three-fold: (1) to provide notice to the defense so that they could 
adequately prepare for sentencing; (2) to ensure that the evidence was reliable; and (3) to 
ensure that the facts offered in support of the aggravating circumstances existed by a 
preponderance of the evidence; and (4) that the noticed aggravating circumstances were 
based on independent evidence. Trial counsel should have relied on grounds for the 
motion including the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
L. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
CASELOAD. 
Petitioner incorporates by reference his arguments under Claim L.1. Petitioner 
asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to decline 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 92 
OO?d.~ 
assignment of additional cases, or in the alternative, by failing to remove themselves 
from Petitioner's case due to excessive caseloads. Petitioner asserts these failures 
constitute deficient performance. 
To demonstrate prejudice, Petitioner asserts that prejudice should be presumed in 
that his counsels' obligations to other clients effectively denied him counsel. United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Alternatively, applying the Strickland standard, 
Petitioner asserts that but for counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately 
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing 
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, Petitioner 
asserts that trial counsels' duty to attend their other cases adversely affected their 
performance in his case. 
M. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. 
Trial counsel were ineffective in (a) failing to claim a Miranda violation during 
Petitioner's interrogations, and (b) failing to move to suppress the third interrogation on 
the basis that Petitioner had already been formally charged and his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel had attached by the time of interrogation. 
Petitioner has not had the opportunity to review the interrogations, reports, 
pleadings, and transcripts relevant to this claim and reserves the right to either expound 
or withdraw this claim after further investigation. In addition, Petitioner requires 
additional materials, requested in his discovery motion, in order to precisely state the 
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deficient perfonnance and prejudice--namely enhanced videotapes and the videotapes as 
played to the jury. 
With regard to (c), Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches the 
moment fonnal judicial proceedings have been initiated. Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201 (1964). The right is triggered when judicial proceedings are initiated against the 
accused, "whether by way of fonnal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, 
infonnation, or arraignment." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). Once the 
right attaches, the state, including the police and their agents, may not interefere with the 
accused's right to counsel. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 2398-2399 (1990). 
The fonnal complaint was filed against Petitioner in the Henneman case at 3:50 
p.m. on April 1, 2003. (Exhibit 21.) The April 1st interrogation with Detectives Allen 
and Mace did not take place until 5 p.m. (Tr., p. 4177, L. 23 p. 4178, L.21). Thus, the 
interrogation violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Trial counsel were 
ineffective under the Strickland standard in failing to move to suppress statements 
obtained from Petitioner in this interrogation. 
N. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO MOVE FOR CHANGE OF VENUE, OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FAILING TO MOVE TO HAVE A JURY FROM 
ANOTHER COUNTY IMPANELED. 
Criminal defendants are entitled to a trial before an unbiased jury. This right is 
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, Article I, Sections 7 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code §§ 19-
1902, -2019, and -2020, and Idaho Criminal Rule 24(b). "The bias or prejudice of even a 
single juror is enough to violate that guarantee." United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 
1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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The Supreme Court has long held that where a criminal case receives excessive 
publicity, the defendant's rights to an unbiased jury and, consequently, a fair trial, may be 
violated if the trial court does not take prophylactic measures, such as changing venue to 
a place less saturated by publicity, to insulate the insulate the jury's decision-making 
process from the outside influences of the pUblicity. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 
360 U.S. 310 (1959) (remanding case for a new trial where seven jurors had been 
exposed to news accounts containing information which was not presented at trial); Irvin 
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (vacating the conviction of a prisoner sentenced to death 
based on the saturation of the jury pool with pretrial publicity and the fact that eight out 
of twelve jurors came into the trial with a preconceived opinion that the defendant was 
guilty); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (holding that the trial court had erred in 
denying the defendant's motion for a change of venue where the media, prior to trial, had 
broadcast a taped confession of the defendant); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 
(1966) (holding that the defendant's right to a fair trial was violated due to circus-like 
media involvement); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (reversing defendant's 
conviction because the media had broadcast the defendant's pretrial hearing). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the United States Supreme Court has held that a 
defendant's right to a fair trial can be violated without a particularized showing of 
prejudice, see Rideau, 373 U.S. 723,27 Idaho's appellate courts sometimes adhere to the 
view that in order to prevail on a claim related to pretrial publicity, the defendant must 
27 The dissent took issue with this aspect of the Rideau decision, complaining that the 
majority opinion, which had failed to "establish[ ] any substantial nexus between the 
televised 'interview' and the defendant's trial, which occurred almost two months later," 
was not faithful to precedent. Rideau, 373 at 1420-23. 
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affirmatively demonstrate prejudice, i.e., that his own jury was biased.28 See, e.g., State 
v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 687-88, 85 P.3d 656, 663-64 (2004); State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 
170,175,857 P.2d 649, 654 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 769 & n.l, 
710 P.2d 1202, 1205 & n.1 (1985). However, they do not always do so. In State v. Hall, 
111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1986), the Court of Appeals noted that: 
a defendant's inability to make a detailed and conclusive showing of 
prejudice is not a proper ground for refusing to change venue. Prejudice 
seldom can be established or disproved with certainty. Rather, it is 
sufficient for the accused to show "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial 
news [coverage] prior to trial will prevent a fair trial." Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 .... 
Hall, 111 Idaho at 829, 727 P.2d at 1257, (emphasis and alteration in original). See also 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 278, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003) (adopting the "reasonable 
likelihood" standard set forth in Hall). Regardless of whether a showing of prejudice is a 
strict requirement though, the Idaho courts have said that there are certain basic factors 
that should be considered on appeal in evaluating the question of whether pretrial 
publicity had necessitated a change of venue below: (1) the nature and content of the 
pre-trial publicity; (2) the amount of time elapsed between the pretrial pUblicity and the 
trial (and sentencing); (3) whether there is evidence, e.g., affidavits, indicating prejudice, 
or a lack thereof, in the community where the defendant is to be tried; (4) voir dire 
testimony by actual jurors indicating whether or not they had pre-formed opinions as to 
28 In this regard, the Idaho courts often do not distinguish between motions to change 
venue based on pretrial publicity and other claims involving biased jurors. Petitioner 
respectfully contends that, to the extent that the Idaho courts fail to recognize pretrial 
publicity cases as different, the Idaho courts are in error. Petitioner contends that Rideau 
recognized that these cases are a unique subset of "unfair triallbiased juror" cases in that 
the defendant is not required to prove prejUdice and move to strike individual jurors for 
cause. 
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the defendant's guilt or innocence; and (5) whether the defendant moved to strike any of 
the jurors for cause. Hall, 111 Idaho at 830, 727 P.2d at 1258. 
In the present case, the nature and volume of pretrial publicity that the case 
received should have caused trial counsel to investigate and weigh a motion to change 
venue. This would have required counsel to obtain and analyze the articles and television 
and radio broadcasts that had saturated Ada County, and either conduct a poll or obtain 
affidavits evidencing the level of bias that existed in Ada County. In addition, counsel 
should have filed a motion to change venue and, if that motion had been denied, 
developed a record that would have allowed Petitioner to challenge that denial on direct 
appeal. This would have required counsel to question potential jurors during voir dire as 
to the amount, and nature, of the pretrial publicity to which they had been exposed, as 
well as their preconceived opinions as to Petitioner's guilt, and it would have required 
counsel to move to strike apparently biased jurors for cause and to exercise peremptory 
strikes against those apparently biased jurors for whom for-cause challenges had been 
unsuccessful. 
1. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Obtain And Analyze Copies 
Of The Articles And Television And Radio Broadcasts That Had 
Saturated Ada County. 
Had trial counsel engaged in an adequate investigation and analysis, they would 
have discovered that both quantity and the nature of the publicity in this case, and in the 
other crimes for which Petitioner has been charged, rendered it impossible to find an 
impartial jury composed of Petitioner's peers. 
The first flurry of news coverage resulted from Lynn Henneman's disappearance. 
That news coverage, stretching from September 26, 2000, through November 10, 2000, 
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which included near-daily stories III The Idaho Statesman,29 as well as extensive 
1 .. 30· d '1 d . b 1 31 te eVlslOn news coverage, IS etm e , III part, e ow: 
• September 26, 2000. One day after she was reported missing, the Statesman 
reported Ms. Henneman's disappearance in the banner headline of its "Local" 
section. Patrick Orr, Woman missing since Sunday, police say, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Sept. 26, 2000, at IB. The article detailed the highly visible 
efforts to find Ms. Henneman: a dive temn, Life Flight flying over the Boise 
river, and Idaho Mountain Search and Rescue temn. Id. It also included a 
picture of Ms. Henneman. Id. 
• September 28, 2000. The Statesman's front-page banner headline was that 
some of Ms. Henneman's personal effects had been found. Patrick Orr, Boy 
finds missing woman's purse, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 28, 2000, at lA, 12A. 
That article indicated that after the effects had been discovered, police 
engaged in a throrough search of the immediate vicinity-in full view of the 
29 The Statesman, headquartered in Boise, and claiming Ada and Canyon Counties as its 
primary markets, see The Idaho Statesman (visited Apr. 14, 2006) 
<http://custserv.idahostatesman.comiCustSvc/advertising_services/adv-pdfs/market-
profile12005BoiseMSASnapshot.pdf>, is, by far, the most widely circulated Idaho 
newspaper. The Idaho Newspaper Association reports the Statesman's circulation as 
68,060 copies. See Idaho Newspaper Association (visited Apr. 12, 2006) 
<http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html>. In comparison, the next most widely 
circulated Idaho newspaper is the Post Register, at only 26,551 copies. See Idaho 
Newspaper Association (visited Apr. 12, 2006) http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html 
It is interesting to note that undersigned counsel has searched for, but has been 
unable to locate any articles regarding Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death, or 
Petitioner, in either the Coeur D'Alene Press or the Idaho State Journal, two of the major 
newspapers in north Idaho and east Idaho, respectively. See Idaho Newspaper 
Association (visited Apr. 12, 2006) <http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html>. Thus, the 
chances of prejudice attributable to pretrial publicity in this case could have been cut 
drastically by transferring venue to a court in north or east Idaho. 
30 In response to Petitioner's requests for information, only one of four local network 
affiliates voluntarily provided Petitioner with materials related to its coverage of Ms. 
Henneman's disappearance and death, Ms. Hanlon's death, and the Petitioner. Copies of 
those materials are provided on the DVDs and corresponding transcripts marked as 
Exhibit 22 and provided herewith. The other three network affiliates have refused to 
cooperate with Petitioner and, thus, this claim cannot be fully developed unless or until 
this Court allows Petitioner to obtain issue subpoenas. 
31 All of the articles from the Statesman are marked as Exhibit 23 and are provided 
herewith. 
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public. Id. at 12A. One witness to the search commented that she knew the 
search had to do with Ms. Henneman "because they kept it so hush-hush." Id. 
(quoting a local resident). In discussing Ms. Henneman's disappearance 
generally, the article also indicated that "[t]he news media has really hit the 
airwaves hard with her picture .... " Id. at 12A (quoting the spokeswoman for 
the Garden City Detective Unit). It also indicated that the publicity was 
apparently working as detectives had already received fifty different tips. Id. 
Finally, the article again included a picture of Ms. Henneman. Id. 
• September 29, 2000. Another banner headline about Ms. Henneman's 
disappearance appeared in the "Local" section of the Statesman. Patrick Orr, 
Henneman may have gone to comedy club, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 29, 
2000, at IB. That article revealed that the publicity campaign had led to the 
police receiving some 34 more tips in only 24 hours. See id. It also included 
Ms. Henneman's picture. Id. 
• September 30, 2000. The Statesman ran a front-page story revealing that a 
$20,000 reward was being offered for information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of anyone involved in Ms. Henneman's disappearance. Emily 
Simnitt & Patrick Orr, $20,000 reward offered, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 30, 
2000, at lA, 7 A. That article also reported that a "tearful" press conference 
had been given by Ms. Henneman's family: 
[F]amily members aid Henneman IS a friendly person who 
rarely showed anger. 
"I miss Lynn," [Micki] Husienga [Ms. Henneman's mother] 
said. "She was the mediator between Mark and Laura 
(Henneman's brother and sister). I want my daughter back. 
Please try to help just a little bit more." 
Henneman's older brother, Mark Husienga, described her as 
someone who would naturally strike up a conversation with 
anyone. "I don't know if I've ever seen her angry," he said. 
Mark Husienga also said he hoped the reward would keep up 
the momentum of support the family has already received from 
the community. 
Micki Husienga said when she went to pick up Mark Husienga 
and his wife, Diane, from the airport, several people hugged 
her and expressed their support. 
Id. at 7 A. The article also included a very moving photo of at least five 
members of Ms. Henneman's family holding each other during that press 
conference; it included a second emotional picture of Ms. Henneman's 
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husband obviously breaking down, with his hands covering his face, it 
included yet another picture of Ms. Henneman. Id. at lA, 7A. 
With regard to the community's support of Ms. Henneman's family, the 
article indicated that Boise residents had been passing out missing person 
fliers, and it urged all Boise residents and businesses to tum on their lights on 
Sunday, October 1,2000, as a show of support for the family. See id. at lA, 
7A. 
• October 1,2000. For the fourth day in a row, the Statesman reported on Ms. 
Henneman's disappearance, but only to say that no new leads had developed. 
No leads develop in hunt for woman, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 1,2000, at Bl. 
It also reiterated the Statesman's plea that anyone with any information about 
Ms. Henneman's disappearance come forward. Id. 
• October 4, 2000. In an article prominently displayed on the first page of its 
"Local" section, the Statesman reported that Ada County residents were 
feeling uneasy about using the "Crown Jewel" of their community, the Boise 
River Greenbelt, in light of Ms. Henneman's disappearance: "Henneman's 
recent disappearance has many shaken up. 'Seeing those pictures [the missing 
person fliers] everywhere is haunting. It really makes you apprehensive .... I 
didn't really start worrying about it until this last incident. '" Patrick Orr, 
Greenbelt incidents make users nervous, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 4, 200, at 
lB, SB (quoting a local resident). In discussing the public's unease, the article 
highlighted two previous rape-killings on the Greenbelt in recent years-that 
of Kay Lynn Jackson in 1998, and that of Samantha Maher earlier in 2000. 
Id. at SB. But, at the same time, it included a large photo of a bicycle police 
patrol, id. at IB, and included numerous reassurances from officers that the 
Greenbelt is actually relatively safe, id. at lB, SB. 
• October 8, 2000. The banner headline on the cover of the Statesman indicated 
that Lynn Henneman's body had apparently been found. Jeff McKinni & 
Patrick Orr, Body Found in Boise River, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 8,2000, at 
lA, 9A. This article included a timeline and an annotated map of the 
Greenbelt and downtown Boise, showing, among other things, where Ms. 
Henneman had last been seen and where her body was recovered; two photos 
of officers, apparently at the scene of the body recovery; and yet another 
photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at lA, 9A. 
• October 9, 2000. The day after reporting her body apparently found by a 
fisherman, the Statesman reported, in another front-page banner headline, that 
Ms. Henneman's body had been positively identified. Patrick Orr, Coroner 
confirms body's identity, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 9, 2000, at lA, 9A. That 
article quoted the Ada County Coroner, Erwin Sonnenberg, as asserting 
unequivocally: "It was definitely a homicide. There were no gun wounds or 
stab wounds, but there are other findings we can't release right now that 
indicate it was a homicide." Id. at lA (quoting Mr. Sonnenberg). The article 
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divers, search-and-rescue dogs, and helicopters, that had failed to uncover Ms. 
Henneman's body. Id. Finally, the article included yet another picture of Ms. 
Henneman. Id. at IA. 
• October 10, 2000. For the third day in a row, the Statesman carried a front-
page banner headline about Ms. Henneman. Patrick Orr, Searchers find items 
from slain woman, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 10,2000, at lA, 8A. The article 
reported that additional items belonging to Ms. Henneman had been found: 
"Right now, we are not disclosing what those items are, but there are some 
things we know are hers, Boise Police Spokesman Jim Tibbs said at the scene 
Monday. "We need to look at all the evidence before we can release that 
information." Id. (quoting police spokesman). It also included an annotated 
Greenbelt/downtown map, two large photos of police officers' evidence 
recovery efforts, and another photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at lA, 8A. 
• October 11, 2000. In another front-page banner headline, the Statesman 
again, for the second time in eight day, addressed the public's safety concerns 
in light of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and apparent murder. Patrick Orr, 
Boise to step up Greenbelt security, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 11,2000, at lA, 
7 A. The article quoted then-police chief Don Pierce as saying: "I think first 
and foremost it was a traumatic event for this community. The Greenbelt is 
one of our most prized possessions, and when something like this happens, it 
is like someone steals one of our possessions." Id. at IA. 
In a separate article, carrying its own banner headline, and appearing on the 
first page of the Statesman's "Local" section, it was reported that the Ada 
County Coroner was expected to reveal the cause of Ms. Henneman's death 
later that day. Patrick Orr, Cause of woman's death expected today, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Oct. 11, 2000, at IB, 6B. It went on to repeat the earlier-
reported "knowledge" that certain items found in or near the Boise River over 
previous days "definitely" belonged to Ms. Henneman. Id. at IB. The article 
included another photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at IB. It also reported that Ms. 
Henneman's family had expressed gratitude to the citizens of Boise for all 
their support, but were also "fearful for the citizens of Boise, because there is 
a killer on the loose." Id. at IB, 6B (quoting a Boise lawyer who had been in 
contact with the family). 
• October 12, 2000. In its fifth Henneman-related front-page banner-headlined 
article in a row, and again including a picture of Ms. Henneman, the 
Statesman reported that, although the Ada County Coroner would not publicly 
reveal his opinion as to the cause of Ms. Hennman's death, he had "ruled out 
stabbing, shooting, and blunt head trauma," and another newspaper had 
reported that she was "probably strangled" to death. Patrick Orr, NY. 
newspaper: Henneman was 'probably strangled,' IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 12, 
200, at lA, 6A. The article went on to report that police had said that they 
were withholding the exact cause of death for tactical reasons: 
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Sonnenberg said not releasing the infonnation could be a 
helpful tactic in detennining whether any leads are true or in 
questioning potential suspects, though they have none. 
"It helps if leads come in on infonnation that has not been 
released," he said. "There are some things the people don't 
know but a perpetrator does know." 
Boise Police Spokesman Lt. Jim Tibbs said Wednesday 
releasing infonnation about the evidence could be detrimental 
to the investigation. 
"At the initial stage of this investigation, especially in a 
case this unique, so little infonnation is available that you do 
not publicize everything you have found," he said. 
Not publicizing sensitive infonnation can help detectives 
when they are interviewing potential suspects, Tibbs said. 
"Again, you have to think down the road instead of 
running to the media," he said. 
ld. at lA, 6A. In addition, the article noted that the reward for infonnation 
about Ms. Henneman's death had been increased to $30,000 with the 
anonymous $10,000 contribution ofa local businessman. ld. at 6A. 
In the "Local" section of the Statesman, Ms. Henneman's obituary appeared. 
Obituaries, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 12,2000, at 7B. That obituary indicated 
that Ms. Henneman had "become a part of the community" during the 
previous two weeks, it asked that the "residents of the Treasure Valley" pray 
for the Henneman family, and it urged "the residents of the Treasure Valley" 
to attend a public memorial service to be held on October 19,2000. ld. The 
obituary also included another picture of Ms. Henneman. Id. 
• October 13,2000. For the sixth day in a row, the Statesman reported on the 
Henneman's, but only to say that no new no infonnation had been released by 
the police. No new info released in Henneman case, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 
13, 2000, at Bl. That article indicated that police had, by then received in 
excess of300 tips from members ofthe community. ld. 
• October 20, 2000. [Officer tells women to trust instincts, stay safe ]32 
32 In some instances, Petitioner has provided the Court with only a date and an article 
title. In such instances, Petitioner knows that an article, believed to support his claims, 
was published, but he has not yet been able to obtain a copy of that article. For the most 
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• October 23, 2000. In a front-page banner headline, the Statesman again 
discussed the community's safety concerns regarding the Greenbelt in light of 
Ms. Henneman's death. Emily Sirnnitt, Police to rethink Greenbelt safety 
after attack, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 23, 2000, at lA, 7A. That article 
reported on an apparent attempted attack on a 20-year old woman which 
garnered a "heightened [police] response [which] was due in part to a partially 
implemented plan to beef up security around the Greenbelt after Henneman 
was slain near the pathway on about Sept. 24." Id. at IA. Despite the 
overwhelming police response, the article indicated that members of the 
public were still greatly disturbed: 
"It's outrageous (that) as women, we can't go out 
walking any place after dark," said Sue Fellen, whose office is 
near the Greenbelt. "The city is paying attention, but 
obviously, it's not doing enough. They need to take this 
seriously. " 
"We need to send the message to bad people: 'Don't 
corne to our town because there are consequences to pay. '" 
For Bryana Deits, the stronger officer presence and better 
lighting discussed by police and the parks department can't 
corne soon enough. Deits, who moved to Boise three weeks 
ago from Seattle, says she's more scared here. On Sunday 
afternoon, Deits carefully chose a spot in the open and close to 
busy Broadway Avenue in which to picnic. 
Id. at 7 A. The article went on to detail measures that were being taken to 
enhance Greenbelt security, including stepping up bike, horse, and motorcycle 
patrols, increasing lighting, adding telephones, and moving transients out of 
the area (even though police acknowledged that transients have as much of a 
right to use the park system as do other residents, and that they had no reason 
to believe that transients had been involved in the most recent attack). Id. 
• October 27, 2000. In a banner headline on the front page of its "Local" 
section, the Statesman reported a new lead in the Henneman case. Emily 
Simnitt, Taskforce investigates Henneman lead, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 27, 
part, undersigned counsel represents that articles have not been obtained due to technical 
difficulties with the Idaho Statesman's website and a lack of cooperation from Idaho 
Statesman staff. Petitioner believes that, given sufficient time and discovery, he will be 
able to obtain the missing articles, and that all of the articles, taken together, will 
demonstrate that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to adequately 
develop some form of a "motion for change of venue or, in the alternative, motion to 
have a jury from another county impaneled," and for failing to file the same. 
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2000, at 1 B. That article indicated that Ms. Henneman was seen talking to 
someone on the Greenbelt shortly before she diappeared, but it also reported 
that the police still refused to disclose the cause of her death, and whether she 
had been sexually assaulted, for tactical reasons: "'Hypotehtically, let's say 
she was sexually assaulted,' Boise Det. Dave Smith said. 'If we put that out, 
the killer knows we know and might leave the area. '" Id. It also included Ms. 
Henneman's picture again, as well as another plea from help from the 
community, promising a $42,500 reward for information leading to an arrest 
and conviction. Id. 
• November 10,2000. [Henneman task force loses members.] 
This summary of the early news coverage of the Henneman case makes a number 
of things clear: (1) not only was the media spreading information about the Henneman 
case through traditional channels, but police, Ms. Henneman's family, and concerned 
members of the community were actively reaching out to everyone in the community-
not just news readers/watchers-through pleas for information and missing person 
posters; (2) the net result of these combined efforts was that Ms. Helmeman's death was 
thrust to the forefront of Boise's consciousness virtually every day for over a month; (3) 
Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death were deeply emotional, not only for her 
family, whose personal suffering was shared with the entire community, but also for the 
community as whole, many of whom were able to empathize with the family's personal 
loss; (4) Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death, which had come relatively soon after 
two prior rape/murders on the Greenbelt, was a terrifying event not only for those Ada 
county residents who regularly used the Greenbelt, but for all members of the local 
community who perceived the Greenbelt to be a symbol of everything that is great about 
the Treasure Valley; and (5) the police were completely in control of the information that 
was disseminated to the public through the various media outlets, such that where police 
suspicions were presented, they were given as fact, and where the police suspicions were 
in doubt, they were presented as being withheld for tactical reasons. In the aggregate, 
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this coverage virtually guaranteed that all of Ada County's residents would have strong 
feelings about whoever might eventually be charged with harming Ms. Henneman. They 
felt deep and pain and fear, and they had been led to believe that everything the police 
said was fact. 
After November 2000, although the specifics of the Henneman case were no 
longer reported on a near-daily basis, the case never strayed far from people's minds. 
Throughout 2001 and 2002, the major media outlets occasionally reported on the fact that 
no progress had been made in the Henneman case, but were actually more likely to report 
on the related issue of the public's safety concerns regarding the Greenbelt 
• April 4, 2001. [City to light Greenbelt tunnels] 
• April 26, 2001. [Ada residents still worry about Greenbelt safety] 
• June 10,2001. [Guardians of the Greenbelt] 
• August 20,2001. [Group seeks to light Greenbelt] 
• September 25,2001. [Clues still sought in Henneman case] 
• October 20, 2001. [Boise adds to Greenbelt trail security] 
• November 19,2002. [Police chief tries to allay CIU fears] 
• April 11, 2002. [Boiseans to gather on birthday of flight attendant slain in 
2000] 
• April 13,2002. [Boiseans show their support for slain woman's family] 
• June 19, 2002. [Boise council awards bid to light up the Greenbelt] 
• September 24, 2002. [Murders, other crimes prompt Boise Police to increase 
Greenbelt safety] [2 years later, detectives still search for killer] 
It is undersigned counsels belief that these articles demonstrate that, although 
months had passed since the discovery of Ms. Henneman's body, the residents of Ada 
County had not forgotten either: their deep sense of hurt over Ms. Henneman and her 
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family's suffering; or their new-found fear that their beloved Greenbelt was no longer a 
safe place to recreate. 
On March 1, 2002, anther tragic event greatly impacted the Henneman 
investigation and, ultimately, Petitioner's prospects of getting a fair trial in the Henneman 
case: Cheryl Ann Hanlon was found dead in the Boise foothills. That event led to more 
saturation-style media coverage, and eventually led to Petitioner being labeled a "killer" 
in the public's eye. 
• March 2, 2003. In a front-page banner-headlined article, the Statesman 
reported that Cheryl Ann Hanlon had been found dead on a North End 
hillside, the victim of an apparent ligature strangulation. Chereen Langrill, 
Woman found strangled on North End hillside, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 2, 
2003,2003, at 1, 8. The article contained a small map of the North End, twp 
photos of the body recovery scene, a photo of Ms. Hanlon, and pleas for 
citizens to help the police by calling in all potential tips. Id. at 8. 
• March 3, 2003. In a banner-headlined article on the first page of the 
Statesman's "Local" section, the paper provided a sketch and a physical 
description of a man supposedly seen with Ms. Hanlon shortly before she 
turned up dead. Jonathon Brunt, Sketch of man released by police, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Mar. 3,2003, at 1, 7. The article also included another picture of 
Ms. Hanlon, another map of the North End, another plea for help from the 
community, and a photo of Ms. Hanlon's truck. Id. at 1, 7. Finally, the 
article, intimated that Ms. Hanlon's apparent murder might be related to one 
or more of the numerous other unsolved Boise murders, including those of 
Kay Lynn Jackson and Lynn Henneman. Id. at 1, 7. 
• March 4, 2003. In another banner-headlined article on the first page of the 
Statesman's "Local" section, the paper reported again on Ms. Hanlon's 
apparent murder, providing another picture of her, another composite sketch 
and physical description of the man she was supposedly seen with, and 
another plea for information from the community. Jonathon Brunt, Police 
follOWing up tips in killing, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 4, 2003, at 1, 3. The 
article also included a number of safety tips for area residents. Id. at 3. 
• March 5, 2003. On the first page of its "Local" section, the Statesman 
reported that Ms. Hanlon had leisurely strolled into the foothills alone, had 
stopped at some point, had struggled with her assailant, and then had been 
dragged downhill to the place where her body was ultimately found. Chereen 
Langrill, Police: Murder victim walked into foothills, IDAHO STATESMAN, 
Mar. 5,2003, at 1, 3. That version of events, apparently derived from police 
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measurements of footprints at the scene, was presented by the police (through 
the Statesman) as fact. See id. at 1. The article also provided another picture 
of Ms. Hanlon, another composite sketch and physical description of the man 
she was supposedly seen with, and another plea for information from the 
community. Id. at 1, 3. 
• March 15,2003. On its front page, the Statesman reported that Petitioner had 
been charged with the murder of Ms. Hanlon. Patrick Orr, Transient charged 
in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar.15, 2003, at 1, 11. That article 
prominently referred to Petitioner as a "transient," which was the same 
negative label that had been used to describe the homeless people who were 
assumed to present safety challenges on the Greenbelt after Ms. Henneman's 
death. See Police to rethink Greenbelt safety after attack, IDAHO STATESMAN, 
Oct. 23, 2000, at lA, 7 A. It also offered a side-by-side comparison of the 
composite sketch of the individual supposedly last seen with Ms. Hanlon, to 
Petitioner's unflattering mug shot. Patrick Orr, Transient charged in Hanlon 
death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 1 5, 2003, at 1. 
It also made it appear that the police had, without doubt, found their man: 
"The city of Boise can breathe a sigh of relief that Eric 
Hall is off the streets," Boise Police Chief Don Pierce said 
Friday morning. 
Pierce said Hall admitted to detectives late Thursday that 
he killed Hanlon, 42, in the foothills near 5th and Alturas 
streets in the early morning hours of March 1. 
Piece also said detectives had amassed a significant 
amount of physical evidence tying Hall to the sexual assault 
and murder but declined to specify the evidence. 
Investigators believe Hall sexually assaulted Hanlon and 
strangled her to death, then tried to conceal her body in a 
shallow hole by covering her with grass and tree branches, 
Pierce said. 
Detectives say Hall then took Hanlon's car, eventually 
abandoning it near 13th and Franklin streets. 
Id. at 1, 11. The article then went on to detail what it called Petitioner's 
"extensive" criminal history, highlighting his conviction for statutory rape 
after having been accused of sexually assaulting and choking a 17-year old 
girl, and his subsequent charge of failure to register as a sex offender. Id. at 
11. It also indicated that Petitioner had been implicated based on tips from the 
public: "'This is a very good example of how we rely on our community to 
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help us,' Pierce said, praising the more than 100 people who came forward 
with tips on the case." Id. at 11. Finally, the article included yet another 
picture of Ms. Hanlon, as well as a photograph of Boise Police Chief Don 
Pierce. Id. at 1, 11. 
In a separate article, the Statesman reported that a DNA sample taken from 
Petitioner would be sent out-of-state for analysis. Chereen Langrill, DNA 
tests in slaying may be delayed, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 15,2003, at Local 
11. 
• March 18, 2003. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman ran 
an article reiterating many of the inflammatory content of its March 15 article. 
Patrick Orr, Suspect in Hanlon killing faces hearing on March 28, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Mar. 18,2003, at Local 1. It included Petitioner's unflattering 
mugshot; it reported that prosecutors claimed he "used a belt to strangle 
Hanlon," as if that allegation had already been established as fact; it asserted 
that Petitioner had admitted to killing Ms. Hanlon; it stated that police had 
categorized Petitioner as a "transient"; it implied that Petitioner may have 
raped and killed either Kay Lynn Jackson or Lynn Henneman; and it detailed 
his criminal history, highlighting the unproven allegation that he had raped, 
bound, and choked a 17year old girl. Id. 
• March 29, 2003. [Murder suspect also charged with rape] 
The intense media coverage surrounding Ms. Hanlon's death, while at first 
playing to the community's fear for the safety of its young women and, perhaps, outrage 
for having to be concerned with such matters, later offered the community an expedient 
path to peace of mind: get rid of Erick Hall. The media coverage, driven by police 
statements, portrayed Petitioner as a "transient" sexual deviant, with a penchant for 
strangulation during rape, who has lived a life of crime. Thus, it dehumanized him. 
Furthermore, it portrayed his guilt in the Hanlon case as having been already established, 
and it implied that Petitioner may be guilty of other unsolved murders in Boise. And, 
even if he is not guilty of other crimes, it implied that Petitioner was certainly guilty of 
something and, therefore, should be removed from society: "The city of Boise can 
breathe a sigh of relief that Eric Hall is off the streets .... " Patrick Orr, Transient 
charged in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar.15, 2003, at 1 (quoting the Boise 
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Police Chief). Thus, it also made him a lightening rod for all of the community's 
frustration about its crime problems. 
On April 2, 2003, based on the DNA sample obtained from Petitioner in relation 
to the Hanlon case, the State accused Petitioner of raping and murdering Lynn 
Henneman. As detailed below, that charge only served to heighten the prejudicial 
reporting on Petitioner. 
• April 3,2003. In a prominent article on its front page, the Statesman reported 
that Petitioner had been charged with Ms. Henneman's murder. Patrick Orr, 
Suspect charged in Henneman murder, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 1, 
6. That article included a sub-headline reading "DNA test shows Eric [sic] 
Hall killed flight attendant in 2000, Boise police say," which appeared next to 
the unflattering mugshot of Petitioner. Id. The article then went to great 
length to report that in police officers' minds, trial would be nothing more 
than technicality because Petitioner had already been "proven" guilty beyond 
all doubt: 
Boise police say DNA evidence links the same man to 
two brutal rape/murders, providing a major break in a 2~-year 
old murder case that changed the way Boise residents view 
safety on the Greenbelt. 
Lead Detective Dave Smith and others in the department 
took the case personally, Pierce said .... 
Two and a half years later, Pierce said, Boise is a safer 
place with the Henneman murder finally solved. 
"Today, we know the man who killed her, Eric [sic] 
Virgil Hall, is behind bars," Pierce said Wednesday during a 
news conference. "Weare 1 00 percent certain we have our 
man." 
Id. at 1, 6. After all of that, however, "Pierce declined further comment, 
saying he wants to ensure Hall gets a fair trial." Id. at 6. Detective Smith, 
however, picked up right where Chief Pierce had left off. According to the 
Statesman, Detective Smith claimed that the "details at the Hanlon crime 
scene ... immediately brought to mind the Henneman case.... 'Right at the 
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(scene), we had strong feelings there might be a match here,' Smith said.,,33 
Id. at 6 (alteration in original). 
The Statesman's lead article on April 3, 2003 also tugged at the public' 
heartstrings. It was topped by a large picture of Ms. Henneman's relatives, at 
taken at the previous day's City Hall news conference announcing that 
Petitioner had been charged, showing them overcome with emotion. Id. at 1. 
Later, it had a large photo of Ms. Henneman's husband and sister hugging at 
the conclusion of the press conference. Id. at 6. The article said that during 
the news conference, Ms. Henneman's parents and sister stood behind Chief 
Pierce, "at times holding each other for support," while Ms. Henneman's 
husband stood quietly to the side. Id. It then quoted Ms. Henneman's 
husband, Walter Us, as being just as convinced of Petitioner's guilt as Chief 
Pierce and Detective Smith were, and printed his request that 'justice" be 
done: '" I am sad another person had to die to catch this killer, but I am glad he 
is behind bars and will have to face justice," Us said. Lynn deserves justice. 
All we can do is pray and hope for the best and pray justice is carried out. '" 
Id. at 1,6 (quoting Ms. Henneman's husband). 
Finally, it is worth noting that the article touched on the psychological effects 
of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death on the Boise community. It 
noted that "Henneman's disappearance as she walked along the river to her 
hotel frightened city residents and led to several safety improvements on 
Boise's Greenbelt." Id. at 1, 6. It made it clear that Ms. Henneman's 
disappearance and death had changed the way many Boiseans viewed their 
community: See id. at 6. 
In its April 3, 2003 edition, the Statesman devoted a full page (besides the 
front-page coverage) to Petitioner's alleged crimes. At the top of the page 
was an article detailing Ms. Henneman's family's two and a half year ordeal. 
Patrick Orr, Henneman's family has mixed feelings about arrest, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 6. In that article, it was noted that Petitioner's 
33 It should be noted that Detective Smith's claim on or about April 3, 2003, which was 
reiterated by the Statesman on AprilS, 2003 and April 24, 2003, Jonathon Brunt, 
Henneman suspect fell through cracks of DNA testing, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 5, 2003, 
at 8; Patrick Orr, Suspect to plead in rape, killing of woman, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 24, 
2003, at Local 6, is directly at-odds with statements made by Chief Pierce a few weeks 
earlier. See Patrick Orr, Transient charged in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 15, 
2003, at 1 ("Pierce said a DNA sample has been taken from Hall and will be compared 
against DNA evidence from other major unsolved crimes in Boise, likely including the 
Lynn Henneman and the Kay Lynn Jackson rape/murderer cases in 2000 and 1998 and 
last year's serial rape attacks in the Winstead Park area. However, he said, there is no 
suspected link to those cases at this point."); Patrick Orr, Suspect in Hanlon killing faces 
hearing on March 28, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 18,2003, at Local 1 (same). Thus, one 
has to wonder whether Detective Smith's statement is true or whether, p'erhaps, his 
recollection was altered by the DNA testing results. 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 110 
00264 
arrest had "eased the minds" of the family, and had given them "some relief." 
Id. Interestingly, the article appeared with a large photo of a tough- and 
serious-looking Detective Smith posing next to an American flag. Id. In the 
article, Ms. Henneman's family and Chief Pierce heaped praise upon 
Detective Smith, portraying him as a tireless advocate of justice: 
"This guy is just fantastic," Micki Husienga said, 
pointing at Smith. 
Id. at 6. 
"For the last two and a half years, Micki has been calling 
and saying 'Dave, I love you, and I have been praying for you' 
... " Smith said .... 
Smith said he took the case personally, working on the 
case at least a week--chasing every lead, re-examining old 
clues, scouring the Internet for similar cases and getting DNA 
samples from people of interest while working on his regular 
caseload. 
"These are the kinds of cases where good detectives 
become intimately, personally involved in the case," Chief Don 
Pierce said. 
Also in the April 3, 2003 edition of the Statesman was an article largely 
vilifying Petitioner. See Jonathon Brunt, Suspect in two slayings has lengthy 
criminal record, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 6. In that article, which 
contained a second copy of Petitioner's unflattering mugshot, Petitioner's 
prior criminal history was detailed, with particular attention paid to the fact 
that he had been on probation for "assaulting a different woman when one of 
the victims [Ms. Hanlon] was killed .... " Id. However, the article did finally 
reveal some information that did not come directly from the police: it quoted a 
friend as saying that Petitioner had cried and asserted his innocence, and that 
he is actually a kind and gentle young man. Id. 
• April 4, 2003. The Statesman reported that Petitioner had been arraigned in 
the Henneman case. Patrick Orr, Suspect arraigned on rape, murder charges, 
IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 4, 2003, at Local 1. The article then went on to offer 
the police department's version of the facts without question: "he [Petitioner] 
eventually confessed to [the Hanlon murder]"; and "[a] DNA sample taken 
from Hall linked him with the two murders .... " Id. The article then went on 
to quote a friend of Petitioner's who, despite her faith in him, had already 
been persuaded by the State's evidence which had been reported in the media, 
and her misperception of the strength of that evidence: 
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Id. 
[Jillian] Stone said she first met Hall during the summer 
of 2000 at Julia Davis Park. "He was like a father figure to me, 
so the first time I heard about this, I didn't believe it-there 
was no way he could have done it. But DNA doesn't lie." 
She added: "Now I think, 'What if that was me?'" 
• April 5,2003. The Statesman, in a front-page article that provided yet another 
copy of Petitioner's unflattering mugshot, as well as much more flattering 
photos of his two alleged victims, reported that despite Petitioner's criminal 
record, the State did not have a sample of Petitioner's DNA on-hand when it 
started investigating the Henneman and Hanlon murders because he had been 
released from prison before Idaho's DNA sampling law went into effect. 
Jonathon Brunt, Henneman suspect fell through cracks of DNA testing, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Apr. 5,2003, at 1, 8. The clear implication of this article is that 
if the DNA sampling law had gone into effect sooner, then Petitioner would 
have been apprehended sooner and Ms. Hanlon might never have been killed. 
See id. However, this implication pre-supposes the accuracy of the DNA 
testing and interpretation, and Petitioner's guilt. 
• April 14, 2003. Lest there have been any confusion about whether the 
Statesman had prematurely adjudged Petitioner guilty in its April 5, 2003 
article, the newspaper made its position clear in an April 14, 2003 editorial: 
It's outrageous to think that Eric [sic] Virgil Hall, now 
accused of killing two women in Boise, could sit in prison for 
seven years without submitting to a DNA test. But it's 
downright scary to think that other violent criminals may have 
slipped by the DNA database because of lack of administrative 
follow-up. 
Editorial, DNA testing is a must, preferably at booking, IDAHO STATESMAN, 
Apr. 14, 2003, at Local 8. Thus, the newspaper labeled Petitioner a violent 
criminal and, by arguing that his alleged crimes had "slipped by the DNA 
database," it presupposed that he is actually guilty of those crimes. It then 
went on to argue that DNA matches are indisputable by quoting then-Ada 
County Sheriff, Vaughn Killeen: '''DNA determines guilt or innocence,' 
Killeen said. 'It's more reliable than eyewitness accounts. If I were falsely 
accused of a crime, I'd want to have the DNA testing. ,,, Id. It should be 
noted that the Statesman's editorial also featured Petitioner's unflattering 
mugshot. 
• April 24, 2003. On the front-page of its "Local" section, the Statesman 
reported that Petitioner had been arraigned in the Henneman case. Patrick 
Orr, Suspect to plead in rape, killing of woman, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 24, 
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2003, at Local I, 6. In that article, the Statesman, which referred to Petitioner 
not as "the man" or "the person," but rather "the transient" accused of killing 
Ms. Henneman, reiterated: the details of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and 
death; the fact that Petitioner stood accused of killing not only Ms. Henneman, 
but also Ms. Hanlon; the allegation that Petitioner had confessed to killing Ms. 
Hanlon; the allegation that "[a] DNA sample taken from Hall after his arrest 
in the Hanlon killing linked him with the Henneman killing"; and Detective 
Smith's questionable claim that the Hanlon crime scene immediately brought 
the Henneman case to mind because it appeared to involve a similar modus 
operandi. Id. at 1, 6. In addition, the article indicated that, in discussing 
supposedly secret grand jury proceedings, the Ada County Prosecutor had 
selectively leaked information which he obviously felt would help his chances 
of convicting Petitioner: the fact that multiple out-of-state experts had testified 
"that DNA taken from murder suspect Eric [sic] Hall matched DNA taken 
from victim Lynn Henneman." Id. at 6. 
• May 6,2003. [Greenbelt patrols spring into action] 
• May 8, 2003. [Execution sought in Henneman slaying] 
• May 20, 2003. [Plea in Henneman case delayed] 
• May 22, 2003. In an article on the front-page of the "Local" section, the 
Statesman reported that Petitioner had been indicted in the Hanlon case. 
Patrick Orr, Hall indicted in Hanlon murder, rape case, IDAHO STATESMAN, 
May 22, 2003, at Local 1. The article contained cursory summaries of both 
cases and highlighted what the police/Statesman saw as the damning 
evidence: Petitioner's "extensive" criminal record; a DNA sample which 
"linked him to the Henneman killing"; and the questionable claim that the 
Hanlon crime scene bore such similarities to the Henneman case that that 
crime scene immediately brought the Henneman case to mind for 
investigators. Id. It should be noted that this article also once again 
showcased the unflattering mugshot of Petitioner, and a smiling picture of Ms. 
Hanlon. Id. 
• May 29,2003. [Recent rash of murders strains police, prosecutors] 
• June 7, 2003. [Not guilty pleas entered in two Ada County murder cases] 
As the above news reports make clear, after Petitioner had been charged with Ms. 
Henneman's death, the police began to use the press to begin conditioning the community 
to internalizing the themes that it would later develop during voir dire and, ultimately, at 
trial. The press portrayed Detective Smith, the lead investigator on the Henneman case, 
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as being a indefatigable proponent of justice: a tough, hardworking cop on the outside, 
but a caring man on the inside whose only flaw is sometimes he take the pursuit of 
"justice" too personally. See generally, e.g., Patrick Orr, Henneman's family has mixed 
feelings about arrest, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 6. At the same time, the press 
reported that the officers involved in the Henneman case, whose integrity and 
professionalism had already been bolstered, could personally vouch for the "fact" of 
Petitioner's guilt. See, e.g., Patrick Orr, Suspect charged in Henneman murder, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 6 ("We are 100 percent certain we have our man.") (quoting 
Police Chief Pierce). At the same time, the press characterized the police department's 
evidence as being virtually incontrovertible. First, it treated the police department's 
characterization of the DNA evidence as being the unquestionable truth. Second, it 
adopted Detective Smith's after-the-fact and highly suspect contention that once he saw 
the Hanlon crime scene, it immediately brought the Henneman case to mind because of 
an allegedly similar modus operandi. Third, it portrayed Petitioner as evil: it included a 
sinister-looking mugshot with every article; it adopted the police department's 
dehumanizing label of "transient"; and it highlighted what it repeatedly called 
Petitioner's "extensive" criminal record at every tum while, at the same time, trying to 
draw analogies between the pending rape/murder charges and his prior statutory rape 
conviction and assault charge. Indeed, if there is any doubt about the degree to which the 
police had shaped the public's preconceptions about the case through their use of the 
media, one need tum no further than the statements given to the Statesman by Jillian 
Stone. Ms. Stone was a friend of Petitioner's who, at one time, had trusted him so much 
that she though of him as a father-figure. But even Ms. Stone was quickly convinced of 




Petitioner's guilt and the infallibility of the State's DNA evidence-not by evidence 
adduced at trial or by a jury's verdict, but by the pretrial media publicity (as driven by the 
statements of the police): "[T]he first time I heard about this, I didn't believe it-there 
was no way he could have done it. But DNA doesn't lie. Now I think, 'What ifthat was 
me?'" Patrick Orr, Suspect arraigned on rape, murder charges, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 
4,2003, at Local! (quoting Ms.Stone). 
Any time the press shows the police and, in particular, the lead investigator on a 
case, such adoration, treating the individual officers as saviors of the community, and 
also presents the State's evidence as categorically true, while at the same time denigrating 
the defendant and treating him as sub-human, there is always going to be a risk that the 
public will develop a tremendous prejudice against the defendant. However, that risk 
was heightened in this case because the messages offered to the public by the press were 
the very types of messages that the public so wanted to embrace. In this case, the public 
was so deeply saddened, angered, and terrified by the circumstances of Ms. Henneman 
and Ms. Hanlon's deaths, that it must have been comforting to hear-and to believe-
that the cause of all the suffering had been removed from society and, therefore, that the 
streets of Boise were once again safe. See, e.g., Patrick Orr, Suspect charged in 
Henneman murder, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 1 ("Today, we know the man 
who killed her, Eric [sic] Virgil Hall, is behind bars.") (quoting Chief Pierce). 
While the intensity of the news coverage surrounding the Hanlon and Henneman 
cases certainly diminished after Petitioner was indicted in those cases, it did not go away. 
Consequently, neither case strayed far from the public consciousness. As detailed below, 
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from the winter of 2003 to the start of the Henneman trial in the fall of 2004, both cases 
continued to be the subject of publicity. 
• November 30,2003. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman 
reported that the $42,500 reward that had been offered for information leading 
to an arrest and conviction in the Henneman case would not be given to 
anyone because the case was "solved" by police work, not a tip. Patrick Orr, 
Reward won't be given for solving homicide, IDAHO STATESMAN, Nov. 30, 
2004, at Local 1, 5. In that article, besides proclaiming Petitioner's guilt in 
the Henneman case by referring to it as having been "solved," the newspaper 
reiterated a number of its previous prejudicial statements. It continued to refer 
to Petitioner as "Boise transient"; it made it clear that Petitioner stood accused 
of two crimes which the police now claimed involved a similar modus 
operandi; and it repeated the police department's assertion that "[t]he DNA 
samples matched Hall with both Hanlon and Henneman." Id. 
• January 17, 2004. [Trial put off in Henneman slaying] 
• January 24,2004. [October trial set in slaying ofLynn Henneman] 
• February 10, 2004. [Bill would require more criminals to have DNA test] 
• February 23,2004. [Greenbelt seems safer-and stats say it is] 
• February 24,2004. [City is investing wisely in keeping Greenbelt safe] 
• February 26, 2004. [Volunteers free up Garden City police for more time on 
street] 
• March 24, 2004. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman 
reported that during the previous afternoon another young woman had turned 
up dead near the Boise Greenbelt. Kathleen Kreller & Patrick Orr, Passer-by 
discovers body of woman in Boise pond, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 24,2004, at 
Local 1. Later, this woman was identified as Amanda Stroud, an individual 
who was listed as a potential State's witness in the Henneman case. 
• March 25, 2004. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman 
reported that the dead body found two days earlier near the Greenbelt was that 
of Amanda Stroud. Patrick Orr, Police seek clues to where woman was living, 
Idaho Statesman, Mar.25, 2004, at Local 1, 3. It further reported that the 
cause of her death was unknown. Id. 
• March 27,2004. [Dead woman linked to murder suspect] 
• April 3, 2004. [Toxicology results pending in woman's death] 
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• April 22, 2004. [Tests fail to show how woman, 21, died] 
• September 22,2004. [Courthouse to host 2 big trials] 
The above media coverage, while certainly not as intense as it had been at 
previous times, undoubtedly kept the Hanlon and Henneman cases on the public's 
collective mind. Moreover, since the coverage had been so persistent for so long (it was 
just about four years between Ms. Henneman's disappearance and Petitioner's trial), the 
State's message, as reported through the media, had no doubt become ingrained in 
people's thinking about the cases. Indeed, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has already 
recognized: "When prospective jurors are incessantly exposed to news stories selectively 
packaged for mass consumption, they may become subtly conditioned to accept a certain 
version of facts at trial. Such repetitive exposure may diminish the jurors' ability to 
separate information absorbed before trial from information during trial." State v. Hall, 
111 Idaho 827, 830, 727 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Ct. App. 1986) (discussed favorably in State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 278, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003)). This danger seems especially 
insidious in cases such as this one--where some, but not a great deal, of time has passed 
between the most frenzied media coverage and the actual trial. In this case, enough time 
has passed (approximately a year and half between the time that the police, amid great 
pomp and circumstance, announced that they had collared "their man," and the time that 
Petitioner was actually tried) for potential jurors to forget the details of what they had 
heard and seen in the news, such that their biases would not have been readily articulable 
during jury selection, but an insufficient amount of time had passed for those potential 
jurors to have forgotten their much more subtle biases about the police, the evidence, and 
the defendant. 
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In light of both the quantity and the quality of the pretrial pUblicity in this case, 
trial counsel should have, at the very least, thoroughly investigated and considered the 
issue of whether it was possible for Petitioner to receive a fair trial before an unbiased 
jury in Ada County. ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.7 ("Counsel should 
maintain copies of media reports about the case for various purposes, including to support 
a motion for change of venue, if appropriate, to assist in the voir dire of the jury 
regarding the effects of pretrial pUblicity, to monitor the public statements of potential 
witnesses, and to facilitate the work of counsel who might be involved in later stages of 
the case.") Moreover, because even a cursory review of the pretrial pUblicity that 
occurred in this case reveals that there was "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news 
coverage prevented a fair trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution," State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003), and, thus, a 
change of venue would likely have been granted, counsel should have done more than 
simply investigate; counsel should have fully developed and litigated a motion for a 
change of venue. 
2. Trial Counsels' Failure To Poll The Community And/Or Obtain 
Affidavits Demonstrating A Community Bias Against Petitioner. 
Although the sheer volume and prejudicial nature of the pretrial publicity in this 
case was sufficient to warrant a change of venue, see, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 
723 (1963), counsel was, nevertheless, required to do more than rely on the publicity 
itself; counsel was required to develop a thorough motion to change venue, highlighting 
all possible grounds for that motion to be granted. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to 
Guideline 10.8 ("Whether raising an issue specific to a capital case (such as requesting 
individual, sequestered voir dire on death-qualification of the jury) or a more common 
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motion shaped by the capital aspect of the case (such as requesting a change of venue 
because of publicity), counsel should be sure to litigate all of the possible legal and 
factual bases for the request. This will increase the likelihood that the request will be 
granted and will also fully preserve the issue for post-conviction review in the event the 
claim is denied."). That means that counsel had an obligation to obtain evidence that the 
community was, in fact, biased against Petitioner. See Hall, 111 Idaho at 830, 727 P.2d 
at 1258 ("Among the factors considered [when reviewing a judge's denial of a motion to 
change venue] are the existence of affidavits indicating prejudice, or lack of prejudice, in 
the community where the defendant was tried .... ") Thus, in this case, trial counsel 
should have made some effort to document, in a systematic and reliable way, the bias of 
the community, i.e., the jury pool. 
In the present case, every indication is that trial counsel made no effort 
whatsoever to document, in a systematic and reliable way, the bias of the community.34 
Because such an effort would likely have revealed an overwhelming bias against 
Petitioner, and because such bias would likely have led to a motion for change of venue 
being granted, Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective. 
3. Trial Counsels' Failure To File A Motion To Change Venue Or, In The 
Alternative, To Have A Jury From Another County Impaneled. 
Because no motion for change of venue was filed, this Court was never given the 
opportunity to review the significant amount of damaging media coverage regarding this 
case and Petitioner generally. As discussed above, such a motion would have been 
extremely compelling, and would have been likely to succeed based solely upon the 
34 Because trial counsel has refused to disclose their notes or to otherwise cooperate with 
post-conviction counsel, this claim cannot be fully developed until such time as Petitioner 
is allowed to engage in discovery. 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 
prejudicial media coverage. However, it would have been more thorough, and would 
have had a better chance to succeed if supported by evidence-such as affidavits or a 
poll-quantifying the level of actual bias against Petitioner. Either way though, trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file any motion to change venue. 
4. Trial Counsels' Failure To Develop An Adequate Record For Appeal By 
Failing To Adequately Question Potential Jurors During Voir Dire As To 
The Amount, And Nature, Of The Pretrial Publicity To Which They Had 
Been Exposed. 
As discussed above, the Idaho courts have been incorrect when they have said that 
in order to obtain a change of venue based upon unfair pretrial publicity the defendant 
must show that he was actually prejudiced by inclusion of a juror, specifically proven to 
be biased, on his jury. See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). Nevertheless, 
there can be no doubt that inclusion of a juror, specifically shown to be biased, warrants 
vacation of the defendant's conviction. United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111 
(9th Cir. 2000). Thus, in this case, trial counsel should have thoroughly examined all of 
the prospective jurors regarding the extent to which they had been exposed to, and 
influenced by, pretrial publicity-whether to make a record to appeal a denial of a motion 
for change of venue (had one been filed) or to ferret out instances of actual bias. See 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8 ("Whether raising an issue specific to a 
capital case (such as requesting individual, sequestered voir dire on death-qualification of 
the jury) or a more common motion shaped by the capital aspect of the case (such as 
requesting a change of venue because of publicity), counsel should be sure to litigate all 
of the possible legal and factual bases for the request. This will increase the likelihood 
that the request will be granted and will also fully preserve the issue for post-conviction 
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review in the event the claim is denied."). However, as set forth in detail below, trial 
counsel utterly failed to do SO.35 
Linda Ostolasa (Juror No. 6) 
Ms. Ostalasa, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. I, p.850, Ls.22-
24.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.850, L.25.) Later, in response to a question from the prosecutor, Ms. Ostalasa indicated 
that she had seen "the media" before. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1060, Ls.17-I8.) But it is not clear 
whether the prosecutor was talking about a news program or fictional television 
programming when he asked that question. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.1060, Ls.5-23.) Either 
way, it is obvious that these questions, which were the only questions that could have 
gone anywhere toward delving into the question of whether Ms. Ostolasa had come into 
contact with any of the extensive pretrial pUblicity in this case, or had formed some type 
of opinions about the case based on that publicity, were not well-crafted for that purpose. 
Thus, trial counsel should have followed up with questions of their own. However, they 
did not. They did not ask a single question about pretrial pUblicity, or Ms. Ostolasa's 
pre-conceptions about the case, before passing her for cause. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, 
p.1067, L.I8 -p.1083, L.5.) 
Betty Clark Mitchell (Juror No. 51) 
Ms. Clark Mitchell, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was 
asked by the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion 
35 Undersigned counsel is not aware of the extent to which the juror questionnaires 
inquired into matters of pretrial publicity since Petitioner has not yet received them. 
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that the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.1766, Ls.lO-12.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.1766, L.B.) 
The prosecutor asked Ms. Clark Mitchell if she was a Greenbelt user, and Ms. 
Clark Mitchell answered affmnatively. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1829, L.IS - p.1830, L.3.) Later, 
the prosecutor asked Ms. Clark Mitchell if she remembered the details of the Henneman 
case and whether she was a television news watcher, and Ms. Clark Mitchell answered 
affinnatively again-to both questions. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1831, Ls.9-18.) Thereafter, the 
prosecutor tried to elicit testimony along the lines of "but that's all I can remember about 
the case," but Ms. Clark Mitchell kept coming up with additional details that she could 
recall-she volunteered that she remembered that Ms. Henneman's body was not found 
for some time, that Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death "was a huge story," that 
she was exposed to the details of the Henneman case through newspapers and television 
news, and that Petitioner was finally "caught" and arrested. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.1831, L.9 
-p.1832, L.1O.) 
Despite the fact that Ms. Clark Mitchell had said that she was a Greenbelt user, 
that she had been exposed to the extensive (prejudicial) news coverage about the 
Henneman case, and that she remembered that Petitioner had been "caught," trial counsel 
never asked any worthwhile follow-up questions about the pUblicity issue. (See generally 
Tr. Vol. II, p.1832, L.21 - p.1849, L.16.) Instead, counsel asked cursorily whether Ms. 
Clark Mitchell could recall Petitioner's background or the circumstances of his being 
charged and, when she said no to both questions, counsel tried to essentially rehabilitate 
her by asking, in a leading fashion, whether, when she said Petitioner had been "caught," 
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she meant to imply that she believed he was guilty. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1833, Ls.2-16.) Ms. 
Clark Mitchell answered this last question with a "no." (Tr. Vol. II, p.1833, Ls.ll-16.) 
Ultimately, trial counsel passed Ms. Clark Mitchell for cause. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1849, L.16.) 
An effective voir dire would have entailed deeper, more probing, questions about 
what Ms. Clark Mitchell knew about: the Henneman case, including the highly emotional 
fact of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that was made of her 
family's suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar modus operandi 
between the two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of Petitioner's guilt. 
Elisabeth Keeney (Juror No. 62) 
Ms. Keeney, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.1985, 
Ls.17-19.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p.1985, L.20.) 
The prosecutor asked Ms. Keeney what she remembered about the Henneman 
case, and Ms. Keeney testified that she could recall little. (Tr. Vol. n, p.2074, L.20 -
p.2076, L.5.) The only follow-up to this line of questioning on the part of trial counsel 
was to ask whether Ms. Keeney had followed recent articles in the newspaper regarding 
capital juries in general. (Tr. Vol. n, p.2103, L.22 - p.2104, LA.) Ms. Keeney 
responded negatively, indicating that she does not like the Statesman, and that was it. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.2104, Ls.5-16.) 
Again, an effective voir dire would have entailed deeper, more probing, questions 
about what Ms. Keeney knew about: the Henneman case, including the highly emotional 
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fact of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that was made of her 
family's suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar modus operandi 
between the two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of Petitioner's guilt. 
Tammie Johnson (Juror No. 63) 
Ms. Johnson, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.l985, 
Ls.17-19.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p.1985, L.20.) 
The prosecutor asked Ms. Johnson if she could remember anything specific about 
the Henneman case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1211, L.24 -p.2112, L.2.) As Ms. Johnson answered 
that question, first saying that she could not remember any specifics, but then beginning 
to recite those details that she did remember, the prosecutor cut her off "[t]hat suits us 
just fine." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2112, Ls.3-6.) At that point, Ms. Johnson, probably feeling that 
her knowledge of the case actually wasn't important, stated simply: "Just from the paper, 
you know." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2112, L.7.) 
Trial counsel did not ask a single follow-up question about Ms. Johnson's 
exposure to pretrial publicity, or any pre-conceived opinions that she may have 
developed based on that publicity, before passing her for cause. (See generally Tr. Vol. 
II, p.2121, L.22 - p.2136, L.22.) Again, an effective voir dire would have entailed deep, 
probing, questions about what Ms. Johnson knew about: the Henneman case, including 
the highly emotional fact of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that 
was made of her family's suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar 
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modus operandi between the two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of 
Petitioner's guilt. 
John Jasper (Juror No. 65) 
Mr. Jasper, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by the 
Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.1985, 
Ls.17 -19.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p.1985, L.20.) . 
The prosecutor asked Mr. Jasper ifhe and his family used the Greenbelt, and Mr. 
Jasper explained that they had done so on a regular basis. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2146, Ls.12-16.) 
However, he did not follow up with any questions about whether this case had alarmed 
Mr. Jasper, or even whether he knew anything about this case going into it. (See 
generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2140, L.3 - p.2149, L.2.) 
Even though Mr. Jasper had indicated that he and his family had used the Boise 
Greenbelt and, therefore, he was a prime candidate for having been influenced by the 
media's coverage of the Henneman case, trial counsel never questioned him further about 
his feelings about the Greenbelt or about this case. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2149, L.5 
- p.2169, L.22.) Nor did counsel question him about pretrial publicity at all. (See 
generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2149, L.5 -p.2169, L.22.) 
Omar Alloway (Juror No. 68) 
Mr. Alloway, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2177, L.24 
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- p.2178, L.l.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p.2178, L.2.) 
Neither the prosecutor nor trial counsel ever asked Mr. Alloway a single question 
about the quantity and nature of the pretrial pUblicity to which he had been exposed, or 
whether such publicity could have caused him to form preconceptions about this case. 
(See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2227, L.9 - p.2238, L.22 (prosecution's voir dire); p.2239, 
L.l-p.2268, L.2 (defense's voir dire).) 
Ann McNeese (Juror No. 83) 
Ms. McNeese, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked 
by the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that 
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2441, 
Ls.1O-12.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p.2441 , L.13.) 
In response to the prosecutor's questions, Ms. McNeese admitted that she 
remembered, based on television and newspapers, that this case is "the case about the 
woman that was the flight attendant .... It's just that the case on the Grrenbelt, she was 
found murdered." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2491, Ls.2-12.) Ms. McNeese indicated, however, that 
she did not know how Petitioner came to be charged in the case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2491, 
Ls.lS-17.) Later, Ms. McNeese told the prosecutor that her strong pro-death penalty 
views were formed, at least in part, based on her knowledge of criminal cases as reported 
in the newspaper and on television. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2497, L.16 -p.2498, L.lS.) 
After all of that, trial counsel failed to follow up in any meaningful way. Counsel 
did ask if she had ever talked about the Henneman case with her husband (who happens 
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to be a Deputy Attorney General) and, eventually, after twice denying that she had done 
so, Ms. McNeese grudgingly admitted that they may have discussed the case "in passing" 
because "[i]t's odd to have murder cases in Boise." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2511, L.5 - p.2512, 
L.l.) However, trial counsel never sought to find out the details of what Ms. McNeese 
may have known about the Henneman case, what she may have discussed with her 
husbands, and what opinions, preconceptions, or biases she may have formed. (See 
generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2507, L.12 - p.2534, LA.) 
Later, trial counsel asked Ms. McNeese about other high-profile criminal cases, 
such as those of Scott Peterson and O.J. Simpson. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2515, L.23 - p.2517, 
L.l6.) In response to counsel's questions, Ms. McNeese indicated that she had formed 
opinions as to both defendants' guilt based on what she had heard through the media and, 
with regard to the Scott Peterson case, which was ongoing at that time, she had adjudged 
the defendant guilty at "day one." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2515, L.23 - p.2517, L.16.) Yet, trial 
counsel never tried to relate these questions back to the Henneman case by asking why, if 
she was interested in the Peterson and Simpson cases out of southern California, she was 
not interested in a high-profile case right here at home. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, 
p.2507, L.12 - p.2534, LA.) Nor did counsel ever question her ability to remain neutral 
and unpersuaded by the pretrial pUblicity where she readily admitted that she had formed 
steadfast opinions as to defendants' guilt based on pretrial pUblicity in the past. (See 
generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2507, L.12 - p.2534, LA.) 
Joann Frances Brown (Juror No. 85) 
Ms. Brown, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
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defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2441, 
Ls.lO-12.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p.2441 , L.13.) 
The prosecutor asked Ms. Brown what she could recall about the Hennemen case 
from what she had read in the newspaper. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2562, Ls.17-19.) Ms. Brown 
indicated that she remembered that a flight attendant had gone missing and that Ms. 
Henneman's name had "hooked" her, but that Petitioner's name did not, and that she 
could not recall the circumstances of his being charged in this case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2562, 
L.20 - p.2563, L.ll.) However, trial counsel never followed up with these responses in 
any way. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2567, L.20 - p.2594, L.17.) Counsel never sought 
to ferret out the specific details of what she had read and seen, never sought to jog her 
memory about individual news stories, and never sought to determine whether she had 
formed any preconceptions about the case. 
Lori Ann Green (Juror No. 89) 
Ms. Green, and the rest of a mini-panel of five prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2607, Ls.9-
11.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.2607, Ls.12-13.) 
The prosecutor asked Ms. Green what she knew about the Henneman case going 
into it. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2693, Ls.5-6.) Ms. Green responded by saying that she did not 
"know a whole lot." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2693, Ls.7; 10-11.) She indicated that she read about 
Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death, but was not aware that a suspect had been 
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found. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2693, Ls.7-11; p.2693, L.21 - p.2694, LA.) She further indicated 
that she did not know anything about the defendant or how he came to be implicated in 
the Henneman case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2693, Ls.15-20.) 
Trial counsel, once again, failed to adequately follow up on the pUblicity issue. 
The only question counsel presented to Ms. Green was in leading fonn: "I understand 
from what you said before, you haven't been following this case particularly closely?" 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.2713, Ls.19-2l.) Not surprisingly, Ms. Green responded in the negative. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.2713, L.22.) Thus, counsel once again utterly failed to ferret out the 
specific details of what this juror had read and seen, never sought to jog her memory 
about individual news stories, and never sought to detennine whether she had fonned any 
preconceptions about the case. 
Luke Anson Call (Juror No. 102) 
Mr. Call, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by the 
Court whether any of them had "fonned or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2836, 
Ls.21-23.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p.2836, L.24.) 
In response to the prosecutor's questions, Mr. Call indicated that he gets his local 
news on the Statesman's website. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2858, L.25 - p.2859, L.ll.) However, 
the prosecutor never asked whether Mr. Call had read anything about this case on that 
website or had, in any other way, obtained any infonnation about this case. (See 
generally Tr. Vol. IT, p.2847, L.17 - p.2869, LA.) 
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Although trial counsel followed up on the publicity, counsel did so in a cursory 
and wholly inadequate way. Counsel asked Mr. Call whether he remembered anything 
reading about this case, and Mr. Call responded affinnatively. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2869, L.24 
- p.2870, L.3.) Counsel then asked if Mr. Call remembered reading anything about the 
case other than that infonnation which was contained in the juror questionnaire, and Mr. 
Call responded negatively. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2870, Ls.4-9.) Finally, counsel asked if Mr. 
Call knew anything about Petitioner, and Mr. Call again responded negatively. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p.2870, Ls.I0-ll.) Without ferreting out the specific details of what this juror had 
read and seen, without jogging his memory as to what he had been exposed to, and 
without seeking to detennine whether he had fonned any preconceptions about the case, 
counsel moved on to other topics and, ultimately, passed Mr. Call for cause. (See 
generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2870, L.12 - p.2892, L.15.) 
James Kennedy (Juror No. 110) 
Mr. Kennedy, and the rest of a mini-panel of eight prospective jurors, was asked 
by the Court whether any of them had "fonned or expressed an unqualified opinion that 
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2951, , 
Ls.6-8.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p.2951 , Ls.8-9.) 
The prosecutor asked Mr. Kennedy simply: "And it looks like you have heard that 
the -Lynn Henneman's body was-well, she disappeared and then her body was found. 
Have you heard much beyond that? (Tr. Vol. II, p.3021, Ls.18-21.) In response, Mr. 
Kennedy said no, he works a lot and does not have time to watch much television. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p.3021 , Ls.22-24.) At that point, the prosecutor positively reinforced Mr. 
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Kennedy's downplaying of his knowledge of the case, explaining: "That suits us fine .... 
The less you know before you walk in here the easier it is for you to make decisions." 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.3021 , L.25 - p.3022, L.4.) 
Trial counsel did follow up on the pretrial pUblicity issue, but not in a meaningful 
way. Counsel started by mischaracterizing and downplaying Mr. Kennedy's knowledge 
of the case: "you say that you haven't heard anything about this case?" (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.3069, L.24 - p.3070, L.l.) Mr. Kennedy clarified the facts, while at the same time 
apparently taking the cue of both attorneys: "Not very much. Heard a little bit, yeah." 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.3070, L.2.) At that point, the follow-up question from counsel was a 
leading query confirming that Mr. Kennedy had not heard how Petitioner came to be 
implicated in the case, again conveying a subtle message that counsel really did not want 
to hear what Mr. Kennedy knew about the case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.3070, L.3-4.) Moreover, 
when Mr. Kennedy's answer indicated that he did not understand the question ("Mr. 
Hall's what-the defendant. Yeah, we read the charges and stuff."), counsel almost 
immediately abandoned the inquiry and passed Mr. Kennedy for cause. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.3070, Ls.3-8.) Thus, not only did counsel generally fail to ask relevant questions, but 
the few questions that counsel did ask were terrible because they were not calculated to 
determine what Mr. Kennedy had actually heard or what preconceptions Mr. Kennedy 
might actually have and, in fact, conveyed to Mr. Kennedy that the "correct" response 
was to say "no, I don't know anything about the case." 
Diane Proctor (Juror No. 111) 
Ms. Proctor, and the rest of a mini-panel of eight prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
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defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.29S1, Ls.6-
8.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.29S1, Ls.8-9.) 
The prosecutor asked Ms. Proctor about the fact that she knew Dave Smith, the 
lead detective in the Henneman case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.307S, Ls.2-12.) However, he never 
asked Ms. Proctor if she had seen the extremely favorable media coverage of Mr. Smith 
during the pendency of the Henneman case. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.3073, L.23 -
p.3086, L.S.) In fact, he never asked if Ms. Proctor had seen any pretrial coverage of the 
case. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.3073, L.23 - p.3086, L.S.) 
Again, trial counsel utterly failed to follow up in a productive manner. Counsel 
again raised the issue of pretrial publicity with a leading question conveying the message 
that the "correct" was to say "no, I know nothing about this case:" "You have indicated 
you know something about this case, and I don't know that you know anything other than 
what we've already told you. But do you know anything about?" (Tr. Vol. II, p.3086, 
Ls.l7-21.) Not surprisingly, Ms. Proctor parroted back many of the same words used by 
counsel in his leading question: "I know nothing about it, other than what's been reported 
in the Statesman early on." (Tr. Vol. II, p.3086, Ls.22-23.) At that point, counsel 
confinned that Ms. Proctor believed that her memory of the case was constrained to Ms. 
Henneman's disappearance and death in the 2000 timeframe, not Petitioner's becoming a 
suspect in the 2003 timeframe, and was content to move on to other matters. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.3086, L.24 - p.3087, L.S.) Counsel never sought to investigate the issue of whether 
Ms. Proctor had been traumatized by the event or preconditioned to look favorably upon 
the State's evidence; counsel was concerned only with the issue of whether she knew that 
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Petitioner stood accused of murder in the Hanlon case as well, but did not even examine 
that issue carefully. 
5. Trial Counsel Failed To Develop An Adequate Record For Appeal By 
Failing To Question Potential Jurors During Voir Dire As To Their 
Preconceived Opinions As To Petitioner's Guilt And The Sentence That 
He Should Receive. 
See Claim N.4, supra 
6. Trial Counsel Failed To Develop An Adequate Record For Appeal By 
Failing To Move To Strike Biased Jurors For Cause. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim because he is still conducting his 
reinvestigation of the case, as well as awaiting receipt of the jury questionnaires, 
discovery, cooperation from trial counsel, and permission from the Court to contact the 
Jurors. 
7. Trial Counsel Failed To Develop An Adequate Record For Appeal By 
Failing To Exercise Peremptory Strikes To Remove Jurors Who Had 
Admitted That Pretrial Publicity Had Caused Them To Be Biased 
Against Petitioner, But Who Were Not Removed For Cause. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim because he is still conducting his 
reinvestigation of the case, as well as awaiting receipt of the jury questionnaires, 
discovery, cooperation from trial counsel, and permission from the Court to contact the 
Jurors. 
O. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO PRECLUDE AND OBJECT TO TESTIMONY. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Object To, Or Otherwise Preclude, Opinion Evidence Of Dr. Glen 
Groben Not Based Upon A Reasonable Degree Of Medical Probability, 
And Their Failure To Move For A Mistrial When Dr. Groben Testified 
Before The Juror Inconsistently With An Opinion Relayed During His 
Voir Dire Outside The Presence Of The Jury. 
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To be admissible, an expert's opinion must be based on a reasonable degree of 
medical probability. Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 934 P.2d 17 (1997). 
Expert opinion, which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the 
record, is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is 
inadmissible under IRE 702. State v. Alger, 115 Idaho 42, 764 P.2d 119 (1988); Bromley 
v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999) (trial court did not err in excluding 
testimony of ballistics expert where expert never performed testing and only speculated 
about possible causes); but see State v. Schneider, 129 Idaho 59, 921 P.2d 759 (Ct. App. 
1996) (Ct. App. 1996) (where expert previously expressed opinion on cause of death, 
subsequent testimony on other possible causes properly expressed qualifications on that 
opinion). Expert opinion testimony based upon a mere possibility of a causal connection 
does not satisfy the standard for admissibility. Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., supra. 
Petitioner also asserts that due process and the need for heightened reliability in capital 
cases guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments requires that Dr. Glen 
Groben's opinions should have been, but were not, supported by a preponderance of 
evidence. In addition, permitting Dr. Groben to base his opinions on mere speCUlation or 
possibilities violated Petitioner's rights to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 
Petitioner asserts that several opinions related by Dr. Groben were objectionable 
as speCUlative, conclusory, unsubstantiated, or based upon mere possibilities. Trial 
counsel apparently shared this opinion, and moved to strike Dr. Groben's reenactment 
opinion based on a lack of foundation, relevance and prejudice, (Tr., p. 3967, L. 14 - p. 
3969, L. 17; p. 4001, L. 4), but did not specifically move to exclude or strike such 
opinion, the assumptions upon which the opinion was based, as well as other independent 
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opinions based on IRE 702 or the constitutional grounds asserted above. Opinions that 
should not have been admitted included the following: 
• That "[t]here were seven defects on [the victim's] head, but only five of 
those could I say were definitively impacts. (Tr., p. 3981, Ls. 17-19) 
• That the cause of death was ligature strangulation. (Tr., p. 3989, Ls. 5-7 
(Q. Do you have an opinion, Doctor, on the cause of death of Lynn 
Henneman? A. Ligature strangulation.); p. 4069, Ls. 3-11.).) 
• That the cause of death was not drowning. (Tr., p. 3990, Ls. 21-23.) 
• That the victim's body was lying on a hard surface with the upper body in 
contact with that surface for at least a twelve-hour period. (Tr., p. 3994, 
Ls. 4-7; Tr., p. 4056, Ls. 17-20 (Q. SO you think that the person died and 
then remained on a flat surface on the shore for the full 12 hours you 
think? A. Probably did, yeah.); p. 4057, Ls. 1-2 (So 12 hours is a good 
median, happy medium there. So I can't say for sure.).) 
• That the lividity on the victim's body was due to being hogtied and that 
the reenactment photographs were an accurate rendition of the victim's 
post-mortem condition. (Tr., p. 4000, L. 20 - p. 4001, L. 23.) 
• Any opinions in regard to the reenactment photographs due to 
inconsistencies in Dr. Groben's testimony and bias for the prosecution. 
Specifically, while the jury was in recess and during voir dire in aid of the 
defense objection to the photographs on relevance grounds, Dr. Groben 
testified that the victim was hog-tied after death. (Tr., p. 4030, Ls. 10-12; 
p. 4008, Ls. 3-7 (Q. Are you suggesting that this occurred when the person 
was alive? A. No. I believe they were strangled and then placed on her 
stomach when this was done.) Following this testimony, the State made an 
argument that despite Dr. Groben's testimony, the victim may have been 
alive when tied up. (Tr., p. 4008, Ls. 22-23.) Subsequently, during cross-
examination, trial counsel inquired whether the victim was tied before or 
after death, presumably assuming that the doctor would testify consistently 
with his voir dire testimony. However, the doctor stated that he had no 
way of knowing thus leaving the jury with the impression that the victim 
may have been alive and conscious when hogtied. (Tr., p. 4078, L. 19 - p. 
4079, L. 3) (Q. Okay. Do you have any way of knowing whether the 
hands were tied before or after death? A. No. Q. In the scenario that you 
had photographed with the -- using the -- the cloth, I guess, to tie both 
wrists and the ankles together. Do you have any way of knowing whether 
that could have happened before or after death? A. No.) Trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial. In the alternative, trial should 
have moved to have the record read back for impeachment purposes and 
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requested a special instruction from the Court that the jury could use such 
prior statement to establish the truth of the matter asserted and to question 
Dr. Groben's credibility. 
• That the victim died approximately thirty minutes after her last meal. (Tr., 
p. 4038, Ls. 6-10.) 
• That the victim's right arm was broken post-mortem but prior to the body 
being placed in the river. (Tr., p. 4056, Ls. 2-5) ("So that would be the 
most logical assumption on that. I can't say for sure though. That's just 
my opinion on when it would have occurred.) 
• That the alcohol in the victim's body was produced post-mortem. (Tr., p. 
4061, Ls. 5-10.) 
In support of this claim, Petitioner submits the affidavit of Dr. Sally Aiken in 
which she notes numerous opinions by Dr. Groben that were conflated, were not based on 
a reasonable degree of medical probability, or were otherwise not based on sound 
science. (Exhibit 24.) 
Petitioner asserts that trial counsels' failure to object or otherwise preclude Dr. 
Groben's opinions constituted deficient perfonnance that creates a reasonable probability 
that the outcome would have been different both at trial and at sentencing. Petitioner also 
asserts that trial counsels' failure to move for a mistrial, after Dr. Groben testified before 
the jury that he had know way of knowing whether the victim was alive when hogtied 
where he had just testified outside the presence of the jury that he believed the victim was 
dead when hogtied. Petitioner was prejudiced because there is a reasonable probability 
that a mistrial would have been granted. Further, if the motion for mistrial had been 
denied, then counsel should have asked the court reporter to playback Dr. Groben's 
testimony to both undennine his credibility and to establish that the victim was in fact 
deceased at the time she was hogtied. Trial counsels' failure to take such measures also 
prejudiced Petitioner. Since Dr. Groben's testimony was relevant at both trial and 
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sentencing, there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have been 
convicted of murder of the first degree or sentenced to death. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still investigating this claim and is 
anticipating additional relevant evidence to be disclosed following a positive ruling on his 
Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006, and scheduled for hearing in June 2006. 
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Object To, Or Otherwise Preclude, Testimony Of Norma Jean Oliver Due 
To Her Lack Of Competency To Testify. 
Trial counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Norma Jean 
Oliver. (R., p.372-375.) In their motion, counsel noted that the circumstances to which 
Ms. Oliver was to testify were thirteen years old and involved criminal charges resulting 
in a plea agreement that precluded any contemporaneous cross-examination. 
Trial counsel was fully aware of her state of mind prior to Ms. Oliver taking the 








Okay. Who is your first witness? 
Norma Jean Oliver. 
And you have had the opportunity, Mr. Myshin, to 
prepare for this? 
Yeah. 
All right. 
I mean she was too distraught to even talk to. 
Okay. All right. And then the second witness 
tonight, sir was? 
Tr., p.4755, L.21·- p.4756, L.3. 
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Trial counsel should have moved to exclude Ms. Oliver's testimony based on a 
lack of competence. Trial counsels' failure to object to or move to strike Ms. Oliver's 
testimony based on her incompetence was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. 
Trial counsel obviously heard the testimony of Ms. Oliver, yet failed to move to strike 
her testimony or preclude further testimony. A witness' lack of recollection is grounds for 
exclusion of testimony. I.R.E. 602 (witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the 
matter); see Claim F.3, supra, State v. Johnson, supra, State v. (Patrick) Hall, supra. The 
admission of this testimony violated the Sixth Amendment, and because this was a capital 
sentencing proceeding, the admission of this testimony violated the Eighth Amendment 
and the Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Object To, Or Otherwise Preclude, Testimony Of Other Criminal Acts. 
Petitioner asserts that evidence of other criminal activity was used as non-
statutory aggravating circumstances. (Tr., p. 5518, L. 5 - p. 5520, L. 20.) As such, the 
Court should have instructed that the State bore the burden of proving such circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Such other criminal acts included the alleged forcible rape of 
Norma Jean Oliver. Petitioner was entitled to a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt on 
such crimes based on his rights as guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
In addition, with the advent of jury sentencing, and the inability, or limited ability, 
of juries to disregard irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence, Petitioner submits 
that evidence of other crimes should not be admitted into evidence as support for 
statutory aggravating circumstances unless they are proven to have occurred beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. But see State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983). In the 
alternative, Petitioner asserts that where evidence of other crimes are admitted as support 
for statutory aggravators, the Court should instruct the jury to disregard such evidence 
unless the jury finds that the other crimes are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
People v. Kennedy, 36 Ca1.4th 595, 636 (2005). Further, Petitioner asserts that even if 
evidence of other crimes are admissible upon a mere preponderance of the evidence, trial 
counsel should have moved for a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine the reliability 
and sufficiency of the evidence prior to admission before a jury. 
Petitioner asserts that evidence that he forcibly raped Norma Jean Oliver, i.e., 
evidence of another charged crime to which he pled guilty to reduced charges, would not 
have been admissible under any of these claims. Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied 
both prongs of Strickland. 
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Object To, Or Otherwise Preclude, Hearsay Testimony. 
Trial counsel failed to object to or inadequately objected to numerous instances of 
the admission of inadmissible hearsay violating both the rules of evidence and the 
Confrontation Clause to the United States Constitution and applicable state and federal 
case law. See Claim G, supra. Petitioner requires additional time to analyze the trial 
transcripts in order to fully state this claim. 
P. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES AND 
REBUT STATE THEORIES. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Effectively Cross-Examine Dr. Groben And Rebut The State's 
Presentation Of Evidence That The Victim Was Hogtied And Suffered A 
Terrifying And Tortuous Death. 
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The State's evidence and subsequent argument that the victim was not only 
hogtied, but hogtied while conscious, and that the victim suffered a terrifying and 
tortuous death was based nearly entirely on the testimony of Dr. Glenn Groben. Trial 
counsel failed to hire a forensic pathologist or other expert to review Dr. Groben's results 
and make an independent determination of cause of death or injuries inflicted upon the 
victim prior to her death. Trial counsel should have obtained independent consultation in 
each of these areas to truly subject the prosecution's case to the level of adversarial 
testing demanded in capital cases at both the guilt and penalty phases at trial. 
During Petitioner's reinvestigation of the case, he has consulted with Dr. Sally 
Aiken. Dr. Aiken is a pathologist with the Spokane County Medical Examiner's officer 
in Spokane, Washington. (Exhibit 24.) Dr. Aiken also consulted with trial counsel on 
both the Hanlon and Henneman cases; however, trial counsel failed to consult with her 
until after Petitioner's trial and jury sentencing. (Exhibit 24.) Had trial counsel 
consulted with Dr. Aiken in a timely manner, they would have been able to preclude 
much of Dr. Groben's speculative testimony. They also would have been able to 
effectively cross-examine Dr. Groben. 
For instance, Dr. Groben testified that the victim died of ligature strangulation 
(Ir., p. 3989, Ls. 5-7), and that it would take three to five minutes for death to take place. 
(Ir., p. 4040, Ls. 19 - 20). Dr. Aiken strongly disagrees, and states: 
An article of clothing around the neck is not enough evidence to draw the 
conclusion that strangulation occurred. Dr. Groben's opinion in this 
regard is speCUlation. The decedent had no internal neck injuries .... Dr. 
Groben cannot exclude the possibility that this ligature was applied after 
death to aid in moving the body, for example. In my opinion, the cause of 
death would have been listed most accurately as "homicidal violence of 
unknown etiology." 
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(Exhibit 24.) 
Dr. Aiken also disavowed Dr. Groben's re-enactment of ligatures because it was 
"not based on a reasonable degree of medical probability." Dr. Aiken disputes that 
ligatures were necessarily applied at all, and rejects Dr. Groben's testimony to the jury 
that there was no way to know whether the ligatures, if any, were applied before or after 
death. (See Tr., p. 4078, L. 19 - p. 4079, L. 3.) Dr. Aiken would have testified that the 
lack of injury beneath the ligature of the left wrist argues against this ligature being 
present premortem. (Exhibit 24.) 
Trial counsel's failure to consult with Dr. Aiken was highly prejudicial. The State 
used Dr. Groben's testimony as the basis for setting out an egg timer to support a finding 
of premeditated murder, to dramatize the horror of dying in this manner to support, at a 
minimum, the utter disregard aggravator: 
... This utter disregard aggravating factor refers to the defendant's lack of 
conscience regarding the killing of a human being. Again doesn't this jury 
instruction look like it was written for Erick Hall? Doesn't it look like it 
was written to describe him? You know that it fits. Last Thursday Mr. 
Bourne talked to you about this utter disregard and how Lynn was killed. 
He did it with his egg timer and you've been in the courtroom with a lot of 
high tech things. But what has been more dramatic at showing you what 
this was like with this egg timer? 
(Tr., p. 5452, Ls. 11-22.) The State also admitted the highly inflammatory "re-enactment 
photos of the victim's nude, partly decomposed body "hog-tied." 
Had counsel consulted with Dr. Aiken, there would have been doubt as to the 
cause of death, no consideration of speculative theories about the cause of death, and no 
consideration of speculative theories about horror endured by the victim. Trial counsel 
could have kept highly prejudicial speculative displays from the jury. 
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Dr. Aiken would have testified at Petitioner's trial or sentencing regarding her 
findings if she had been contacted prior to Petitioner's conviction and sentence of death, 
and her testimony would have contradicted that of Dr. Groben. Further, timely 
consultation with Dr. Aiken would have at least provided trial counsel with an 
opportunity to effectively cross-examine Dr. Groben. 
In summary, consultation with Dr. Aiken would have provided trial counsel with 
the information necessary to challenge Dr. Groben's testimony regarding: cause of death; 
cause of lividity patterns; whether, even if present, ligatures were applied before death; 
time of death; the murder weapon; the number pre-mortem head wounds; Dr. Groben's 
qualifications; and the accreditation status and reliability of the Ada County Coroner's 
Office. 
Dr. Aiken requested trial counsel provide X-rays, microscopic slides and formal 
toxicology reports. (Exhibit 24.) Dr. Aiken never received this information from trial 
counsel. These items and others are still necessary to conduct a full review of the case, 
but Petitioner is awaiting a decision on his Motion for Discovery. This investigation, 
then, is ongoing, and further information will be provided to Dr. Aiken in order to obtain 
a complete consultation. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied both prongs 
of Strickland. 
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Effectively Cross-Examine Catherine Colombo And Rebut The State's 
Argument That Petitioner Was The Only Contributor Of DNA Removed 
From The Victim. 
The DNA testing prior to trial showed that there was a 13th allele at the D5 
marker. Neither Petitioner nor the victim had a 13th allele at that location. Trial counsel 
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was ineffective in failing to call an independent DNA expert as a witness to dispute the 
misleading conclusions given to the jury despite the presence of the 13th allele.
36 
Kathryn Colombo testified for the State regarding the DNA evidence. Even 
though Ms. Colombo acknowledged that the 13th allele "could be the true nature of the 
sample" (Tr., p. 4467, Ls. 15-16), she downplayed its importance by repeatedly testifying 
that it could be a "stutter artifact," a ''technical artifact," or "contamination." (Tr., pp. 
4466, L. 20 - p. 4467, L. 15.) Ms. Colombo testified that she could not "make any 
conclusions about that type because it's just so little information." (Tr., p. 4467, Ls. 3-
4.) Trial counsel was ineffective in allowing the State's expert to downplay the 
probability of a second semen contributor by labeling it a mere "possibility" among other, 
unlikely possibilities. 
Dr. Colombo's conclusions were based on an assumption that there were only two 
sources of the DNA and that the non-sperm donor is one source: 
Q. Okay. And in that letter do you say that your calculations, or your 
conclusions are based upon the assumption that there was only one 
contributor to the - one male contributor to the sperm fraction? 
A. No. I stated that there are only two sources of the DNA and that 
the non-sperm donor is one source. Those are the assumptions. 
Q. Assumptions. 
A. Correct. 
Q. In fact, you used the word, didn't you? 
36 It appears as though trial counsel did consult with a DNA analyst at Forensic 
Analytical. However, due to trial counsel's failure to consult with and fully disclose files 
to post-conviction counsel, it is unknown the extent of the consultation. It appears that 
trial counsel did not attempt to retain a DNA expert for trial for either consultation or 
expert testimony. Thus, Petitioner asserts that counsel's failures precluded adequate 
cross examination and rebuttal of the State expert's DNA testimony, to the prejudice of 
Petitioner. 
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A. I did. And actually in the original reports I told you that there was 
an original report written in December of 2000, and that I then 
amended it on April 28th, 2003. And the only difference between 
those two reports is that I crossed out that assuming two people in 
the chart. And we decided to do that because the primary profile is 
so clear and so unambiguous you don't need to make any 
assumptions in order to pull out that primary profile. 
Q. Is it possible that there was a second male contributor to the sperm 
fraction? 
A. It's possible. We've got one reading, it the only reading, a small 
type that cannot be attributed to the non-sperm donor or the 
primary source of the sperm fraction. So I don't know where that 
came from. 
Q. Thank you. 
(Tr., p. 4525, L. 23 - p. 4526, L. 25.) The non-sperm donor is, of course, the victim. 
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit that the 13th allele was in fact positive 
evidence of a second sperm donor, and for not adequately challenging the assumptions 
upon which Ms. Colombo based her findings. 
Petitioner has consulted with Dr. Greg Hampikian, Ph.D. Dr. Hampikian teaches 
at Boise State University and his expertise is in forensic biology and DNA analysis. 
(Exhibit 8.) After reviewing data and testimony,37 Dr. Hampikian is certain, "to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability," that "the semen sample recovered from the 
victim includes DNA from more than one male." (Exhibit 8.) Dr. Hampikian's 
analysis shows that the 13th allele is a "real" DNA peak, and it indicates a second male 
contributor. Had trial counsel called an expert to testify, the jury would have heard 
testimony similar to Dr. Hampikian's conclusion, "The most direct interpretation of the 
37 Again, these consultations are still in preliminary stages due to time restrictions and failure to 
receive discovery necessary to expert conSUltation. 
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DNA evidence presented at trial is that a second male contributor is included in the 
semen sample recovered from the victim. The best evidence of this is the 13th allele at 
D5." (Exhibit 8.) 
This was critical infonnation to a jury detennination both at the guilt and penalty 
phases of trial, and casts doubt on Petitioner's role in the homicide and therefore casts 
doubt on Petitioner's moral culpability as to guilt and punishment. Trial counsel's failure 
to adequately consult with an expert at trial and failure to call an expert to testify, left the 
jury with a muddled, confusing picture of the DNA evidence at best and the belief that 
the 13th allele was a meaningless bit of stutter or contamination at worst, leaving 
Petitioner as the sole moral agent involved in the homicide. Petitioner asserts that he has 
satisfied both prongs of Strickland. 
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Effectively Cross-Examine Norma Jean Oliver. 
Trial counsel's cross-examination of Ms. Oliver fell well below the standards of 
acceptable trial practice and was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. Trial 
counsel failed to cross-examine Ms. Oliver about discrepancies between her grand jury 
testimony in the statutory rape case and her testimony at Petitioner's sentencing tria1.38 
Trial counsel failed to cross-examine Ms. Oliver about discrepancies between her 
testimony and Dr. Hess' report. Trial counsel failed to cross-examine Ms. Oliver about 
discrepancies between her testimony and Dr. Vickman's emergency room report, which 
38 Petitioner does not yet have the Grand Jury transcripts, but has good cause to believe 
that there will be significant discrepancies given Ms. Oliver's inability to testify in the 
rape case, and her lack of memory at Petitioner's sentencing. Furthennore, it does not 
appear that trial counsel obtained transcripts of the grand jury proceedings or used those 
transcripts to cross examine Ms. Oliver, Detective Hess or Jay Rosenthal. The failure to 
obtain prior testimony to prepare for cross-examination is in itself woefully deficient. 
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was contained in trial counsel's files. These failures, as well as those described in Claims 
D.1 and E.4, fell well below an objectively reasonable standard for effectiveness. But 
for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that outcome of the 
trial and the sentencing would have been different. 
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Effectively Cross-Examine Detective Daniel Hess. 
Trial counsel's cross-examination of Detective Daniel Hess fell well below the 
standards of acceptable trial practice and was both deficient and prejudicial under 
Strickland. Trial counsel failed to cross-examine Det. Hess about discrepancies between 
his report and Ms. Oliver's testimony/9 his report and his own testimony, his report and 
Dr. Vickman's emergency room report. Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied both 
prongs of Strickland. 
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Effectively Cross-Examine Jay Rosenthal. 
Trial counsel's cross-examination of Jay Rosenthal fell well below the standards 
of acceptable trial practice and was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. In 
addition to failing to cross-examine Mr. Rosenthal about the reduction of charges against 
Petitioner with respect to the Norma Jean Oliver case, trial counsel failed to cross-
examine Mr. Rosenthal about Petitioner's ultimate sentence for the statutory rape. 
Petitioner received a mere five years, with one year fixed in that case. This sentence is 
just barely above the mandatory minimum sentence, and the statute allows a maximum of 
a life sentence. I.C. § 18-6104 (prescribing minimum sentence of one year and 
39 It appears as though Detective Hess had reviewed his reports (Tr., p. 4789, Ls. 10-14), 
so it is inexplicable why trial counsel did not effectively use the reports during the cross-
examination. 
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maximum sentence of life imprisonment). The low sentence, presumably recommended 
by the Mr. Rosenthal as part of a plea agreement, indicates either that the State's case 
against Petitioner was weak, or that the State did not believe Ms. Oliver's allegations of 
violence. Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland. 
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Effectively Cross-Examine April Sebastian. 
Trial counsel's cross-examination of April Sebastian was both deficient and 
prejudicial under Strickland. Counsel was actively representing Ms. Sebastian at the time 
of Petitioner's trial. (See Claims J.3, supra.) During cross-examination, trial counsel 
seemed more concerned with Ms. Sebastian's well being than with impeaching her 
testimony: 
Q. Tell him that. How were you making a living? 
A. I was stealing from stores, you know, ashamed of myself now, but, 
yeah, I stole from stores and re-sell stuff, sell it to people to make a living, 
pay my bills. 
Q. In fact, that's not an uncommon way for some folks to make a living? 
A. Huh-uh, it's not. 
Q. Stealing and either taking it back to stores or selling it to people, things 
like that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. But you're doing better now? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. In fact, I think you were telling me that you're working on your GED? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're feeling pretty good about the future? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. All right. 
A. Yes, new programs out. 
Q. You think you're benefiting from them? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And I'm sure when you get out you're going to have a happy life? 
A. Yeah, a totally different life. 
Q. Good. Good for you, April. Thanks. 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
MR. BOURNE: Not any on that. Thank you. 
(Tr., p. 4895, L. 6 - p. 4896, L. 11.) Trial counsel's cross-examination of a critical 
witness who testified that Petitioner told her he hit people over the head and take their 
money, amounted to nothing more than a friendly "chat," rather than the "crucible" it is 
supposed to be. 
Petitioner requires additional time to continue to investigate Ms. Sebastian's 
incentives to testify favorably for the State, her representation by Petitioner's trial 
counsel, and the substance of her testimony. Petitioner anticipates that much of the 
information will be contained in the discovery he has requested. 
7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Rebut The State's Presentation Of Evidence That Petitioner Has A 
Propensity To Murder And Probably Constitutes A Continuing Threat 
To The Community Through The Testimony Of Dr. Mark Cunningham. 
Trial counsel apparently believed that the Court's ruling that any presentation of 
evidence by the defense that Petitioner would not pose a continuing threat to the 
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community if not executed would necessarily open the door to evidence of the Hanlon 
homicide investigation. Competent capital counsel would have persisted. 
Specifically, trial counsel should have sought through a motion in limine to clear 
the path for the introduction of testimony of Dr. Mark Cunningham that, in his expert 
opinion, Petitioner does not pose a continuing threat to society. Dr. Cunningham's 
assessment would have been based on Petitioner's criminal history, his past behavior 
while incarcerated, and other information, including the facts uncovered in the Hanlon 
homicide investigation. A motion in limine would have included the following points: 
• Reliance on the Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, including his constitutional right to due process, to 
present a defense, and to present mitigation evidence. 
• Reliance on IRE 703 which provides that "Facts or data that are otherwise 
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the 
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value 
in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect." 
• Permission for the State to conduct a risk assessment of Petitioner with 
consideration of the same evidence in the Hanlon case. 
• A comparison of the State's risk assessment with the assessment made by 
Dr. Mark Cunningham. If the State's risk assessment indicates that 
Petitioner probably constitutes a continuing threat, then a determination of 
whether evidence of the Hanlon homicide was a determinative or relevant 
factor in that assessment of future dangerousness. 
If the State's risk assessment did depend on the Hanlon homicide for the 
divergent results, then trial counsel would not present evidence. However, if the State's 
risk assessment did not depend on the Hanlon homicide for the divergent results, then 
there would have been no reason for introduction of evidence from the Hanlon homicide 
investigation. Petitioner asserts that even a risk assessment by the State would not have 
found that facts suggesting that Petitioner committed a rape/murder of another woman in 
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addition to the victim makes Petitioner more of a risk when incarcerated. If Petitioner's 
assertion is correct, and the Court still did not permit trial counsel to proceed, then the 
issue would have been properly preserved for appeal. 
In addition, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel should have asserted that they 
could not make an informed decision whether to present the testimony of Dr. Mark 
Cunningham because they had not yet conducted an adequate investigation of the 
Hanlon case. Therefore, any strategic decision not to present the full testimony of Dr. 
Cunningham so as to preclude opening the door to evidence from the Hanlon homicide 
was necessarily unreasonable because it was not based on an adequate investigation. 
Petitioner asserts that an adequate investigation of the Hanlon case would have 
either: (1) precluded introduction of the evidence under any circumstance; or (2) 
seriously undermined the State's presentation of the Hanlon case if the defense opened 
the door. Petitioner asserts that either of these two outcomes would have occurred 
because of serious questions about the DNA evidence in the Hanlon case. Petitioner 
has reasonable grounds to assert that DNA testing, had it been conducted by trial counsel 
at that time, would have shown that he is excluded as the perpetrator of rape against 
Cheryl Hanlon and thus likely excluded as her killer. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately 
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner requires additional time to 
consult with Dr. Cunningham.40 Finally, Petitioner fears disclosing too much information 
will prematurely disclose his defense in the on-going prosecution of him for the capital 
40 Petitioner anticipates obtaining a declaration from Dr. Mark Cunningham stating that 
in his opinion Petitioner does not present a continuing threat to the community if 
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
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murder of Ms. Hanlon. At this time, the Hanlon trial is scheduled for April 2007. 
Petitioner requests that these proceedings be suspended so as to preclude unnecessary, 
premature and prejudicial disclosures of his defense in that case. While Petitioner's 
reinvestigation is not yet complete and he still awaits a hearing and ruling on his Motion 
For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006, he nevertheless asserts that he has satisfied both 
prongs 0 f Strickland. 
Q. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR 
ELICITING AGGRAVATING EVIDENCE. 
Through careless cross-examination, i.e., by asking open-ended, non-leading 
questions on cross, trial counsel eliciting evidence suggesting that Petitioner was 
suspected of committing rapes other than that of the victim in the underlying case. (Tr., 
p. 4428, Ls. 9-13.) 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately 
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing 
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, Petitioner 
asserts that trial counsels' performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable 
probability that but for counsels' deficient performance the outcome of the trial and 
sentencing would have been different. 
R. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
THEIR FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE GUILT PHASE 
INVESTIGATION. 
The ABA Guidelines set forth trial counsels' obligations to conduct a thorough 
investigation in preparation for both phases of the case, guilt/innocence and penalty. 
Guideline 10.7 .A.l. provides in relevant part that, 
The investigation regarding guilt should be conducted regardless of any 
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admission or statement by the client concerning the facts of the alleged 
crime, or overwhelming evidence of guilt, or any statement by the client 
that evidence bearing upon guilt is not to be collected or presented. 
The Commentary further provides: 
With respect to the guilt/innocence phase, trial counsel must 
independently investigate the circumstances of the crime and all 
evidence-whether testimonial, forensic, or otherwise-purporting to 
inculpate the client. To assume the accuracy of whatever information the 
client may initially offer or the prosecutor may choose or be compelled to 
disclose is to render ineffective assistance of counsel. As more fully 
described infra in the text accompanying notes 195-204, the defense 
lawyer's obligation includes not only finding, interviewing, and 
scrutinizing the backgrounds of potential prosecution witnesses, but also 
searching for any other potential witnesses who might challenge the 
prosecution'S version of events, and SUbjecting all forensic evidence to 
rigorous independent scrutiny. 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 1.1. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of An Alternate 
Perpetrator Of The Murder And Co-Perpetrator Of Rape. 
Trial counsel retained an independent expert in part for the purpose of reviewing 
the DNA testing conducted by Cellmark forensic laboratories. Trial counsels' expert 
indicated that there was a possibility of a contributor to the DNA sample other than the 
victim and Petitioner. However, rather than pursue this line of investigation or retain the 
services of their experts to assist them in the cross-examination of the State's expert, trial 
counsel ended their investigation of an alternate or co-perpetrator theory. 
Had trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation, they would have 
discovered evidence linking Patrick Hoffert to the crime. See supra, claim D-7, 
incorporated herein by reference. As additional support for this claim, Petitioner submits 
the affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian, who will testify to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability that based on Cellmark's own testing, there is a contributor to the DNA 
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removed from the victim that belongs neither to the victim nor to the Petitioner. (Exhibit 
8.) 
Trial counsel should have investigated and presented evidence of an alternate 
perpetrator through evidence from lay witnesses in combination with the opinions of an 
qualified and independent expert DNA. Trial counsels' failures constitute deficient 
performance. But for counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability 
that Petitioner would not have been convicted of murder of the first degree or sentenced 
to death. 
S. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
THEIR FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE SENTENCING 
PHASE INVESTIGATION. 
Trial counsel has a duty to conduct a thorough investigation in preparation for the 
penalty phase at trial. See Rompilla v. Beard, _ U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2456 (2005); 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 US 510 (2003); Williams v. Tay/or, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). In 
Rompilla, the Supreme Court found counsel ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate 
mitigation investigation despite consulting with mental health experts and conducting an 
investigation into the defendant's background. Specifically, trial counsel failed to 
examine a court file on the defendant's prior conviction for rape and assault where the 
filed included additional mitigating evidence. In Wiggins, the Supreme Court found 
counsel ineffective on basis of inadequate mitigation investigation despite the fact that 
counsel arranged psychological testing for their client and obtained some government 
records to assist in developing their client's social history. Finally, in Williams, the 
Supreme Court found counsel ineffective in failing to adequately investigate their client's 
background despite a "competently handled the guilt phase of the trial." Id. at 395-96. 
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Thus, the high court has recognized that the effectiveness of counsel's assistance will be 
subjected to great scrutiny in a capital case. In short, the constitutional demand on 
counsel to conduct a thorough investigation of the penalty phase is high. Consistent with 
such demands, the ABA Guidelines provide in part: 
At that [penalty) phase, trial counsel must both rebut the prosecution's 
case in favor of the death penalty and affirmatively present the best 
possible case in favor of a sentence other than death. If the defendant has 
any prior criminal history, the prosecution can be expected to attempt to 
offer it in support of a death sentence. Trial counsel accordingly must 
comprehensively investigate--together with the defense investigator, a 
mitigation specialist, and other members of the defense team-the 
defendant's behavior and the circumstances of the conviction. Only then 
can counsel protect the accused's Fourteenth Amendment right to deny or 
rebut factual allegations made by the prosecution in support of a death 
sentence, and the client's Eighth Amendment right not to be sentenced to 
death based on prior convictions obtained in violation of his constitutional 
rights. If uncharged prior misconduct is arguably admissible, trial counsel 
must assume that the prosecution will attempt to introduce it, and 
accordingly must thoroughly investigate it as an integral part of preparing 
for the penalty phase. Along with preparing to counter the prosecution's 
case for the death penalty, trial counsel must develop an affirmative case 
for sparing the defendant's life. A capital defendant has an unqualified 
right to present any facet of his character, background, or record that 
might call for a sentence less than death. This Eighth Amendment right to 
offer mitigating evidence "does nothing to fulfill its purpose unless it is 
understood to presuppose that the defense lawyer will unearth, develop, 
present, and insist on the consideration of those 'compassionate or 
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. '" 
Nor will the presentation be persuasive unless it (a) is consistent with that 
made by the defense at the guilt phase and (b) links the evidence offered in 
mitigation to the specific circumstances of the client. 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 1.1. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of Erick Hall's Traumatic 
Childhood Through Live Testimony Of Family Members Including His 
Mother And Father. 
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Trial counsel built their sentencing case almost entirely around Petitioner's 
developmental years.41 Their apparent goal was for the jury to understand Petitioner's 
childhood and find mercy in their hearts with that understanding. Most of the defense's 
case focused negatively on Petitioner's mother and father, Jean and Frank McCracken. 
Neither testified. Trial counsels' failure to call Petitioner's parents, and other family 
members, to testify was objectively unreasonable. Further, trial counsel failed to fully 
elicit mitigating evidence through the testimony of family members that did testify. Their 
failures undermine the confidence in the outcome ofthe sentencing proceedings. 
During the course of Petitioner's reinvestigation of this case, he has discovered 
that both Jean and Frank would have been willing to testify for the defense. Indeed, Jean 
expected to testify but was told at the last moment by trial counsel that she was not 
necessary. Jean was necessary, and so was Frank. Both seek to a certain extent to 
downplay the abuse and neglect experienced by all family members, and each tend to 
point the finger at the other, or at failures of institutions established to assist them. 
Nevertheless, Petitioner's parents do accept responsibility for their failures, and just as 
importantly, both love their son ... despite his failures. See US. v. Hanken, 381 F.Supp.2d 
936 (N.D. Iowa 2005)(noting that jury considered mitigating value in the fact that the 
defendant was loved by his mother, and the emotional trauma that she would be feel from 
the execution of her son) 
The jury should have heard their stories, and the stories of other relatives; because 
only by hearing their stories could the jury have truly understood Petitioner's childhood 
41 Indeed, as discussed below, counsels failed to adequately investigate and present 
evidence of Petitioner's later years. In addition, it appears that trial counsel spent 
absolutely no time investigating a defense to the presentation of the State's case in 
aggravation through various witnesses, primarily Norma Jean Oliver. 
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and "the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse 
frailties of humankind." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). In 
support of this claim, Petitioner attaches the affidavits from the following family 
members who did not testify: 
• Jean Hall McCracken: Jean, Erick's mother was never called to testify 
although she was willing and planned on it. Jean admits that she used 
drugs during her pregnancy with Erick. Jean provides further confirmation 
and further evidence of head injuries sustained by Erick, as well as 
incidents where Erick "would almost black out in terms of being 
conscious of what he was doing, saying, or engaged in." Jean also 
describes similar experiences she has had, suggesting a genetic component 
to Erick's behaviors. Based on a layperson's perspective, but bolstered by 
her intimate knowledge of Erick's childhood behaviors, Jean believes that 
Erick is Bi-Polar. Jean has also experienced the loss of a loved one by 
violence, noting that her father was murdered in 1998. As a witness, Jean 
would have bridged the gap between the loss the victim's family felt and 
the loss that a convicted murderer's mother feels. 42 Like so many of 
Erick's family members and friends, Jean loves him and does not want to 
see him executed. Noted elsewhere, Jean was willing to testify to all these 
matters despite the prosecution's efforts to dissuade her from presenting 
mitigating circumstances at her son's sentencing hearing. 
• Frank McCracken: Frank Sr., Erick's father, acknowledges that he was 
physically and verbally abusive of Jean in front of the children. He reports 
signs of abuse to Erick following his time at juvenile detention center. 
"When Erick came back to California from the boy's home in 1986-87 he 
had markings on his back from having an iron pressed into his body." 
Frank concludes that he loves Erick, "he is my son, he's always been my 
son, and he will always be my son." Frank does not want Erick to be 
executed. 
• Frankie McCracken: Frankie, Erick's older half-brother, further confirms 
the degree of violence in the McCracken family. Frankie has also 
experienced significant problems in the criminal justice system, having 
spent eight years in prison. He does not want Erick to be executed. 
42 The information provided by Jean, including confirmation of her prenatal substance 
abuse and other incidents of head injuries and strange behaviors is relevant to Dr. 
Merikangas' on-going neurological and psychiatric evaluation but was not available at 
the time of the doctor's preliminary report. 
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• Tiffaney Conner: Tiffaney, Erick's youngest half-sister, has no real 
memories of him as a child but does treasure a picture of him holding her 
when she was a baby. Tiffaney does feel a strong connection to him as an 
adult and loves him. She does not want him to be executed and hopes to 
continue a relationship with him despite his incarceration. "My letters are 
my most prized possession of my brother." 
• Kenneth Douglas, Erick's cousin, further tells of instances of violence in 
Erick's childhood. He also describes another serious head injury when 
Erick fell off a second story roof and hit his head on the rock sidewalk. 
Also apparently drawing from a layperson's perspective, Kenneth 
describes Erick's childhood behaviors as characteristic of "manic 
depressive, Bi-Polar, and schizophrenic." He does not want Erick to be 
executed. 
• John Thompson: John, Erick's younger brother, does not want his older 
brother to be executed. John describes the disruption in the household and 
characterizes Erick's mood swings dramatically as a "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde" split personality as a child. John also confirms Shannon's abuse of 
Erick. 
• Kimberly Bacon: Kimberly was married to Erick's older brother, 
Shannon, and knew Erick as a teenager. She was never contacted by trial 
counsel. She has much more information that confirms family accounts of 
Shannon's explosive, unpredictable violence. Her testimony would have 
bolstered claims that Shannon was extremely abusive, would have added 
accounts of Erick witnessing Shannon's violence against Kimberly, and 
would have described the relationship between Shannon and Erick as one 
in which "Shannon kept Erick around so he could have a scapegoat." 
Kimberly, who since meeting Erick has worked at Columbia River Mental 
Health for two years as a specialist, describes Erick's behavior as a 
teenager as "mentally ill, incompetent, and [having] developmental 
delays," suffering from "severe attachment disorder," "major mental 
instability issues," and "extreme mood swings." 
In addition, Petitioner attaches the affidavits from testifying family members 
whose testimony was incomplete due to trial counsels' ineffectiveness in interviewing 
them and preparing them for their testimony: 
• Shawnra McCracken Hemming: Shawnra, Erick's older half-sister felt 
inhibited from disclosing all details of their troubled childhood, feeling 
that the jury might find it unbelievable. She also loves her brother, and 
notes the important role he plays in their family. 
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• Tamara McCracken: Tamara, Erick's older half-sister, would have 
testified just how much she loves her brother, that she does not want to see 
him die, and the turmoil that his execution will cause her. In addition, 
Tamara would have testified to the techniques that the State utilized to try 
to undermine the effectiveness of her testimony, or even dissuade her from 
testifying. While Tamara testified, trial counsel failed to elicit any of these 
mitigating facts. 
• Deanna McCracken: Deanna, Erick's younger sister, would have testified 
that she has heard that when her mother was pregnant with Erick, her 
father, Frank, hit and kicked her in the stomach. She also describes 
moments where Erick would "black out and go into rages." In such 
circumstances, after Erick calmed down, he would have no memory of the 
incident. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately 
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing 
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, Petitioner 
asserts that trial counsels' performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable 
probability that but for counsels' deficient performance the outcome of the trial and 
sentencing would have been different. 
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of An Alternate 
Perpetrator Of The Murder And Co-Perpetrator Of Rape. 
Petitioner incorporates by reference all facts and legal arguments from, D.7, D.8, 
E.6, P .2, and asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 
adequately investigator an alternate perpetrator or co-perpetrator theory. Trial counsels' 
deficient performance creates a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been 
different. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately 
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing 
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006. 
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3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of Institutional Failure In 
Addition To Evidence Of Abuse In Petitioner's Teen-age Years. 
Evidence that institutions created for the benefit of abandoned and neglected 
youth failed a capital defendant is valid mitigating evidence. See In re Lucas, 33 Ca1.4th 
682 (2004) (vacating death sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to 
adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence including evidence of institutional 
failure) In the reinvestigation of his case, Petitioner has located and interviewed Gayle 
Ihringer, an attorney who formerly represented Petitioner when he was juvenile housed at 
the Clark County Juvenile Detention Center in Vancouver, Washington. 
Attached is an affidavit obtained from Ms. Ihringer. (Exhibit 25.) Ms. Ihringer 
relates incidents in which the juvenile system and the psychologist at the detention center 
failed Petitioner and perpetuated the abuse and neglect that he experienced as a child. For 
example, around the time that Petitioner was housed at the center, there were reports that 
one ofthe teacher's had previously molested a child; another teacher posted papers on the 
classroom walls that identified various youth using names such as 'Prison Barbie,' and 
'Jail Janis.' After Petitioner had left the center, she sued the center for placing special 
education youth in closet-sized rooms and locking the doors for extended periods of time. 
On one occasion a youth at the center was contained in such a room for 105 school days. 
Ms. Ihringer notes that Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA), it is mandatory that all special education youth be re-evaluated every three years. 
In addition, changes in placements also trigger mandatory assessments in Washington. 
She states that based on the poor practices of the center, and in particular, its 
psychologist, Petitioner did not received a properly Individualized Education Plan (IEP) 
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even though one should have been completed for Erick Virgil Hall when his placement 
was changed to Mission Creek. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately 
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing 
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, Petitioner 
asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland. 
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of Petitioner's 
Neurological Deficits, Mental Retardation and Mental Illness. 
Trial counsel did not have Petitioner submit to any neurological testing despite 
ample evidence of closed head injuries and other neurological problems. Trial counsel 
also did not seek psychiatric diagnoses of Petitioner or adequately examine Petitioner's 
childhood diagnosis of mild mental retardation.43 
During the reinvestigation of this case, counsel is uncovenng evidence of 
neurological and physical impainnent that require additional investigation. Petitioner has 
consulted with Dr. James Merikangas, an expert in neuropsychiatry. (Exhibit 26.) 
Petitioner's consultation is not yet complete. Dr. Merikangas met with Petitioner one 
time, and during that preliminary examination, Petitioner's blood pressure was extremely 
high, indicated he had frequent and severe headaches, was unable to walk on his heels or 
43 Due to trial counsel's failure to consult with Petitioner's attorneys, and due to the time 
constraints imposed by the Court, counsel does not fully understand the pre-trial 
investigation into mental illness and mental retardation. It is counsel's understanding that 
an intelligence test was administered and that Petitioner's score was higher than the score 
he achieved as a child. However, Petitioner maintains that the more recent intelligence 
testing was inaccurate or inadequately administered, and will either withdraw this claim 
or provide further support for the claim after conducting an adequate investigation. In 
any case, any significant discrepancies between test score should have been explained 
and must be explored. 
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toes, and was unable to walk tandem without swaying. Petitioner had a scar on the right 
parietal scalp. (Exhibit 26.) Dr. Merikangas is recommending blood work, an MRI scan 
of the brain, a PET scan of the brain, and x-ray ofthe cervical spine. (Exhibit 26.). 
Full psychiatric examination is also warranted. Due to Petitioner's inability to 
obtain an Order from the Court, Dr. Merikangas was not given the usual "quiet and 
confidential setting" required for Petitioner to be forthcoming in answering sensitive 
questions. However, even in his brief testing of Petitioner, Dr. Merikangas noted 
psychiatric anomalies that warrant further investigation. Dr. Merikangas notes in his 
affidavit that Petitioner drew a "very strange person" drawn "without a face" and 
"without genitalia." After asking Petitioner to draw the face, Petitioner "drew a face 
without eyebrows or ears." Under standard scoring, this drawing was appropriate for a 
child of eight or nine years old. (Exhibit 26.) 
Interviews with Petitioner's friends, acquaintances and family members have 
uncovered prenatal exposure to amphetamines, extensive head injuries, black outs or 
lapses in memory, and abnormally pronounced mood swings. Wendy Levy has 
witnessed Petitioner, as an adult, experience "lapses in memory or brief losses of 
memory," where "Erick would pause and have a blank look in his eyes," before 
becoming "re-oriented." (Exhibit 7.) Petitioner's sister describes an occasion where 
Erick went into a rage over his brother Shannon. Afterwards, when Deanna tried to 
discuss the incident with Erick, Erick had no memory of the event. (Exhibit 27.) 
Petitioner's mother describes witnessing similar black outs, and describes experiencing 
her own "[s]imilar explosions with this blackout-type memory loss." (Exhibit 28.) 
Various witnesses have characterized the mood swings as "Jekyll and Hyde," and 
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describe explosive outbursts. (Exhibit 7.), (Exhibit 29.), (Exhibit 27.), (Exhibit 28), 
(Exhibit 30.) Family members describe Petitioner as bipolar and ADHD. (Exhibit 28.), 
(Exhibit 31.) One family member describes him as "mentally ill, incompetent, [having] 
developmental delays," exhibiting "severe attachment disorder" and "ADHD." (Exhibit 
31.) 
Petitioner's mother took amphetamines while pregnant with him. (Exhibit 28.) 
Petitioner fell off his bicycle and hit the back of his head and lost consciousness for up to 
a few minutes. (Exhibit 28.) He required a hospital trip, and for several years afterward 
complained about severe headaches and neck pain, and eye pain. He fell off a roof, and 
when he landed on his feet he fell forward and hit his head on a rock sidewalk. (Exhibit 
32.) All of the symptoms and injuries described above are indicators that Petitioner has 
neurological damage and/or mental illness. 
Witnesses also describe Petitioner's lack of adaptive skills, a critical factor in 
diagnosing mild mental retardation. Wendy Levy describes Petitioner as being 
"uncomfortable in crowds," desiring to provide for her family but lacking the "skills and 
understanding about how to appropriately do so," unable to keep a job, "completely 
unfocused and lost in determining a future course of action," lacking the "skills to 
organize himself, structure events in his life, or plan into the future." Ms. Levy reports 
that several times Petitioner told her he "ate out of the garbage can at a McDonald's." 
(Exhibit 7.) 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately 
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Petitioner's reinvestigation is not yet 
complete and he still awaits a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed 
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January 5, 2006. However, given the preliminary evidence of neurological damage, 
mental illness and mental retardation uncovered thus far, Petitioner asserts that trial 
counsel was deficient in failing to pursue leads readily available, and that will be able, 
upon proper investigation, to satisfy both prongs of Strickland. 
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of Petitioner's Good 
Character As An Adult. 
Petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in failing to 
adequately investigate and present evidence of Petitioner's good character as an adult. 
During sentencing proceedings, the defense offered testimony from family 
members and two experts that described Petitioner's horrific childhood. However, trial 
counsel failed to adequately investigate Petitioner's life in adolescence and adulthood. In 
their closing argument, the prosecution argued this very fact to the jury. Thus, it was 
difficult for the jury to discern that the child, so damaged and abused, nonetheless 
developed into an adult with kind, generous and loving characteristics. The jury was left 
with the impression that there were no mitigating circumstances in Petitioner's adult life. 
Had trial counsel adequately investigated and presented mitigating circumstances 
of Petitioner's adolescence and adulthood including mitigating evidence near the time of 
the crime, it is reasonably probable that the jury would have found that the mitigation 
outweighed the aggravation and sentenced Petitioner to a life sentence. 
This information was readily available. In the course of Petitioner's 
reinvestigation, Petitioner has discovered evidence of caring, loving relationships. 
Wendy Levy was interviewed by trial counsel and provided them with similar 
information, but was never called to testify. (Exhibit 7.) Ms. Levy would have testified 
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that he played with her children, was good with her children, including her special-needs 
daughter, and that her children referred to him as their "Uncle Erick." Petitioner assisted 
with chores, provided food and money to the family when they were hungry and 
otherwise attempted to provide for the family. He was never violent in any manner with 
any of the members of the family. He was a talented artist, playful, a good worker, and 
protective of Wendy and her children. Petitioner referred to Wendy as his sister. 
Evelyn Dunaway, who testified for the State at sentencing regarding violent 
incidents between herself and Petitioner, nonetheless had loving things to say about him, 
which were never elicited by trial counsel. Petitioner tried to help Evelyn quit a meth 
habit and describes him as "very caring with regard to talking to [her], and supporting 
[her] as [she] tried to stay off drugs." (Exhibit 15.) Petitioner exhibited compassion and 
generosity toward her children-spoon-feeding them medicine when they were sick, 
drawing pictures for them, and purchasing a drawing book. Evelyn, the same woman the 
State used to depict Petitioner as a violent monster, states that he "had a lot of good 
qualities," and would pick her flowers almost every day and "did a number of very kind 
things" for Evelyn. Evelyn states that Petitioner was "genuinely nice and wanted to help 
people" and took in homeless people to stay and fixed up bicycles for people who had no 
transportation. Evelyn continues to hold onto a photograph of herself and Petitioner, and 
likes "to think about the good times [they] shared together." To this day, she has feelings 
of care and concern for Petitioner and does not want him to be executed. To the best of 
Evelyn's recollection, trial counsel did not interview her. 
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While this claim is still under investigation, Petitioner nonetheless asserts that 
trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate and present evidence of Petitioner's 
mitigation as an adult was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. 
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate The State's Experts' Opinions By Requesting 
Appropriate Discovery Of Their Reports. 
Petitioner believes that reports from Dr. Michael Estess and Dr. Robert Engle 
contain exculpatory and material evidence. He believes that the reports of their findings 
regarding Petitioner's mental health and his propensity for murder and risk of committing 
murder in the future would be consistent with his experts' findings as well as inconsistent 
with the State's evidence and arguments. Even if reports were not generated, Petitioner's 
counsel should have moved for the preparation of reports. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as Dr. Estess has refused to discuss his 
findings or opinions of the defense testimony with Petitioner. In addition, trial counsel 
has refused to adequately consult with Petitioner and has not disclosed all documents in 
their possession that may include materials relevant to this claim. Finally, Petitioner is 
still awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006, in 
which he made several requests relevant to this claim. 
7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate Evelyn Dunaway And Rebecca McCusker. 
Trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard for failing to 
adequately investigate the state's witnesses prior to sentencing. Had counsel interviewed 
Evelyn Dunaway, they would have had information with which to impeach Rebecca 
McCusker. Ms. McCusker testified that she and her sister intervened on the day 
Petitioner and Ms. Dunaway broke up, and that Petitioner would not allow her to leave 
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his home and told her and Ms. Dunaway that he would kill them both. (Tr., p. 4862, Ls. 
8 -19.) 
In the course of reinvestigating this case, however, Petitioner has interviewed Ms. 
Dunaway. Ms. Dunaway disputes Ms. McCusker's account of the events of that day, and 
specifically states that "When April Stone and Rebecca McCusker came into the trailer 
home in March 2002, Erick never threatened to kill Rebecca, in contrast with her trial 
testimony." (Exhibit 15.) 
8. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate Michelle Deen. 
Trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard for failing to 
adequately investigate the state's witnesses prior to sentencing. Had counsel investigated 
Michelle Deen, they would have had information with which to impeach her testimony 
and illustrate her motive to testify falsely against Petitioner. 
In the course of reinvestigating this case, Petitioner has uncovered information of 
previous deals. In Ada County case no. M0203902/H0200584, Ms. Deen was charged 
with felony possession of a controlled substance. In that court file, Petitioner discovered 
a note, stating that Ms. Deen contacted the author of the note and stated she wanted to 
talk to the police about a "deal." (Exhibit 6.) This case was opened in April of 2002, 
and did not close until August of 2005. The "Cover Sheet" immediately follows a 
document filed May 3, 2002, prior to Petitioner's trial. 
In Ada County case no. M031644/H0301398, Ms. Deen was again charged with 
felony possession of a controlled substance. The register of actions, which Petitioner 
readily obtained from the courthouse, shows that Ms. Deen was ordered to undergo a 
court ordered psychiatric evaluation. The Order was entered on June 30, 2004, prior to 
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Petitioner's trial. Trial counsel should have cross-examined her about the necessity of an 
evaluation. 
Trial counsel also failed to investigate Petitioner's claim that Ms. Deen testified 
falsely because she was angry that he and Janet Hoch reported Ms. Deen to the police 
after Ms. Deen burglarized Petitioner's residence. In the course of reinvestigating this 
case, Petitioner was easily able to obtain police reports from the Boise City Police 
Department confirming Petitioner's claim. (Exhibit 34.) 
T. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO OBJECT 
SHACKLING OR FAILING TO ADEQUATELY OBJECT TO EVIDENCE 
OF DEFENDANT'S CUSTODIAL STATUS. 
Trial counsel should have asserted, argued and moved for written findings from 
the court stating that shackling was not visible, or asserted, argued and moved for a 
mistrial if the shackling was visible to any juror at any time. This failure was both 
deficient prejudicial. See Claim C, supra. 
Trial counsel also failed to adequately object to and argue an objection to 
admission of States Exhibit No. 149, which was a mug shot of Petitioner taken while he 
was wearing a standard orange prison uniform. (Tr., p. 4824, L. 19 - p. 4829, L. 17). 
Counsel did object, however, counsel never argued any constitutional basis for the 
objection. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 505 (1976) (making a defendant 
appear in prison garb poses such a threat to the "fairness of the factfinding process" that it 
must be justified by an "essential state policy.") Trial counsel should have objected on 
the basis of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
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U. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR 
THEIR FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS. 
Trial counsel should have objected to the misconduct in the prosecution's closing 
arguments both in the guilt and the sentencing phases. Petitioner incorporates by 
reference the facts and legal arguments from claims previous claims. Counsels' failure to 
object constitutes deficient performance. Petitioner asserts that but for counsels' deficient 
performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of 
murder of the first degree or sentenced to death. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately 
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. While Petitioner's reinvestigation is not yet 
complete and he still awaits a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed 
January 5, 2006, he nevertheless asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland. 
V. The Composition of Jury Pool Violated Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, And Petitioner Was Deprived The Effective Assistance Of 
Counsel By Their Failure To Challenge The Jury Pool Composition. 
The composition of Petitioner's petit jury, the pool from which the petit jury was 
selected, and the composition of the grand jury did not represent a "fair cross-section of 
the community," and thus violated Petitioner's rights under the Sixth Amendment, Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth 
Amendment. Petitioner asserts that Hispanics are underrepresented and systematically 
exclude from the jury pool, and therefore petit and grand juries are not selected from a 
fair cross-section of the community. 
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Petitioner was entitled to select a jury from a fair cross-section of the community. 
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975). It is part of the established 
tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly 
representative of the community. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). A jury 
system that results in systematic exclusion of a cognizable group violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also, Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78 (1970)(holding 6-person jury scheme violative of the Sixth Amendment for 
failure to provide juries drawn from a cross section of the community). 
In addition, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 
failing to challenge the composition of the jury pool. Petitioner requires additional time 
and discovery to substantiate these claims, and reserves the right to withdraw the claims 
at a later date. 
w. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING 
THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS. 
Despite the exercise of due diligence, it is impossible for Petitioner to fully state 
this claim as Petitioner has not yet received the juror questionnaires. These 
questionnaires were critical in the selection of a jury. As the State noted, the 
questionnaires were the parties' "bible" during voir dire. (Tr., p. 5445, Ls. 1-3.) Further, 
the Court has improperly precluded Petitioner from unrestricted access to jurors that 
would provide additional support for this claim. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that he is 
entitled to relief on this claim as set forth below. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury. Trial counsel 
attempted to utilize a nationally recognized technique for effective assistance of counsel 
in jury selection known as the "Colorado Method." This technique is based on capital 
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jury selection jurisprudence as set forth in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) 
(holding 'juror[ s] who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case" or are 
unwilling or unable to give meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence must be 
disqualified from service); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-26 (1985) (holding that 
trial judges may exclude jurors whose "views on [capital punishment] would 'prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of [their] duties .... "'); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 
38,42,49 (1980) (invalidating statute disqualifying any juror who would not swear "that 
the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life would not affect his deliberations 
on any issue of fact"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,519-23 (1968) (holding that 
the exclusion in capital cases of jurors conscientiously scrupled about capital punishment, 
without inquiring whether they could consider the imposition of the death penalty in the 
appropriate case, violated a defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury.) 
Because the defendant must demonstrate that the juror lacks impartiality, voir dire 
must be adequate to uncover such bias. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 733-34. It is not 
enough simply to ask the jurors if they could be fair and follow the law. Id., at 734-36. 
The defendant must be able to ascertain whether the prospective jurors find mitigating 
evidence irrelevant or even not worth their consideration. Id., at 735. 
The ABA Guidelines, pertaining to the effective assistance of counsel in a capital 
jury selection, state that: 
Counsel should be familiar with the precedents relating to questioning and 
challenging of potential jurors, including the procedures surrounding 
"death qualification" concerning any potential juror's beliefs about the 
death penalty. Counsel should be familiar with techniques: (1) for 
exposing those prospective jurors who would automatically impose the 
death penalty following a murder conviction or finding that the defendant 
is death-eligible, regardless of the individual circumstances of the case; (2) 
for uncovering those prospective jurors who are unable to give meaningful 
consideration to mitigating evidence; and (3) for rehabilitating potential 
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jurors whose initial indications of opposition to the death penalty make 
them possibly excludable. 
Guideline 10.1 0.2.B. Counsel should devote substantial time to determining the 
makeup of the venire, preparing a case-specific set of voir dire questions, planning a 
strategy for voir dire, and choosing a jury most favorable to the theories of mitigation that 
will be presented. Guideline 10.10.2, Commentary. Given the intricacy of the process 
and the sheer amount of data to be managed, counsel should consider obtaining the 
assistance of an expert jury consultant. Guideline 10.1 0.2.c. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failure To Insist On 
Appropriate Procedures Under ICR 24 
Idaho Criminal Rule 24 requires that all jurors, including alternate jurors be 
selected in the same manner, and be removed by lot at the conclusion of the trial: 
... At the conclusion of closing arguments, jurors exceeding the number 
required of a regular panel shall be removed by lot. Those removed by lot 
may be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict, unless the 
court otherwise directs as provided below. 
LC.R. 21(d). There is no discretionary component to the first requirement of this rule, 
'jurors exceeding the number shall be removed by lot." When a state implements 
procedures designed to ensure a fair trial, including a fair jury selection process, it must 
follow that process or violate a defendant's due process rights. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 
supra. Trial counsel was therefore ineffective in stipulating to an alternate procedure 
wherein the above prescribed procedure was abandoned: 
MR. MYSHIN: And the other thing that has always given me heartburn is 
this notion that alternate jurors are selected by lot and-
THE COURT: I agree with you, sir. I think I am coming at this -- you 
and I and Mr. Bower and Mr. Bourne and the Court have always agreed in 
the past that this was a solution in search of a problem. I respect former 
Justice Walters' committee and the work he did. He was motivated by an 
effort, sincere effort to improve the system, but there wasn't a problem 
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here to fix. And I was hoping that by stipulation we would just agree to 
do it the way we've always done it, which is the persons that end up sitting 
in -- I will have a chart for you, seating chart that I'll show you. This is 
the way we've done it before, the way we did it in State versus Payne in 
fact. The persons that end up sitting in Boxes 13, 14 and 15 are alternates 
No.1, No.2 and No.3 respectfully, but we don't tell them. We don't tell 
them that they're alternates unless and until their services are no longer 
needed when the jury is sent out to deliberate, so that human nature being 
what it is, these folks will pay careful attention to every single thing that 
happens in the trial and will only get the disappointing news when it is 
necessary to tell them. I think you and I are on the same page. 
MR. MYSHIN: We are, Judge, entirely on the same page. I just would 
like to add fuel to the fire and tell you that it is my information that the 
civil lawyers are the ones that cooked up this dismissal by lot idea. So it's 
not us fine criminal lawyers. I think it's more the subject -
THE COURT: Sometimes they don't understand the differences in nature 
between civil and criminal cases. I think the whole purpose of the struck 
jury system is to know who you have coming and to know who's there and 
to know, for example, that the person in Box 13 is Alternate No. 1 and the 
person in Box 14 is Alternate No.2 and Box 15 is Alternate No.3, and 
that that means something and we all know who they are in advance, but 
we don't tell them that. Mr. Bourne, are you -- this is the way we've 
always -- are you okay with it? 
MR. BOURNE: We'll stipulate. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Myshin subject of a stipulation? 
MR. MYSHIN: Yes, sir. 
(Tr., p. 607, L. 21 - p. 609, L. 18.) Trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective under 
Strickland in failing to guarantee that Petitioner receive all of the procedural protections 
he was afforded by the State of Idaho. Investigation into this claim is ongoing, and in 
part relies on receiving jury questionnaires and conducting juror interviews. 
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2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Conduct An 
Adequate Voir Dire, Failing To Move To Strike For Cause, And Failing 
To Utilize A Preemptory Challenge To Strike Biased Jurors. 
Petitioner asserts that trial counsel performance during jury selection was both 
deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. Petitioner has retained an expert attorney, 
David Lane, to assist in evaluating trial counsels' performance during voir dire, 
especially in light of trial counsels' use of a jury selection technique known around the 
country as "The Colorado Method of Jury Selection." (Exhibit 35.) The details of the 
Colorado Method are set forth in Mr. Lane's declaration. 
Mr. Lane concludes that "trial counsel attempted to utilize the Colorado method, 
however the effort was absolutely premised upon a complete lack of understanding of the 
basic principals of this technique." (Exhibit 35.) "Trial counsel's voir dire in every 
instance was ineffective in identifying and ranking jurors, in stripping jurors to help in 
the identification process and in insulating or isolating jurors, or in challenging 
mitigation-impaired jurors for cause." (Exhibit 35.) Mr. Lane concluded: 
The voir dire conducted in this matter was among the worst examples 
of capital voir dire undersigned counsel has ever read. Trial counsel 
failed repeatedly to challenge jurors for cause even in the face of the juror 
telling the court and counsel that they would automatically vote for the 
death penalty or that they were substantially impaired in their ability to 
give meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence. 
As a result, the jury consisted of many 7-rated jurors who should have 
been excused for cause. 
(Exhibit 35 at 39-40)( emphasis added).44 
44 Mr. Lane's noted that he was "somewhat circumspect" in his analysis due to the lack of 
jury questionnaires, but was confident based on the voir dire "that the level of 
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Petitioner relies in part on the declaration of Mr. Lane to support his claim that 
trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in failing to move to strike jurors for cause, 
which left Petitioner with a biased, mitigation-impaired jury. In addition to those 
grounds set forth in the affidavit, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel should have moved 
to strike the following jurors for cause for the reasons set forth below. All of the 
following claims require further investigation, including jury questionnaires and juror 
interviews. Petitioner reserves the right to withdraw any claim at a future date if such 
claim is not supported by facts uncovered during Petitioner's reinvestigation. 
Juror Linda Ostolas indicated she would have great difficulty with sequestration 
beyond a "few days." (Tr., p. 1056, Ls. 8-11.) Trial counsel should have moved to strike 
for cause. 
Juror Betty Mitchell indicated THAT she is a regular Greenbelt user. (Tr., p. 
1829, Ls. 15-24.) Petitioner asserts that this juror's familiarity with the Greenbelt biased 
her views of the crime and the Petitioner. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for 
cause. 
Juror Elisabeth Keeney knew Angie Abdullah, attended the same church, and 
knew "a lot of information about her." (Tr., p. 2074, Ls. 12-19.) Petitioner asserts that 
this juror's relationship with Angie Abdullah, the alleged victim in a near-simultaneous 
capital murder trial, biased her views of the crime and Petitioner. Trial counsel should 
have moved to strike for cause. 
Juror Tammie Johnson had hearing impediments, had to wear hearing aids, and 
suffered from hearing loss most of her life. (Tr., p. 2117, L. 22 - p. 2118, L.3, p. 2123, 
performance by trial counsel in the voir dire is far below the standard of that of 
reasonably effective trial counsel." (Exhibit _ at 17, nA.) 
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Ls. 7-21.) Given the poor quality of the police interrogation tapes played to the jury, 
Petitioner asserts that this juror was unable to hear critical evidence offered at trial. Trial 
counsel should have moved to strike for cause. 
Juror Omar Alloway previously worked for moc, including work at the 
maximum security prison. (Tr., p. 2251 - p. 2252.) Petitioner asserts that this juror's 
dealings with the correctional system, inmates, and death row inmates biased his views of 
the crime and the Petitioner. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause. 
Juror Ann McNeese is married to Timothy McNeese, who is a Deputy Attorney 
General for the State of Idaho. Mr. McNeese is specifically assigned to the moc. His 
job includes defending against conditions of confinement lawsuits, including those 
brought by death-sentenced inmates. (See Gomez v. Spalding, D. Idaho, Civ. 91-0299-S-
LMB.) Conditions of confinement were referenced during the sentencing phase of 
Petitioner's trial. See, e.g., Tr., p. 4904 et seq. (testimony of Dennis Dean). Mr. 
McNeese's job also includes developing the moc protocol to be used in executions. Mr. 
McNeese was sanctioned by the federal district court for opening prisoner mail during a 
conditions lawsuit, and possibly faced or faces bar sanctions. (Exhibit 36.) Petitioner 
asserts that trial counsel should have moved to strike Ms. McNeese for cause. Ms. 
McNeese ultimately served as the foreperson. It is hardly reasonable to assume that the 
wife of an advocate for the State in carrying out death sentences would not be affected by 
her husband's employment when determining whether to impose the death sentence. 
Further, Petitioner served a 10-year term in the moc during the period that Mr. 
McNeese served as the Deputy Attorney General. It is likely that Mr. McNeese was 
familiar with Erick Hall and there is a reasonable probability that he shared discussions 
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about inmates, possibly including Petitioner, as well as infonnation about conditions of 
confinement and other matters that a juror might consider, appropriately or not, during 
the sentencing process with his wife. As stated, Petitioner does not have trial transcripts, 
the record or files in this case and thus has not had the opportunity to review them. In 
addition to the above, because a key State witness-Jay Rosenthal-also worked for the 
Attorney General's office, Ms. McNeese was not able to objectively weigh his testimony. 
Furthennore, Ms. McNeese worked for IDOC, which biased her views of the crime and 
Petitioner. Moreover, Ms. McNeese's cousin was raped and murdered. It is unreasonable 
to assume that that event did not color Ms. McNeese's views of crime and punishment. 
Petitioner asserts that that event biased her views of the crime and Petitioner. Trial 
counsel should have moved to strike for cause. 
Juror Joann Brown's husband was an investigator for the U.S. Investigative 
Services. (Tr., pp. 2547 - 2548.) Petitioner asserts that this juror was unable to 
objectively weigh law enforcement testimony and had biased views toward the crime and 
Petitioner. 
Juror Luke Call admitted that his mind wanders in the afternoon. (Tr., p. 2863, 
L. 25 - p. 2864, L.3.) Petitioner asserts that this juror was unable to hear evidence at trial 
and sentencing. 
Juror James Kennedy works for the Department of Transportation and works 
with a Deputy Attorney General. (Tr., p. 3020, Ls. 19-20.) The juror works, with his 
son, with the Ada County Court. (Tr., p. 3022, Ls. 10-16.) The juror worked at the 
penitentiary for several years, and managed Correction Industries, and had inmates 
working for him. (Tr., p. 3044, Ls. 13-16, p. 3045, Ls. 5-6.) The juror worked for the 
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Department of Law Enforcement. (Tr., p. 3051, Ls. 1-2.) Petitioner asserts that this 
juror's background biased his views against the crime and Petitioner. 
Juror Diane Proctor works for the Sheriffs Office and was a former neighbor of 
Detective Dave Smith, a key prosecution witness. (Tr., p. 3074, Ls. 6-7, p. 3075, Ls. 3-
9.) Petitioner asserts that this juror's background biased her views against the crime and 
Petitioner. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause. 
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To 
The Court's Preliminary Instructions To Jurors. 
The preliminary question asked by the Court prior to the commencement of voir 
dire by counsel simply asked whether the jurors would weigh aggravation against 
mitigation and arrive at a decision. This is a burden..:shifting question, as the prosecutor 
has to prove an aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt prior to the weighing process. Trial 
counsel was ineffective under Strickland in failing to object to the court's erroneous 
instructions to jurors. Instructions that shift the burden of persuasion violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that the state prove every element of a criminal 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
x. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
FAILING TO ENSURE THAT ALL PROCEEDINGS WERE RECORDED 
AND THAT PETITIONER WAS PRESENT FOR ALL PROCEEDINGS. 
Numerous unrecorded proceedings were held in chambers without Petitioner's 
presence. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to protect 
Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to be present and his due process right to meaningful 
appellate and post-conviction review. The ABA Guidelines provide in part: 
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[C]ounsel at every stage must ensure that there is a complete record 
respecting all claims that are made, including objections, motions, 
statements of grounds, questioning of witnesses or venire members, oral 
and written arguments of both sides, discussions among counsel and the 
court, evidence proffered and received, rulings of the court, reasons given 
by the court for its rulings, and any agreements reached between the 
parties. If a court refuses to allow a proceeding to be recorded, counsel 
should state the objection to the court's refusal, to the substance of the 
court's ruling, and then at the first available opportunity make a record of 
what transpired in the unrecorded proceeding. 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8. See also Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357, 
358 (1993). Proceedings that Petitioner is aware took place off the record and outside his 
presence include: 
• An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and 
the State in which the parties discussed a note received from the jury 
foreman during jury deliberations. (Tr., p. 5463, L. 25 - p. 5464, L. 11.) 
(noting that jury foreperson Ann McNeese was concerned that her privacy, 
i.e., identity, had been violated in open court). 
• An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court and trial counsel in 
which the parties discussed retaining attorney Rolf Kehne as a jury 
consultant. (Tr., p. 2062, Ls. 3-8.) There was no mention of Petitioner's 
presence. 
• An unrecorded discussion between trial counsel and the Court in which 
the parties discussed trial counsel's intention not to file a brief, and the 
decision to not employ Mr. Kehne "from this point forward" as a jury 
consultant. (Tr., p. 2067, Ls. 10-20.) There was no mention of 
Petitioner's presence. 
• An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and 
the State in which the parties discussed expert access to Petitioner, use of 
experts, and the defense's Motion to Suppress. (Tr., p. 530, L.9 - p. 535, 
L. 20.) There was no mention of Petitioner's presence. 
• An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and 
the State in which the parties discussed the videotapes and transcripts of 
the interrogations of Petitioner. (Tr., p. 359, L. 9 - p. 362, L.3.) Petitioner 
was not present, apparently at the request of trial counsel. (Tr., p. 359, Ls. 
3-12.) 
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• An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and 
possibly the State in which the parties discussed the logistics and 
substance of what portions of the videotapes would be shown and "the 
issues that Defense was concerned about." (Tr., p. 431, Ls. 3-17.) There 
was no mention of Petitioner's presence. 
Petitioner is still investigating this claim. His investigation has been compromised 
by trial counsels' failure to adequately consult with him, making it difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify matters that are not of record. 
Y. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
FAILING TO RAISES CHALLENGES TO ANY NONSTATUTORY 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Challenge The Introduction Of Victim Impact Evidence. 
The jury was instructed to consider and weigh all evidence presented at 
sentencing. The jury was also instructed that "victims" have a right to personally address 
them regarding the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the 
defendant's crimes. (Tr., p. 4955, L. 16 - p. 4956, L. 3.) The jury was never told that 
victim impact is not evidence. The instructions gave the jury absolutely no guidance on 
how to utilize such statements in assessing the gravity of aggravating circumstances, the 
existence or weight of mitigation, and the weighing of aggravators against the mitigation. 
It is reasonably likely that the jury, considered victim impact as non-statutory 
aggravating circumstances. As such, without a proper limiting construction, the victim 
impact is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment and violated 
Petitioner's rights to due process and notice as protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
It is reasonably likely that the jury used the victim impact when weighing the 
aggravators against the mitigation. Victim impact is irrelevant to any of the statutory 
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aggravating circumstances. The introduction of the victim impact without additional 
instructions violated Petitioner's due process rights, as protected by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. 
It is reasonably likely that the jury used the victim impact in a way that precluded 
or otherwise undermined their ability to give meaningful consideration to Petitioner's 
mitigating evidence in violation of Petitioner's due process rights, as protected by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights under the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments. 
In addition, introduction of unsworn victim impact statements not subjected to 
cross-examination violated Petitioner's right to confront witnesses against him under the 
Sixth Amendment, as well as his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Due to time constraints and Petitioner's duty to investigate matters outside the 
record as well as matters hidden within the record, Petitioner has not had sufficient time 
to consider all elements of this legal issue, as well as other legal issues in this case, and 
reserves the right to provide further factual and legal support for this and all other issues 
raised in this Amended Petition. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied 
both prongs of Strickland. 
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Challenge The Introduction Of Any Nonstatutory Aggravating 
Circumstances. 
Beyond the victim impact evidence, other nonstatutory aggravating circumstances 
were introduced against Petitioner, including his convictions for Escape and Burglary as 
well as evidence that he committed a forcible rape against Norma Jean Oliver. Petitioner 
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asserts that none of this evidence was admissible for reasons stated in this claim and 
through the Amended Petition. 
Prior to Ring v. Arizona, the Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 
362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), held that the finding of aggravating circumstances other than 
those listed in I.C. § 19-2515, was not error as long as at least one statutory aggravating 
circumstance was found beyond a reasonable doubt: 
We hold that the list of aggravating factors set forth in the statute is not 
exclusive, albeit one of those factors must necessarily be found to exist 
beyond a reasonable doubt for a sentence of death to be upheld. 
Id. at 369-70,670 P.2d at 470-71. 
In the advent of jury sentencing, trial counsel should have challenged the 
admissibility of non-statutory aggravating circumstances on the following grounds: 
• That such evidence was not pled by way of Indictment or Information; 
• That jury was not properly instructed on the manner in which to consider 
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances and likely weighed them when 
finding statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and 
when weighing such statutory aggravators against the mitigation; 
• That I.C. 19-2515, in its latest incarnation post-Ring, does not provide for 
consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances and provides an 
exclusive list of statutory aggravating circumstances; 
• That neither the statute nor the instructions given offer any guidance to jury 
and thus affords them unbridled discretion; 
• That the jury was not instructed to find the nonstatutory aggravating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and 
• That Petitioner was not given adequate notice. 
Trial counsel should have objected to nonstatutory aggravating circumstances 
based on Petitioner's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland. 
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Z. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
FAILING TO RAISES CHALLENGES TO THE STATUTORY 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Aggravating circumstances must "genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible 
persons" in a way that reasonably 'justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence on 
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 US. 
462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). Further, both on their face, and as applied, aggravating 
circumstances must permit the sentencer to make a "principled distinction between those 
who deserve the death penalty and those who do not." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 US. 764, 774 
(1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 US. 356 (1988) ("[t]he construction or application 
of an aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally broad or vague if it does not channel 
or limit the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty"). 
Even if an aggravating circumstance is vague on its face, it can nevertheless 
support a death sentence if the state courts have narrowed its scope to a constitutionally 
sufficient degree and if such a narrowing construction actually guided the sentencer in the 
case under review. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 US. 420 (1980). Applying this principle, the 
US. Supreme Court held that Idaho's limiting instruction of the "utter disregard for 
human life" aggravating circumstance, specifically, that the aggravator "is meant to be 
reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the 
utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless slayer," was 
sufficient under the Eighth Amendment. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 468 (1993). 
Idaho's limiting instruction was satisfactory because it defined a "state of mind that is 
ascertainable from surrounding facts." Id. at 1541-42. Because some murderers do exhibit 
feeling, the Court also determined that the aggravating circumstance genuinely narrowed 
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the class of persons eligible for the death penalty as required by Zant v. Stephens, 462 
US. 862 (1983). Id. 
Petitioner recognizes that he is asserting, for at least a few of the claims below, 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise challenges that the Idaho Supreme 
Court, and even in one case, the US. Supreme Court, have previously rejected. 
Nevertheless, trial counsel has a duty to consider all potential claims in capital cases. See 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline, 10.8 ("As described in the commentary to 
Guideline 1.1, counsel also has a duty, pursuant to Subsection (A)(3)(a)-(c) of this 
Guideline, to preserve issues calling for a change in existing precedent; the client's life 
may well depend on how zealously counsel discharges this duty.") Indeed, over the past 
few years, the US. Supreme Court has expressed a willingness to overrule precedent in 
capital cases. See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 US. 551 (2005) (holding that it is 
unconstitutional to execute juveniles, overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 US. 361 
(1989)); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US. 304 (2002) (holding that it is unconstitutional to 
execute the mentally retarded, overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)); Ring 
v. Arizona, 536 US. 584 (2002) (holding that a jury must find aggravating circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt, overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)). 
With the advent of jury sentencing, counsel should have considered raising all 
claims for reconsideration by the Idaho Supreme Court and federal courts. See State v. 
Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing that Idaho's 
"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance may be 
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unconstitutional if relied upon in a jury sentencing). The failure to raise a claim on the 
grounds that it has been repeatedly rejected may cost a capital defendant his life.45 
This following does not represent a final statement of this claim. Petitioner 
requires additional time to fully state the legal and factual grounds for all challenges to 
the statutory aggravating circumstances listed under this claim. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Challenge Aggravating Circumstances As Vague And Overbroad. 
Trial counsel should have argued that, in light of jury sentencing in Idaho, the 
following aggravating circumstances were vague and overbroad in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment: 
a. The "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance set 
forth in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(e). 
b. The "utter disregard for human life" aggravating circumstance set forth in 
I.C. § 19-2515(9)(f). 
c. The "propensity" aggravating circumstance set forth in I.C. § 19-
2515(9)(h). But see State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983). 
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Challenge Aggravating Circumstances On The Grounds That An 
Inadequate Limiting Construction Was Given. 
Trial counsel should have argued that, in light of jury sentencing in Idaho, that the 
limiting instructions were insufficient to pass muster under the Eighth Amendment: 
45 For example, in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Supreme Court declined to 
address the merits of a petitioner'S claim that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated 
by the testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined him without warning him that the 
interview could be used against him. Appellate counsel failed to assert this claim because 
the Virginia Supreme Court had rejected such claims. The Supreme Court subsequently 
found such testimony unconstitutional in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). The 
Court concluded that the claim was not deemed sufficiently novel to constitute cause for 
the procedural default. Id., at 536-37. Mr. Smith was barred from raising the issue in 
federal habeas proceedings, id., at 539, and later executed. 
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a. The "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" (herein "HAC") aggravating 
circumstance set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(e). But see Leavitt v. A rave, 
383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2004). 
The limiting instruction given to the jury was inadequate, in part, because it did 
not preclude the jury's consideration of circumstances occurring after the victim's death 
when determining whether the aggravator existed. Cf State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 
851 P.2d 370, 390 (1993) (holding that in regard to the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" 
factor: "[t]he murder is complete with the death of the victim. Subsequent abuse of the 
body would not constitute the manner in which the murder was committed"); Robedeaux 
v. State, 866 P.2d 417,435 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (same) 
b. The "utter disregard for human life" aggravating circumstance set forth in 
I.C. § 19-2515(9)(f). But see Arave v. Creech507 U.S. 463, 468 (1993). 
The limiting instruction given to the jury was inadequate, in part, because it does 
not limit the language, "circumstances surrounding [the murder's] commission," to pre-
mortem conduct of the defendant. Cf State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 851 P.2d 370,390 
(1993) (holding that in regard to the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor: "[t]he murder is 
complete with the death of the victim. Subsequent abuse of the body would not constitute 
the manner in which the murder was committed"); Robedeaux v. State, 866 P.2d 417, 435 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (same); but see State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 103-04, 967 P.2d 
702, 717-18 (1998). 
c. The "propensity" aggravating circumstance set forth in I.C. § 19-
2515(9)(h). But see State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983). 
First, the limiting instruction given to the jury was inadequate, in part, because it 
permitted the jury to consider circumstances occurring after the victim's death when 
determining whether the aggravator existed. Cf State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 851 
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P.2d 370, 390 (1993) (holding that in regard to the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor: 
"[t]he murder is complete with the death of the victim. Subsequent abuse of the body 
would not constitute the manner in which the murder was committed"); Robedeaux v. 
State, 866 P.2d 417, 435 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (same) 
Second, the limiting instruction does not distinguish this aggravator from the 
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator. The jury could determine that both 
aggravating circumstances exist on the single determination that the defendant enjoys to 
kill. Specifically, "cruel" as used in the "HAC" aggravator means murder "with utter 
indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others."} (emphasis added). This 
definition is sufficiently similar to "propensity," which is described a person with "an 
affmity toward committing the act of murder," to render the "propensity" aggravator 
unconstitutionally duplicative. 
Third, the limiting instruction does not limit consideration of the defendant's 
"continuing threat to society" to an incarcerated environment. Instead, the jury was 
invited to consider the risk to the public upon the speculation that the defendant might be 
released, or might escape, from prison. Specifically, the prosecution urged the jury to find 
this aggravator based solely on a finding of propensity, without regard to any actual 
likelihood that he would commit another murder. (Tr., p. 5459, Ls. 18-21) ("If you're 
tempted to give him prison over this, remember prison only affect (sic) his ability to 
murder? He still has that propensity to murder. He's still a threat."}.}(sic added}. In 
addition, trial counsel should have requested a definition of "society" limiting it to the 
prison context. 
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3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Challenge The "Propensity" Aggravating Circumstances On The 
Grounds Other Grounds That Asking A Jury To Find That He "Likely 
Constitutes A Continuing Threat To Society" Is Unconstitutional In 
Vlolation Of The Mandate Of Ring V. Arizona, In That It Permits The 
Jury To Find An Aggravating Circumstances By A Preponderance Of 
The Evidence. 
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Challenge Aggravating Circumstances On The Grounds That There Was 
Insufficient Evidence To Find The Aggravating Circumstances Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt. 
Trial counsel should have argued that there was insufficient evidence to find the 
following aggravating circumstances: 
a. The "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance set 
forth in I.e. § 19-2515(9)(e). 
b. The "utter disregard for human life" aggravating circumstance set forth in 
I.C. § 19-2515(9)(f). 
c. The aggravating circumstance set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(g). 
d. The "propensity" aggravating circumstance set forth in I.C. § 19-
2515(9)(h). 
AA. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY RAISE LEGAL CHALLENGES. 
To render effective assistance of counsel, capital counsel must consider all legal 
claims potentially available to protect the client's constitutional rights and stay abreast of 
the latest developments in the law that might provide additional claims for the client. 
ABA Guidelines, Guidelines 1O.8.A.l; 1O.8.C.1. 
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1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Move To Challenge The Idaho Death Penalty Scheme And Disqualify The 
District Court For Lack Of Qualifications To Preside Over A Capital 
Case. 
Trial counsel should have challenged the Idaho death penalty scheme on the 
grounds that it does not require judicial qualifications for district court judges to preside 
over capital cases. In addition, trial counsel should have moved to disqualify this Court 
from presiding over this case due to a lack of death penalty qualifications in light of all 
the new law and issues applicable to capital jury sentencing which were previously 
irrelevant under Idaho's former death penalty scheme. Trial counsel should have drawn 
upon the language and rationale of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 42 that provides: 
(a) In order to insure the highest degree of judicial competency during a 
capital trial and sentencing hearing Capital Litigation Seminars approved 
by the Supreme Court shall be established for judges that may as part of 
their designated duties preside over capital litigation. The Capital 
Litigation Seminars should include, but not be limited to, the judge's role 
in capital cases, motion practice, current procedures in jury selection, 
substantive and procedural death penalty case law, confessions, and the 
admissibility of evidence in the areas of scientific trace materials, genetics, 
and DNA analysis. Seminars on capital cases shall be held twice a year. 
(b) Any circuit court judge or associate judge who in his current 
assignment may be called upon to preside over a capital case shall attend a 
Capital Litigation Seminar at least once every two years. 
The Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases explained the need for 
the rule in part as follows: 
The committee's proposal to require judicial training follows from the 
finding that reliability and fairness in a capital trial depend upon the skill 
and knowledge of the trial judge, the prosecutor, and counsel for the 
defense. The training requirement for judges complements rules 
establishing minimum qualifications for trial counsel and prosecutors in 
capital cases .... Rule 43 is intended to increase judicial training and access 
to information and should not be viewed as a limitation on the kind or 
amount of training judges receive. For example, in requiring attendance at 
seminars, Rule 43 is not intended to foreclose the use of video 
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conferencing, Internet access, or other technological means to participate 
in training from remote locations. Trial judges are encouraged to 
participate in additional training whenever possible. It is contemplated that 
any judge who presides over a capital case on or after the effective date of 
paragraph (b) of the rule will have prior thereto attended a Capital 
Litigation Seminar. 
The "reliability and fairness" required in capital cases is mandated by the Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Trial counsel should have relied on these 
constitutional mandates in challenging Idaho's death penalty scheme, which currently 
only requires qualifications for trial counsel. See ICR 44.3. Further, trial counsel should 
have moved to disqualify this Court as unqualified to preside over a capital case, 
especially in light of the new death penalty scheme requiring jury sentencing. Trial 
counsels' failures to make these challenges constituted deficient performance. Their 
deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner because the "reliability and fairness" of his 
proceedings was undermined by the lack of the Court's "skill and knowledge" in 
fundamental areas of capital jurisprudence. For instance, during jury selection, the Court 
indicated that it was not familiar with some constitutional concepts common in capital 
jury sentencing litigation. For instance: 
• The Court did not understand what trial counsel meant when counsel 
moved to excuse a potential juror on the grounds that the juror was 
"substantially mitigation impaired." (Tr., p. 2030, Ls. 2-3.) 
• The Court did not understand what trial counsel meant when counsel 
relied on the decision in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), in 
support of a motion to excuse a juror for cause. (Tr., p. 2032, Ls. 21-22)("1 
don't know anything about Whitt (sic). Do you want to give me a 
cite?")(sic added).46 
46 In Witt, the Supreme Court clarified the standard for excusing a potential capital juror 
for cause, holding that "the standard is whether the juror's views would 'prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath." ld., at 424. A recent Westlaw search of all state and federal 
cases for ("Wainwright v. Witt") yielded 2085 results, exceeding by approximately 500 
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• The Court expressed frustration with Rolf Kehne's assistance as a jury 
consultant. (Tr., p. 2062, Ls. 9-14) ("I'm now getting a cite Whitt (sic) v. 
Waynewright (sic) that I've not heard before, that I've never had a chance 
to look at. Sixth Amendment has been referred to in ways that are unclear 
without a chance to reflect on it, and a brief that's promised after the 
weekend.") (sic added).47 
• The Court readily invited trial counsel to elicit a waiver from Petitioner his 
right to challenge his counsels' ineffectiveness during the jury selection 
process. (Tr., p. 2536, L. 23 -po 2540, L. 19.) 
Trial counsel had a duty to assess the new death penalty statute, in all its facets. 
Trial counsel should have recognized the need for qualified judges, just as they should 
have recognized the need to reassess what it means to be a qualified trial lawyer in the 
State of Idaho with the advent of jury sentencing. Trial counsels' failure to challenge the 
lack of a judge-qualifying procedure and their failure to move to disqualify this Court as 
unqualified constituted deficient performance. Petitioner asserts that but for counsels' 
deficient performance, he would not have been convicted of murder of the first degree or 
sentenced to death. 
similar searches for ("Woodson v. North Carolina") and ("Ring v. Arizona"), but falling 
short of ("Furman v. Georgia") with just under 3000 results. The same search for 
("Wainwright v. Witt") but limited to Idaho cases yielded just two results, the most recent 
decided over fifteen years ago, State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 (1991). It is a 
simple and natural consequence of Idaho's long history of judicial sentencing, that Idaho 
district and appellate courts are not accustomed with addressing capital jury selection 
procedures. This fact is born out by the somewhat crude but meaningful Westlaw search 
demonstrations. 
47 Beyond the right to effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment provides that 
an "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed ... ") The Sixth Amendment jury-trial right "guarantees to the criminally 
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 
717, 722 (1961). At its core, the right contemplates that jurors will render their decision 
based on the law and the facts presented. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 
(1965). The right to an impartial juror in capital cases is likewise grounded, not in the 
Eighth Amendment, but in the Sixth Amendment. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 414. 
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2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Object To Jurors Use Of Inaccurate Transcripts While Viewing 
Videotaped Interrogations Of Petitioner. 
Trial counsel failed to object to the use of transcripts as "an aid to understanding" 
video tape recordings of police interrogations of Petitioner. (Tr., p. 4024, L. 13 - p. 
4027, L. 18) The videotapes were of "pretty marginal" quality. (Tr., p. 4020, L.8) The 
transcripts were inaccurate and the transcripts of those videotapes stated "inaudible" in 
places where a person could hear what was being said. (Tr., p. 4020, Ls. 12-16) Trial 
counsel's failure to object to the jury's use of these transcripts was clearly deficient. 
Investigation of this claim is ongoing, since counsel for Petitioner have not yet received 
copies of the transcripts provided to the jury, or the tapes-as played-to the jury. At 
least one juror had a significant hearing impediment and would most likely have relied on 
the transcripts rather than the poor audio quality of the tape. (Tr., p. 2217, L. 22 - p. 
2118, L. 3, p. 2123, Ls. 7-21) 
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To 
The Prosecutor's Misconduct During Opening And Closing Arguments 
At Both Phases Of The Trial. 
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the 
prosecution's improper arguments at both phases of the trial. In support of this claim, 
Petitioner incorporates by reference Claims I, Trial counsel were ineffective for allowing 
each these arguments to be presented to the jury without objection. But for trial counsels' 
failure to object and request a mistrial, and in the alternative, request an admonishment 
and corrective instruction by the Court, there is a reasonable probability that the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. 
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4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Challenge 
The Failure Of Idaho's Death Penalty Scheme And Instructions To 
Adequately Address The Weighing Process. 
a. Trial counsel should have challenged the constitutionality of the death 
penalty statute for its failure to assign a burden of proof to the jury's 
weighing findings. 
A defendant cannot be sentenced to death, even if aggravators are found, unless it 
is also found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See e.g., State 
v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) ("We hold that the trial 
court may sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial court finds that all the 
mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating 
circumstances found and make imposition of death unjust.") Unless this additional 
finding is made, the maximum punishment is life without the possibility of parole. 
Accordingly, based on the rationale of Ring, this finding represents a finding that must be 
presented to a jury and found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. The rule adopted by the 
Court in Ring states: 
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice 
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than 
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be 
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Ring, 536 U.S. at 600 (citations omitted). See also, Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 
2003) (holding that the determination of whether aggravation outweighs mitigation is of 
the type of factual finding encompassed by Ring); Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 59 
P.3d 450 (2002). 
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Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to challenge the 
Idaho death penalty scheme for removing from the State the burden of proving this fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In addition, by failing to assign the burden upon the State, the new death penalty 
statute impermissibly shifts the burden of proof upon the defendant to disprove an 
element, or functional equivalent of an element, or even just an essential fact. This 
violates the defendant's rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), as well as his rights under 
the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. But see 
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,417,631 P.2d 187, 199 (1981) (holding pre-Ring, that 
the scheme does not violate due process because weighing process is not part of an 
element of the offense). 
Petitioner asserts that trial counsels' failures to challenge the weighing process 
satisfies both prongs of Strickland. 
b. Trial counsel should have challenged the constitutionality of the death 
penalty statute for its failure to define "sufficiently compelling" in a 
manner requiring that the individual aggravating circumstances outweigh 
the mitigation. 
Under well-established Idaho law, the rule is that a defendant cannot be sentenced 
to death unless it found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See 
e.g., State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) (holding that a 
defendant can be sentenced to death, only if it is found "that all the mitigating 
circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances 
found and make imposition of death unjust.") Accordingly, if the mitigation outweighs 
the gravity of each of the aggravators, by any degree, then the defendant cannot be 
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sentenced to death. Under Idaho law, even where the mitigation is only of equal weight to 
the gravity of the aggravation, the maximum punishment is fixed life.48 
Trial counsel should have challenged the new Idaho death penalty statute because 
it does not provide that the individual aggravators must outweigh the mitigation. The 
death penalty statute provides in relevant part: 
If the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed 
against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the 
death penalty would be unjust. 
I.e. § 19-2515 (8)( a)(ii). The statute does not define "sufficiently compelling" as 
requiring the aggravation to "outweigh" the mitigation. The instructions likewise provide 
no definition for "sufficiently compelling" and do not require that the jury find that 
individual aggravators each "outweigh" the mitigation. 
There is simply no way of knowing whether the jury imposed a death sentence 
even if they believed the mitigation was of equal weight to the aggravation. Indeed, there 
is a reasonable probability that the jury believed that the mitigation outweighed the 
aggravation, but not in such a manner or degree as to make imposition of the death 
penalty unjust. It may very well be that the jury believed that the mitigation must 
substantially outweigh the aggravation for the imposition of the death penalty to be unjust 
under the facts of this case. The State advocated this unconstitutional interpretation of 
the statute. In closing argument, the Ada County Prosecutor argued: 
48 In Kansas v. Marsh, 04-1170 (cert granted May 31,2005) (case below: 102 P.3d 445 
(Kansas)), the United States Supreme Court is presented with the question of whether a 
death penalty statute violates the Eighth Amendment if it provides for the death penalty 
to be imposed when the sentencing jury finds the aggravating and mitigating factors to be 
equal. To the extent the Idaho Supreme Court construes the new death penalty statute in a 
fashion inconsistent with its prior construction, Petitioner asserts that such construction 
violates the Eighth Amendment. 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 194 
{)O~l1~ 
And I believe that when we go back over these things you will agree that 
these aggravating factors have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and 
that the mitigation does not outweigh the aggravation in a manner that 
would make the death penalty unjust ... 
(Tr., p. 5447, Ls. 6-11.) It is worth repeating: the prosecutor tells the jury that the law 
requires imposition ofthe death sentence so long as "the mitigation does not outweigh the 
aggravation in a manner that would make the death penalty unjust." What could that 
mean other than that the jury could find that the mitigation outweighs the aggravation, 
but perhaps not "in a manner" that would make the death penalty unjust? The prosecutor 
played off the lack of guidance provided by the statute or the instructions, and, in the 
course of doing so, violated Petitioner's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Trial counsel, seemingly ignorant of the prosecutor's slight of 
hand, failed to object, and moreover, failing to challenge the death penalty weighing 
scheme as unconstitutional and in failing to request a jury instruction for the proper 
weighing required as set forth in Charboneau and its progeny. 
c. Trial counsel should have challenged the Court's instruction that the jurors 
have a duty to consult with one another regarding their findings, including 
their findings of whether mitigation exists and whether the mitigation is 
sufficiently compelling as to make the imposition of the death penalty 
unjust because the instruction undermines the defendant's constitutional 
rights to the individual opinion of each juror who exercises his or her own 
personal moral judgment despite competing views or moral beliefs of the 
other jurors. 
A capital defendant has a due process and Eighth Amendment right to the 
individual opinion of each juror who exercises his or her own reasoned moral judgnlent, 
regardless of the competing views or beliefs of the other jurors. See e.g., Simmons v. 
South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994)(Souter, J. and Steven, J., concurring); Mills v. 
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,382 (1988). 
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These rights were violated by the Court's Instruction No. 51 informing the jurors 
that they had a duty to consult with one another before making their own individual 
decisions, and to deliberate with the goal of reaching an agreement as a group. (Tr., p. 
5439, Ls. 10 - p. 5440, L. 5.) Further, the instruction suggesting that even the juror's 
individual beliefs about the existence of a mitigating fact, i.e., whether certain evidence 
presented was actually mitigating, and the weight afforded to any mitigation found, 
should be subjected to the views of the other jurors. Petitioner asserts that trial counsels' 
failures satisfy both prongs of Strickland. 
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Request A 
Special Jury Instruction That Would Require The Jury To Provide 
Written Findings Delineating The Mitigating Circumstances That Were 
Found And In Their Failure To Challenge The New Death Penalty 
Statute On Grounds That It Forces A Defendant To Choose Between 
Constitutional Rights. 
Prior to the new death penalty statute, a judge was required to make written 
findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance found and set forth in 
writing any mitigating factors considered. I.C. § 19-2515(f) (Michie 2000). The failure 
to make such written findings constituted reversible error. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 
405,415-16,631 P.2d 187, 197-98 (1981). 
A written findings requirement serves two purposes: (1) it helps to ensure that the 
imposition of the sentence of death is reasoned and objective as constitutionally required, 
and (2) it protects a capital defendant's right to meaningful appellate review. See 
Osborn, at 414-15; 631 P.2d at 196-97. Without the findings, the reviewing court cannot 
determine whether the fact-finder overlooked or ignored any mitigation that was 
presented, whether the evidence supports the aggravating factors found, and whether the 
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fact-fmder properly weighed all factors. Id. at 415,631 P.2d at 197; State v. Pratt, 125 
Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993). 
Pursuant to the current version of the statute, if a defendant waives the right to a 
jury at his sentencing proceeding, the district court is still required to make written 
findings of the aggravation, mitigation considered, and the weighing process. I.C. § 19-
2515(8)(b). In contrast, when a defendant chooses not to waive his Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury, he must forgo the written findings requirement; a jury is only required to 
indicate on special verdict forms whether a statutory aggravating circumstance has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and "whether all mitigating circumstances, when 
weighed against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death 
penalty would be unjust." I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a). 
Because the jury is not required to specify the mitigating circumstances it found, a 
defendant who chooses to have a jury make the findings of fact at his sentencing 
proceeding relinquishes his constitutional right to have his sentence meaningfully 
reviewed by the district court and by the Idaho Supreme Court on direct appeal and as a 
part of its mandatory sentencing review under I.e. § 19-2827. Without a complete 
record, the district court and the Idaho Supreme Court are precluded from conducting a 
meaningful review which includes a determination whether imposition of the death 
sentence was reasoned and objective or the result of arbitrariness and passion. See e.g., 
Osborn, at 415,631 P.2d at 197 ("If the findings of the lower court are not set forth with 
reasonable exactitude, this court would be forced to make its review on an inadequate 
record, and could not fulfill the function of 'meaningful appellate review' demanded by 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."); see also State v. Lanliford, 116 
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Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing the increased potential of 
arbitrary and inconsistent imposition of the death penalty by juries). 
Trial counsel should have requested a special verdict form requiring the jury to 
delineate the mitigating circumstances it found and the weighing of such mitigation 
against the individual aggravating circumstances when rendering its sentencing decision. 
Petitioner has been deprived of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
have this Court and an appellate court make a meaningful determination of whether his 
sentence was the product a reasoned and objective, as opposed to an arbitrary and 
unguided, analysis. 
Trial counsel should have requested special written findings from the jury, as 
required of judges, on all the federal constitutional grounds stated above. In addition, 
counsel should have asserted that the new death penalty statute is unconstitutional 
because it forces a defendant to choose between his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
and his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because of trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness, Petitioner has lost the necessary predicate for his right to a meaningful 
review. Petitioner's sentence should thus be vacated and be afforded a new sentencing 
proceeding where the sentencer is required to provide adequate written findings. 
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Request A 
Special Jury Instruction That Would Require The Jury To Provide 
Written Findings Delineating The Evidence Considered In Finding The 
Aggravating Circumstances And By Failing To Request An Instruction 
To The Jury That The Same Evidence Can Be Used To Find Multiple 
Aggravating Circumstances So Long As Additional Aggravating 
Evidence Is Found To Support The Other Aggravator Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt. 
In determining whether a certain aggravating circumstance exists, the jury may 
consider the same evidence they considered in relation to a different aggravator so long 
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as the jury finds additional aggravating evidence to support a finding of that particular 
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,210, 731 P.2d 192, 
205 (1986). Trial counsel should have requested written findings and an instruction to 
prohibit improper duplication of evidence in support of multiple aggravating 
circumstances. Without written findings, the record is insufficient to detennine whether 
the jury properly considered additional aggravating evidence to support its finding of 
each of the aggravating circumstances. The lack of findings violated Petitioner's rights 
under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner asserts that he has 
satisfied both prongs of Strickland showing that trial counsels' failures denied him 
effective assistance of counsel. 
7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To 
The Court's Instruction Regarding The Governor's Power To Commute 
Or Pardon. 
At the request of the State, and without objection by trial counsel, (Tr., p. 5420, 
Ls. 1-4), the Court gave the following instruction, not previously approved by Idaho 
appellate courts or contained in the proposed Idaho Supreme Court death penalty 
instructions: 
The governor of the State of Idaho has the authority to grant a 
commutation or pardon for any crime except treason, based upon a 
recommendation from the Idaho Department of Pardons and Parole. Such 
a commutation or pardon could apply to either a life or death sentence. 
(Tr., p. 5438, L. 25 - p. 5439, L. 5.) This instruction was constitutionally infinn for 
several reasons including, but not limited to the following. First, the instruction has not 
been approved by the Idaho Legislature or the Idaho Supreme Court. Second, the 
instruction is not an accurate and complete statement of Idaho law. Third, the instruction 
failed to instruct the jury not to speculate on what parole authorities will do in the future. 
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Fourth, the instruction diminishes the jury's sense of responsibility for the gravity of their 
decision in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. But see California v. 
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001-1005, 1014 (1983). Fifth, the instruction diverts the jury from 
its individualized sentencing determination mandated by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. But see Ramos, supra. Finally, Petitioner asserts that his federal right to 
due process was violated because there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury utilized the 
instruction in an unconstitutional manner. 
While the Supreme Court decision in Ramos would seemingly approve this 
instruction, the rationale of Ramos is called into question by Ring. Specifically, when 
rejecting Ramos' Beck49 argument that the instruction diverts the sentencer's attention 
from a "central focus," the Court distinguished Beck on the grounds that Beck involved 
the guilt/innocence phase where the prosecution bore the burden of proving elements of 
capital murder whereas Ramos' case involved an instruction at the penalty phase 
involving no similar "central issue." Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1007-09. Petitioner asserts that 
Ramos no longer controls since capital sentencing now involves a jury's determination of 
elements, or at least the functional equivalent of elements, during the penalty phase. 
Accordingly, the instruction is unconstitutional. 
In addition to these specific grounds, Petitioner's counsel should have asserted 
that the instruction violated Petitioner's federal constitutional rights under the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the concomitant rights under the 
Idaho Constitution providing greater, but not less, protection than the federal constitution. 
Each of these constitutional violations was due to trial counsels' failure to object to the 
49 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). 
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instruction. Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland. Petitioner 
requires additional time to research the factual and legal foundation for this claim. 
8. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Raise International Law Violations. 
Trial counsel were ineffective in failing to raise international law violations on 
behalf of Petitioner, which prejudiced Petitioner under Strickland. The convictions and 
sentences entered against Petitioner were obtained in violation of international law. 
Petitioner requires additional time to research this claim, but his preliminary investigation 
shows that his death sentence was obtained in violation of The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits death sentences where (a) the 
accused will endure a prolonged incarceration on death row which violates Article 7, (b) 
the accused does not have access to a meaningful clemency process, which violates 
Article 6, (c) the accused is arbitrarily deprived of his life, which violates Article 6, and 
(d) the accused is denied his rights to due process, which violates Article 14. Petitioner's 
death sentence was also obtained in violation of the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man, Article XXVI (guaranteeing an "impartial" hearing to the accused), 
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (providing protection for the less culpable co-defendant who refuses to 
cooperate as Damocles' Sword of the death penalty is held over his head). 
The ICCPR, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment were signed and ratified by the United States. Idaho may not impose or 
execute Petitioner's death sentence without violating the Supremacy Clause ofthe United 
States Constitution, which states: 
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All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. Const., Article VI, § 2. 
Moreover, Petitioner's death sentence does and will violate (a) the American 
Convention of Human Rights, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relation, which have not yet been signed by the United 
States, but which inform Customary International Law. The United States is obligated to 
pay heed to Customary International Law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 670 
(1900)("[I]nternationallaw is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered 
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determinations.") Petitioner's death 
sentence further violates the principle of jus cogens. Ajus cogens norm is an elementary 
right of humanity, so basic as to be recognized by the international community as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Article 53; Restatement 3d of Foreign Relations Law, § 102. The execution of the 
neurologically damaged, mentally ill and/or mentally retarded violates this principle. 
BB. DEPRIVATIONS OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
DUE TO COUNSELS' FAILURE TO RAISE AND PRESERVE 
CLAIMS BY FILING MOTIONS IN LIMINE. 
"Because '[p]reserving all [possible] grounds can be very difficult in the heat of 
battle during trial,' counsel should file written motions in limine prior to trial raising any 
issues that counsel anticipate will arise at trial." Commentary, ABA Guidelines, 
Guideline 10.8 (footnotes and quotations omitted). Trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel by failing to file numerous motions in limine. Trial counsels' failure 
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to file motions in limine left them in the dark as to whether critical evidence would be 
admitted at trial and precluded adequate preparation and presentation of a defense at both 
the guilt and penalty phases. But for trial counsels' failure to file each of the following 
motions in limine there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings 
would have been different. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
File A Motion In Limine To Preclude Evidence Of Petitioner's Prior 
Convictions For Burglary And Escape. 
Without objection, the State introduced at sentencing Petitioner's pnor 
convictions for burglary and escape. This evidence was irrelevant to any aggravating 
circumstance properly before the jury and thus inadmissible. Trial counsel should have 
moved in limine to preclude the evidence. The introduction of such evidence violated 
Petitioner's constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
File A Motion In Limine To Preclude The State From Making Improper 
Closing Arguments At Both Phases Of The Trial. 
Elsewhere in his Amended Petition, Petitioner notes numerous Improper 
arguments made by the prosecution. Based on trial counsels' years of experience with the 
prosecutors in this case, including trial experience in which some of their previous 
client's were sentenced to death, counsel was intimately familiar with the State's tactics 
in closing arguments. Thus, counsel should have anticipated the prosecutors' arguments 
and moved to preclude them by way of a motion in limine. 50 Trial counsels' performance 
50 See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.11 ("Counsel should also object to 
and be prepared to rebut arguments that improperly minimize the significance of 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 203 
was deficient. Petitioner incorporates by reference the legal arguments in claims 1.1-12, 
and asserts that motions in limine would have precluded the State's misconduct and 
created a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. 
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
File A Motion In Limine To Determine Whether Limiting The Scope Of 
The Mitigation Presented To Petitioner's Childhood Would Preclude The 
State From Eliciting The IQ Score Test Results Of Petitioner As An 
Adult. 
Trial counsel elicited mitigating evidence from Petitioner's childhood including 
an intelligence quotient (herein "IQ") test scores that placed him in the mildly mentally 
retarded range of intelligence. Counsel had previously disclosed to the State that 
mitigating evidence315 or equate the standards for mitigation with those for a first-phase 
defense.316".) Footnote 315, written before Tennard, supra, provides: 
Prosecutors will frequently try to argue, for example, that "not everybody" 
who is abused as a child grows up to commit capital murder or that mental 
illness did not "cause" the defendant to commit the crime. See Haney, 
supra note 93, at 589-602. Both of these arguments are objectionable on 
Eighth Amendment grounds because they nullify the effect of virtually all 
mitigation. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 277-80. In any event, 
counsel can seek to counter such arguments by emphasizing the unique 
combination of factors at play in the client's life and demonstrating that 
there are causal connections between, for example, childhood abuse, 
neurological damage, and violent behavior. See, e.g., Phyllis L. Crocker, 
Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty, 
77 N.C. L. REv. 1143, 1157-66 (1999) (reviewing psychological and 
medical "research on the correlation between childhood abuse and adult 
violence"). 
Footnote 316 provides: 
Arguments confusing the standards for a first phase defense and mitigation 
also violate the Eighth Amendment. See generally Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982) (finding unconstitutional trial judge's failure 
to consider defendant's violent upbringing as a mitigating factor at 
sentencing); see generally Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and 
Deathworthiness: Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death 
Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 21 (1997). 
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Petitioner tested at a significantly higher, yet subaverage, range as an adult. Entering the 
sentencing phase, trial counsel apparently either hoped that their limited scope of defense 
would not open the door to Petitioner's subsequent higher IQ score or hoped that the 
prosecution would just kind of forget about it. 
Had trial counsel filed a motion in limine then they would have been able to make 
informed decisions. One possible informed decision would have been to elicit the 
damaging information on direct. It is impossible at this time for Petitioner to state the full 
nature of this claim due to trial counsels' failure to adequately consult with Petitioner's 
current counsel and because Petitioner's reinvestigation of the case is not yet complete. In 
addition to speaking to trial counsel, Petitioner must yet speak to Drs. Linda Gummow, 
Mark Cunningham and Roderick Pettis regarding their professional views on how to 
handle the intelligence scores.51 
Further, the Court should withhold judgment on this claim and all others in this 
Amended Petition, as Petitioner may determine to withdraw this claim if it cannot justify 
sacrificing attorney-client communications and work product. Petitioner's counsel cannot 
make this assessment without adequate consultation with trial counsel and without review 
of all their files and notes. 
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
File A Motion In Limine To Preclude Introduction Of The Reenactment 
Photographs Depicting the Victim's Deceased Body Hogtied In Ligatures. 
Trial counsel was in possession of highly aggravating evidence depicted in 
various reenactment photographs made at the direction of Dr. Glen Groben. Trial counsel 
51 Petitioner has only had preliminary discussions with Dr. Mark Cunningham regarding 
his involvement of the case. Meaningful discussions require prior consultation with trial 
counsel. 
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was thus on notice that the State may attempt to utilize those at both phases of the trial. 
Counsel clearly believed the photographs were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial yet 
failed to file a motion in limine or even to coordinate their oral arguments following their 
objection. See e.g., (Tr., p. 4012, Ls. 1-3.) Trial counsels' performance was deficient. Had 
counsel filed a motion in limine with the factual and legal arguments in Petitioner's 
claims 0.1 and P.l, hereby incorporated by reference, then counsel would have 
successfully precluded the State from using the reenactment photographs resulting in a 
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different at both phases of the 
trial. At the very least, trial counsel would have been on notice that such evidence would 
be admitted, and thus in a position to prepare a defense. 
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v. PRAYERS FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, respectfully prays this 
Honorable Court: 
1. To allow civil discovery pursuant to the IRCP and ICR 57(b); 
2. For leave to file a final amendment to the Amended Petition as more 
information becomes available during the course ofthese proceedings; 
3. For an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a finalized petition; 
4. For an order vacating the convictions and sentences imposed against 
Petitioner; 
5. For such other, further relief as, to the Court, seems just and equitable. 
APr\1 
DATED this If day ~of200'. 
Deputy State ~ellate Public Defender 
.~ 
~..\! ; 
(l ( '- (l'- }. ,kJc;I..L -Lc.kk V\.""..., 
PAULA M. SWENSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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County of Ada ) 
Erick Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That I am the Petitioner in the above entitled action; that I have read the foregoing 
PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF, and I know the contents thereof. and 
that the facts contained therein ate true and correct as I verily believe based upon his 
review of the record, conversations with Petitioner. 
DATED this (}-tft day of April, 2006. 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this I-i~ day of April, 2006. 
otary Pu lie for Idaho 
Residing at A 4 C< 
My commission expires 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this rr"'day of April, 2006, served a true 
and correct copy of the forgoing PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF as 
indicated below: 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
POBOX51 













AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 
I 
Filed 
Monday, May 15, 2006 at 02:03 PM 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY:'_ ~~~~~~==~ __ __ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUD DISTRICT IN 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, PLAINTIFF 









AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT 
Defendant. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
All Motions Tuesday. June 20. 2006 01:30 PM 
(PREVIOUSLY SET FOR JUNE 23, 2006 @ 9:00 a.m.) 
Judge: Thomas F Neville 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing 
entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice 
were served as follows on the 15th T odayDateMont, T odayDate Year. 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTN: MARK ACKLEY 
Mailed Hand Delivered Email \j -- --
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Mailed ---
Dated: Monday, May 15,2006 
0-- NOTICE OF HEARING 
Hand Delivered Email j... --
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the Court 
00364 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
1.S.B. #4843 
MARK J. ACKLEY, 1.S.B. #6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. #6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 




A.M. __ --~ +: 
MAY 241306 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
Petitioner, ) 
) ADDENDUM TO 
v. ) AMENDED PETITION 
) FOR POST -CONVICTION 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) RELIEF 
) 
Respondent. ) (CAPITAL CASE) 
) 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State 
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), and by agreement with the State, files this Addendum to 
Petitioner's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Amended Petition) filed with the 
Court on April 17, 2006. 
The purpose of this Addendum is to correct errors inadvertently made in the Amended 
Petition. The Addendum does not purport to correct typographical or grammatical errors. 
Petitioner anticipates filing a final amended petition, with leave of the Court, upon the 
completion of discovery and the full investigation necessary for post-conviction counsel to 
identify and raise all "arguably meritorious" claims. See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment 
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and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guidelines 1O.15.1(C), (E); I.e. § 
19-4906(a) ("court may make appropriate orders for amendment of the application ... "); I.R.C.P. 
15(a) (the court shall grant leave freely to amend ''when justice so requires"). A final amended 
petition will correct any typographical or grammatical errors. 
Petitioner submits the following corrections to the Amended Petition: 
1. On page 38, Petitioner states: "This information does not appear in 
trial counsels' files ... " This refers to the identification made by 
Ms. Lewis when shown the photographic array. 
2. On page 50, Petitioner states: "His report, however, does not note 
this injury, and Dr. Vickman's report does not note swelling and 
specifically states that there were external signs of bruising on 
neck." 
The sentence should read: "His report, however does not 
note this injury, and Dr. Vickman's report does not note swelling 
and specifically states that there were no external signs of choking 
on the neck." 
3. On page 152, Petitioner states: "Had trial counsel conducted an 
adequate investigation, they would have discovered evidence 
linking Patrick Hoffert to the crime." 
Based in part on current counsels' meeting with Amil Myshin 
on May 23, 2006, trial counsel was aware of evidence linking 
Patrick Hoffert to the crime, but did not recall why this theory was 
not pursued. 
4. On page 164, Petitioner states: "Petitioner exhibited compassion 
and generosity toward her children-spoon-feeding them medicine 
when they were sick, drawing pictures for them, and purchasing a 
drawing book." 
Petitioner's reference to "spoon-feeding" Evelyn Dunaway's 
children is inaccurate. Ms. Dunaway's affidavit states that 
Petitioner spoon fed the child of another family living with Ms. 
Dunaway. (See Exhibit 15 (affidavit of Evelyn Dunaway).) 
5. The Affidavit of Dr. James Merikangas states that Petitioner could 
not identify the scent of either vanilla or cloves. (See Exhibit 26.) 
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Petitioner believes he was able to identify the scent of 
vanilla, but not cloves. Petitioner intends to submit a corrected 
affidavit, upon confirmation with Dr. Merikangas. 
6. On page 171, Petitioner quotes from Idaho Criminal Rule 24, but 
incorrectly cites to "I.C.R. 21(d)." The citation should read "I.C.R. 
24(d)." 
7. On pages 174-175, footnote no. 44, fails to reference a particular 
exhibit. The reference should be to Exhibit 35 (declaration of 
David A. Lane). 
A final note is necessary in fairness to trial counsel. Specifically, throughout the 
Amended Petition, Petitioner referenced the ongoing lack of cooperation by trial counsel. 
(See, e.g., Amended Petition, p. 4 at n.2, p. 23 at n.8, p. 34 at n.12, p. 90, p. 93, p. 133, p. 
143, p. 150, p. 158, p. 160 at n.43, and p. 179.) Petitioner notes that the refusal of D.C. 
Carr continues to date. However, on May 23, 2006, Petitioner's current counsel met 
Amil Myshin for several hours. At that meeting, Mr. Myshin disclosed a file folder of 
hand-written notes containing Mr. Myshin's thought processes, team assignment, and 
witness summaries, among other matters. The folder contains over two hundred (200) 
pages of such notes. Mr. Myshin hadn't reviewed his notes prior to the meeting. Even a 
cursory review of the note indicates many relevant areas which Mr. Myshin's had no 
recollection. Petitioner's counsel anticipates that the notes will contain factual 
information relevant to claims made in the Amended Petition, will provide further factual 
support for claims raised, and will provide a basis for raising additional claims or even 
narrowing or withdrawing current claims. 
ADDENDUM TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 3 
OO!lh7 
r 11--. 
DATED this L day May, 2006. 
PAULA M. SWENSEN 
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit 
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Case No. SPOT0500155D 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
THE AMENDED PETITION 
FOR POST CONVICTION 
RELIEF AND STATE'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the State's response to the petitioner, Erick 
Virgil Hall's Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief as follows. 
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The State admits that this Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 
various Idaho statutes and rules. The State denies that any international human rights 
laws are applicable or give the Court additional authority that it did not otherwise have. 
The State admits that the petitioner is in the custody of the Idaho State 
Department of Corrections pursuant to a judgment and sentence pronounced by this 
Court in Ada County after conviction in Ada County case number H0300518 for the 
crimes of Count I, Murder in the First Degree; Count II, Rape; Count III, Kidnapping 
in the First Degree. After a finding by jury that the death penalty was the appropriate 
punishment for the defendant's criminal behavior, this Court imposed a sentence of 
death in January 2005 for the crime of Murder with consecutive fixed life sentences for 
Rape and Kidnapping. The State admits that the petitioner pled not guilty and that a 
jury returned verdicts of guilty and the death sentence. 
The State admits that the petitioner is restrained of his liberty pursuant to the 
convictions referred to above, but denies that the restraint is illegal in any respect and 
denies that the convictions and sentences were obtained in violation of the law or of the 
Constitution of United States or the State of Idaho. The State denies each and every 
claim upon which the petitioner relies in support of any of his claims. Further, the 
State denies that the petitioner requires additional time for the filing of any amended 
petition given the amount of time that has transpired from the original conviction to 
date. 
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The State will respond to the specifics of the petitioner's claims using the same 
numbering system set up by the petitioner. However, before doing so a review of the 
current law on post conviction claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and other 
similar claims is appropriate. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated the standard for 
judging ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581 (Sup. 
Ct. 2000) as follows: 
The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is "when a counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process, that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result." State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300 (S.Ct.1999), cert. 
denied, 2000 WL 198035 (2000) (quoting, Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984». The test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has 
received the effective assistance of counsel is two-pronged and requires the 
petitioner to establish: (1) Counsel's conduct was deficient because it fell 
outside the wide range of professional norms; and (2) The petitioner was 
prejudiced as a result of that deficient conduct. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96 
(1999). (Citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). In assessing the reasonableness 
of attorney performance, counsel is "presumed to have rendered adequate 
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment." Id. at 329-30 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
In addition, strategic and tactical decisions will not be second guessed or 
serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other short 
comings capable of objective review. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921 (1994), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals further defmed "prejudiced" as it relates to an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269 (Ct. App. 
2002). 
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To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must 
show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant 
was prejudiced by the deficiency. Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, (Ct. 
App. 1995); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65 (Ct. App. 1990); Davis v. State, 
116 Idaho 401 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has 
the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758 
(1988); Russell, supra. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, supra, and Russell, 
supra. 
In other words, it is not good enough for current counsel to merely point out that 
trial counsel conducted the trial differently than current counsel would have done. It is not 
even good enough to point out that trial counsel committed a mistake in the law or the 
facts. The petitioner must establish that trial counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant was prejudiced, and that the outcome 
of the trial would have been different but for the deficient performance. 
The court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law. 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 736 (Ct. App. 1987); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156 (Ct. 
App. 1986). The Goodwin court went on to say that a petition for post conviction relief 
differs from a complaint in a civil action because the petition must contain more than "a 
short and plain statement of the claim" that would be sufficient for a civil complaint under 
LR.C.P. 8(a)(1): 
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Rather, an application for post conviction relief must be verified with respect 
to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, 
records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the 
application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the 
application. Idaho Code §19-4903. In other words, the application must 
present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations 
or the application will be subject to dismissal. 
Idaho Code §19-4906 authorized summary disposition of an application for 
post conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the courts 
own initiative. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's 
evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in 
the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If 
such a factual issue was presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Citations omitted. 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not a test of whether "another lawyer, 
with the benefit of hindsight, would have acted differently, but whether counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington supra 
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently emphasized, "the relevant 
inquiry under Strickland is not what defense counsel could have pursued, but whether the 
choices made by defense counsel were reasonable." Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d. 732, 
736 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Finally, it is important to point out that the petitioner's claims cannot be mere 
conclusions, but must be supported by admissible evidence. As the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated in State v. Lovelace, 140 ID 53 (Sup. Ct. 2003): 
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Lovelace's argument that counsel should and would have advocated 
for a plea bargain, but for his campaign challenge to the sitting 
prosecutor whom he claimed was 'soft on crime' is speculative and 
nothing more than a conclusion. We do not give evidentiary value to 
mere conclusory allegations that are unsupported by admissible 
evidence. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 543 (1986). 140 ID at page 61. 
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
A. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ACT WITH DILIGENCE IN ENSURING 
THAT ALL OF THEm CLAIMS WERE FULLY INSULATED FROM ANY 
FUTURE CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE CLAIMS WERE 
NOT SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVED. 
1. ... ineffective assistance for failing to fully insulate "motion to allow 
defense to provide copy of Grand Jury transcript to the defendant from 
future attacks that the claim was not sufficiently preserved." 
The petitioner admits that trial counsel did move to provide a Grand Jury transcript 
to the petitioner, but that the motion was only "partially denied." The petitioner claims no 
prejudice nor does he cite to any case law. The petitioner shows no reason to think that 
the claim is not "fully insulated." The claim should be dismissed. 
2. . .. ineffective assistance for failing to insulate their "motion to declare 
Idaho's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional." 
The petitioner admits that trial counsel did file a motion to declare the scheme 
unconstitutional, but only claims that there should have been other specific constitutional 
provisions alleged. No showing is made that the constitutional claims cannot be argued on 
appeal nor that the motion is not "insulated." The claim should be dismissed. 
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The petitioner admits that trial counsel did file such a claim and does not show that 
it was denied by the Court. This claim should be dismissed. 
4 .... to preclude Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence. 
The petitioner admits that trial counsel did file such a motion. To the undersigned's 
knowledge, the Court granted the motion by precluding the use of the Hanlon murder facts 
and the statements of Amanda Stroud. The State was allowed to use the Norma Jean 
Oliver rape case and the petitioner's escape conviction during sentencing. The petitioner 
makes no effort to show what further could have been done by trial counsel. The claim 
should be dismissed. 
S .... by failing to raise constitutional grounds in support of their "motion 
to exclude" 
No prejudice is shown. The petitioner makes no effort to show what trial counsel 
could have done differently. This is a bald assertion unsupported by admissible evidence. 
It should be dismissed. 
6. . .. ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise constitutional 
grounds of their "ex parte motion to appoint jury selection consultant." 
To the undersigned's knowledge, trial counsel did use Rolf Kehne as a jury 
consultant. There is no evidence asserted by the petitioner that the trial Court ever denied 
trial counsel's motion for a jury consultant or that the trial Court dismissed Mr. Kehne. 
This is a bald assertion without a factual basis and it should be dismissed. 
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7. . .. failing to raise constitutional grounds to support their "motion to 
strike/dismiss aggravating circumstances." 
The petitioner admits that the motion was made by trial counsel. No showing is 
made citing to different constitutional provisions than those referred to in the motion nor 
that the claim has not been preserved. This claim should be dismissed. 
8. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise constitutional 
grounds in support of their objection to Dennis Deen's testimony. 
The petitioner admits that the motion was made, but makes no effort to show how 
arguing additional constitutional basis for the objection would have been successful. This 
claim should be dismissed. 
B. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY LITIGATE ERRORS OCCURING 
DURING THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS. 
1. ... ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to dismiss the 
Amended Indictment on the grounds that it charged an additional or 
different offense than initially presented to the Grand Jury. 
The petitioner admits that trial counsel filed motions to declare Idaho's capital 
sentencing scheme unconstitutional and to dismiss or strike the aggravating circumstances. 
The petitioner has made no showing that those motions in combination with the argument 
do not adequately preserve the issues for appellate review. The petitioner does not show 
why the petitioner would be precluded from making the arguments that he asserts in the 
petition. This claim should be dismissed. 
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2. . .. trial counsel failed to move to dismiss the Indictment on the ground 
that the Grand Jury failed to fmd that each aggravator outweighed 
mitigation. 
It appears to the undersigned that the petitioner thinks the Grand Jury was required 
to weigh mitigation against aggravation rather than determine probable cause. No legal 
justification is forwarded to support this novel argument. The Grand Jury did not sentence 
the defendant to death. The Grand Jury's obligation was only to determine the question of 
probable cause on the existence of certain charged statutory aggravators. The petitioner's 
analysis that the Grand Jury must do the weighing is completely novel and appears to be 
made up by the petitioner. The claim should be dismissed. 
3. . .. failing to object to the interlineation of "drowning" as one of three 
possible causes of death. 
The petitioner makes no effort to support his argument that a "unanimity 
instruction" is a requirement under these facts. This claim should be dismissed. 
C. THE PETITIONER'S FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS IMPROPERLY 
SHACKLED DURING THE COURSE OF IDS TRIAL. 
The petitioner makes no showing of a factual basis for this claim. Indeed, the 
petitioner merely says that he "believes that the jurors were able to discern this device." 
No factual showing is claimed. The State observes at page 2067 the Court noted that the 
restraint was not visible. The Court said, " ... he is incustody although it's not apparent." 
This claim should be dismissed. 
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D. THE STATE COMMITTED MULTIPLE BRADY VIOLATIONS. 
1. ... by failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to Norma Jean 
Oliver. 
The apparent claim is that trial counsel did not cross-examine Ms. Oliver from the 
emergency room report nor Detective Hess's police report. No claim is made that either 
of those two reports contain information useful for cross-examination nor that any 
prejudice resulted. This claim should be dismissed. 
a. . .. by not disclosing documentation or information that Ms. 
Oliver suffers from bi-polar disorder or other conditions 
tending to undermine her credibility as a witness 
The petitioner pretends in this claim that the jury and trial counsel were not told 
that Norma Jean Oliver had been treated for mental illness. The petitioner ignores Ms. 
Oliver's own statements that she had a chemical imbalance; that she stayed in 
Intermountain Hospital for a while; that she is currently on SSI because she can't hold a 
job and that her memory of the events were not very good because she did not want to 
remember the things that happened to her on the night of the rape; and that Detective Hess 
initially interviewed her at Intermountain Hospital. Jay Rosenthal later testified that she 
was fragile at the time of the crime; that she was staying at Intermountain Hospital in the 
adolescent unit and that she was being treated by a psychiatrist named Lamar Heyrend. 
Otherwise, the State is not in possession of any Intermountain Hospital medical 
records and does not know if any exist. Further, the State is not informed as to whether or 
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not Ms. Oliver was diagnosed with any particular disorder in 1991. No material 
information favorable to the defendant was withheld. There was no Brady violation. 
b .... not disclosing the complete results of the "rape kit." 
The petitioner asserts without factual basis that the rape kit contained exculpatory 
evidence. There is no factual basis upon which a ruling could be made in the petitioner's 
favor. This should be dismissed. 
c .... by not disclosing all photographic evidence that would have 
impeached the testimony of Norma Jean Oliver and Detective 
Daniel Hess ... 
The petitioner's claim is only argument as to the relative value of the photographs 
utilized at triaL The photographs speak for themselves. No showing is made that some 
photos were withheld. No prejudice has been shown and this claim should be dismissed. 
d. . .. by not disclosing evidence suggesting that Norma Jean 
Oliver was incompetent to testify. 
All of the information about Norma Jean Oliver's memory and ability to testify was 
before the jury. No evidence is known by the undersigned to indicate that Norma Jean 
Oliver was legally incompetent to testify. No factual basis has been shown and this claim 
should be dismissed. 
e. . .. by not disclosing incentives given to Ms. Oliver to testify. 
No factual basis has been shown and no incentives are suggested. This should be 
dismissed. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE AMENDED PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (HALL), Page 11 . 
{lo'}on 
2. The prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose favorable evidence 
pertaining to April Sebastian. 
The petitioner suggests without factual basis that the State offered Ms. Sebastian a 
benefit in exchange for her testimony. The claim is not true and there is no factual basis 
to support the claim. It should be dismissed. 
3 .... by failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to Michelle Deen. 
The petitioner makes the assertion that the State did not disclose Ms. Deen's full 
criminal record. The State notes that at transcript page 4823 Ms. Deen admitted that she 
had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine and was on probation. She also 
said that she had done a "Rider." A record check shows that Michelle Deen does have 
two felony convictions; a 2002 possession of controlled substance and a 2003 possession 
of a controlled substance. The jury was on notice that Ms. Deen had been convicted of at 
least one felony and possibly two if one resulted in probation and the other in a rider. 
Arguably she could not be impeached by either conviction because they are both drug 
offenses. There is nothing about this that would cause the Court to lose confidence in the 
outcome. 
The petitioner claims that there is significance to the fact, if it is one, that Ms. Deen 
underwent court ordered substance abuse and psychological evaluations in her case. There 
is no evidence to suggest that the result of either of those was evidence favorable to the 
defendant. The claim should be dismissed. 
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4. . .. failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to Rebecca McCusker. 
The petitioner asserts that Ms. McCusker had a motivation to retaliate against the 
petitioner. No evidence to support the claim is suggested. It should be dismissed. 
5. . .. failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to Evelyn Dunaway. 
This is merely a claim without a factual basis and should be dismissed. 
6 .... failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to Wendy Levy. 
The petitioner claims that Ms. Levy provided evidence to the State that was 
exculpatory. In Ms. Levy's affidavit, she claims that she was interviewed by the 
prosecution and the defense prior to the petitioner's conviction and sentencing. Whatever 
information she had, she claims she told both the prosecution and the defense, neither of 
whom called her as a witness. 
7. .. . failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to a potential alternate 
perpetrator. 
To begin with, the State has no evidence suggesting that there is an "alternate 
perpetrator." The claim is based upon what appears to be completely fabricated reports by 
two women, Lisa Lewis and Peggy Hill. They told Detective Dave Smith in May 2004 
that they had seen Lynn Henneman in Garden City on the day of her disappearance with 
Erick Hall. Ms. Lewis and Ms. Hill have recently embellished their story to increase the 
participation in that story of a person named Patrick Hoffert. The Hoffert story, as now 
claimed by Lewis, was not given to Detective Smith in his May 2004 interview of Hill and 
Lewis, as can be seen from his police report, petitioner's Exhibit #9. 
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Lewis said that Diedre Muncy states that Hoffert said he had "raped the girl" 
without any further reference to who "the girl" was. This is double hearsay and as such is 
not admissible evidence that can support a claim. Lewis's assertion that Hoffert told her 
that "he made sure the woman got back to her hotel" is also inadmissible hearsay. There 
is no admissible evidence to support the claim that the State failed to disclose favorable 
evidence. This claim should be dismissed. 
8 .... by failing to disclose favorable evidence connecting Christian Johnson 
to the Henneman homicide. 
All information tending to connect Christian Johnson to the Henneman homicide 
was given to the jury by Detective Smith during the trial. DNA results eliminated 
Christian Johnson as a suspect as did his alibi witnesses. This claim is speculation only 
and should be dismissed. 
E. THE STATE COMMITTED NUMEROUS NAPU VIOLATIONS. 
1. The prosecutor elicited materially false testimony from Dennis Deen 
regarding Idaho Department of Corrections Inmate Classification 
System ... 
There is nothing in this assertion indicating that there was anything false about the 
testimony of Dennis Deen. Dennis Deen testified that the petitioner would not be eligible 
for minimum custody under the current classification system. 
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2. The prosecutor deliberately created the materially false impression that 
the petitioner seriously choked Evelyn Dunaway while engaging in 
sexual intercourse. 
The petitioner cites an excerpt from the transcript of Ms. Dunaway's testimony. 
There is nothing in that excerpt that supports his claim. This should be dismissed. 
3. The prosecutor deliberately created the materially false impression that 
the petitioner choked Michelle Deen while engaging in forcible sexual 
intercourse. 
Again, the petitioner quotes an excerpt from the testimony of Michelle Deen. 
There is nothing in that excerpt that supports the defendant's claim. It should be 
dismissed. 
4. The prosecutor elicited materially false testimony from Norma Jean 
Oliver. 
The petitioner argues the weight of Norma Jean Oliver's testimony in the context of 
the other testimony at the trial. There is nothing about his argument that supports his 
claim that the prosecutor elicited false testimony. All of the relevant information was 
before the jury so they could make a determination of what weight to give Ms. Oliver's 
testimony. 
5. The prosecutor deliberately injected extra-record and materially 
misleading evidence through leading questions to Detective Daniel Hess. 
The petitioner cites to a certain excerpt from the testimony of Detective Hess. 
There is nothing in that excerpt that supports his claim. It should be dismissed. 
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6. The prosecution committed misconduct by misrepresenting conclusions 
that could be drawn from the DNA test results taken from Christian 
Johnson. 
The petitioner's argument to support this claim appears to be nothing more than 
wild speculation that Christian Johnson raped Lynn Henneman and did not leave any 
semen. He doesn't even pretend to have evidence to support this. It should be dismissed. 
F. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT FOR 
DISSUADE MITIGATION WITNESSES 
PREDISPOSE THEM TO DISREGARD 
MITIGATING EVIDENCE. 
USING TECHNIQUES TO 
FROM TESTIFYING OR 
OR DOWN PLAY VALID 
The bald assertion here is that the State somehow influenced Tamara McCraken 
and Jean McCraken from cooperating with the defense. Tamara McCraken testified for 
the defense in the penalty phase beginning at transcript page 4971. Jean McCraken was 
interviewed for two hours and twenty-two minutes by Dr. Cunningham, transcript page 
5299. She was also interviewed by Dr. Pettis, transcript page 5202. No showing is made 
why she did not testify. No prosecution agent used any technique to dissuade any witness 
from testifying or to otherwise affect their testimony. 
G. ADMISSION OF TESTIMONIAL AND OTHER HEARSAY VIOLATIONS 
VIOLATED PETITIONER'S SIXTH AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS. 
This is a claim that inadmissible hearsay under the Crawford decision was put 
before the jury through Detective Hess concerning things that Norma Jean Oliver had told 
Detective Hess. Since Ms. Oliver testified and was available for cross-examination, there 
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is no Crawford violation. Additionally, Idaho Rule of Evidence lOl(e)(3) indicates that 
the Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings. 
H. THE PROSECUTION COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY ASKING THE 
JURY TO SPECULATE THE WORST SCENARIO BY PRESENTING 
ARGUMENT INCONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE AND BY 
ALLUDING TO EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER MURDER. 
The excerpts of argument cited by the petitioner appear to be proper comment on 
the facts and a proper method of drawing inferences from the facts. There is nothing in 
the quoted excerpts that support this claim and it should be dismissed. 
I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN SENTENCING PHASE CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS. 
1. The prosecution committed misconduct by making an improper closing 
argument regarding the defmition of mitigation by asserting that 
mitigation evidence is limited to evidence that is causally linked to the 
defendant's criminal conduct, evidence that excuses the defendant's 
criminal conduct, and evidence that prevented the defendant from 
choosing not to kill. 
There is nothing about the arguments cited that shows misconduct. The State is as 
free to argue its view of the weight of the evidence as is the defendant. The argument did 
not impede the jury's ability to consider mitigation nor did it impede the defendant's 
ability to present evidence. Whether the mitigation was "valid" or had any weight to it of 
any kind was a jury determination that could be argued by both sides. This claim should 
be dismissed. 
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2. The prosecution committed misconduct by making an improper closing 
argument regarding the manner in which mitigation is weighed against 
the aggravation. 
In this case, the jury was correctly instructed on the need to weigh all mitigation 
against each aggravating circumstance. The verdict form could not have been more clear 
that all mitigation was to be weighed against each individual aggravating circumstance. 
Trial counsel, in his closing argument, also correctly argued that all mitigation needed to 
be weighed against each individual aggravator separately. The drawing of the scale in the 
petitioner's argument was not an effort by the State to instruct the jury on the method of 
weighing. Rather, it was only to show that all of the mitigation was not sufficiently 
compelling to make the death penalty unjust. The jury was correctly instructed and the 
argument was not misconduct. 
3. The prosecution committed misconduct by arguing that the defense 
experts were hired guns. 
The petitioner argues that the State impermissibly argued that the defense experts 
were "hired guns." To begin with, the petitioner cannot point to any argument where the 
words "hired guns" or the equivalent were used. Second, even if those words were used, 
the petitioner shows no legal basis suggesting that an argument of that sort was 
impermissible. The bias or reliability of a witness is always subject to argument. Nothing 
about the petitioner's claim shows that the prosecutor's arguments were improper. 
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4. The prosecution committed Doyle error by eliciting through Dr. Mark 
Cunningham testimony that petitioner did not speak to him about the 
crimes for which he had been charged. 
The petitioner cites an excerpt from the State's cross-examination of one of the 
defense experts. The excerpt shows that the expert did not ask the defendant anything 
about the murder of Lynn Henneman. It was not suggested that the defendant refused to 
answer questions. It showed that the expert was biased in his research and presentation of 
the facts. 
5. The prosecution committed misconduct by misrepresenting the 
testimony of Michelle Deen and Evelyn Dunaway. 
The petitioner cites to an excerpt from closing argument. Nothing in the excerpt 
shows a misrepresentation of the testimony of Deen or Dunaway and does not support the 
claim made. 
6. The prosecution committed misconduct by encouraging the jury to 
speculate in the course of determining whether the propensity 
aggravator existed beyond a reasonable doubt. 
There is nothing improper in the excerpt of the closing argument quoted by the 
petitioner as support for this claim. 
7. The prosecution committed misconduct by making an argument 
inconsistent with evidence outside the record. 
This is mere speculation by the petitioner with no citation to admissible evidence. 
It should be dismissed. 
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8. The prosecution committed misconduct in arguing for imposition of the 
death penalty to deter future crimes or other would-be criminals and as 
retribution for the victim's family. 
There is nothing improper about the excerpts of closing arguments cited by the 
petitioner. The petitioner does not cite to any authority standing for the proposition that a 
State argument as to retribution, protection of society or deterrence is improper. 
9. . .. by expressing their personal opinion that the death penalty was the 
appropriate punishment. 
The excerpt of the closing argument cited by the petitioner is the prosecutor making 
the obvious point that the verdict of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the gUilt phase 
was overwhelming proof. He does not state his opinion as to the propriety of the death 
sentence. 
10 .... by making extra-record argument that lethal injections are painless 
and humane. 
The excerpt of the closing argUment referred to by the petitioner is merely part of 
an argument showing that Lynn Henneman's murder was much more painful and horrific 
for her than execution will be to the petitioner. Additionally, the British journal cited by 
the petitioner only indicates that some prisoners "may" receive inadequate anesthesia. 
This claim is baseless. 
11. ... by arguing that a life sentence would be too lenient and otherwise 
speculating as to what might happen to petitioner if the death sentence 
were withheld. 
There is nothing about the quoted closing argument that is improper. The jury was 
properly instructed and the argument was not false or misleading. 
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12. . .. by arguing that petitioner showed a lack of remorse. 
The petitioner's argument is that the State's argument was a comment on the 
defendant's right to remain silent. Nothing about the quoted argument makes any 
reference to the defendant's silence. The argument refers to his observable conduct in the 
courtroom. It was not improper. 
J. TRIAL COUNSEL LABORED UNDER MULTIPLE AND VARIED 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTED THEIR 
PERFORMANCE. 
1. Trial counsel's competing obligations to attend to other cases created a conflict 
of interest adversely affecting counsel's performance. 
The petitioner cites to no facts supporting this allegation. It should be dismissed. 
2. Norma Jean Oliver. 
The petitioner asserts that Mr. Myshin had a conflict of interest that adversely 
affected his ability to investigate Ms. Oliver's case. Besides the assertion, the petitioner 
has no facts to support this claim. 
3. April Sebastian. 
The petitioner asserts that Mr. Myshin represented April Sebastian in past criminal 
cases. The petitioner asserts that this was a conflict for Mr. Myshin, but points to no facts 
to support this assertion. He also asserts that the State offered Ms. Sebastian benefits in 
exchange for her testimony. No facts are contained in the argument to support that claim. 
4. Christian Johnson. 
No facts are asserted to support this claim. 
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K. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO REQUEST PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING FOR THE 
PRESENTATION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN SUPPORT OF THE NOTICED 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
This seems to be nothing more than an assertion by the petitioner without the 
support of admissible evidence or legal authority. 
L. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
CASELOAD. 
This seems to be a restatement of the claim made J1, that trial counsel had large 
caseloads. It is again asserted without any accompanying factual basis. 
M.DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. 
The petitioner admits that he has not reviewed the trial proceedings to determine 
whether this claim is correct. It should be dismissed. 
N. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO MOVE FOR CHANGE OF VENUE, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FAILING TO MOVE TO HAVE A JURY FROM ANOTHER 
COUNTY EMPANELED. 
No showing is made by the petitioner indicating that any juror was biased due to 
pretrial pUblicity. The claim should be dismissed. 
1- 4. The petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
analyze media broadcasts, to poll the community, to change venue or impanel 
a jury from another county and for failing to question jurors sufficiently about 
pretrial pUblicity. 
While the petitioner cites to certain pretrial publicity, he cites to no facts indicating 
that any of the seated jurors were biased due to pretrial pUblicity. Whether or not the 
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community had an opinion is of no relevance. The only question is whether the petitioner 
received a fair trial from an unbiased jury and there is no evidence to think otherwise. 
These claims should be dismissed. 
5-7. Ineffective assistance claims for failing to develop an adequate record of 
juror's knowledge, for failing to know who to strike for cause and failing to 
use preemptory challenges correctly on pUblicity questions. 
Again, the petitioner has no facts to support any of these claims. The undersigned 
recalls that in addition to extensive questioning during jury selection, the parties had the 
benefit of the jury questionnaires which also asked about pretrial publicity. These claims 
should be dismissed. 
O. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO PRECLUDE AND OBJECT TO TESTIMONY. 
1 .... in failing to object to, or otherwise preclude, opinion evidence by Dr. 
Groben as not being based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
The record shows that Dr. Groben did testify that his opinions were to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty or that otherwise the evidence that he observed supported the 
conclusions that he drew. The fact, if it is one, that another pathologist disagrees with Dr. 
Groben is not evidence that Dr. Groben is incorrect or that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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2. . .. in failing to object to, or otherwise preclude, testimony of Norma Jean 
Oliver due to her lack of competency to testify. 
The fact that a witness remembers certain things and does not remember other 
things does not render the witness incompetent to testify. The petitioner makes no effort 
to show why a motion to strike Ms. Oliver's testimony would likely have been granted. 
3 .... in failing to object to, or otherwise preclude, testimony of other criminal 
acts. 
The State assumes that this claim is in relation to the defendant's prior criminal 
record, which was presented to the jury during the penalty phase. This seems to be no 
more than an assertion by the petitioner and should be dismissed. 
4. . .. in failing to object to, or otherwise preclude hearsay testimony. 
The petitioner says that he requires additional time to analyze this claim. It should 
be dismissed. 
P. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES AND REBUT 
STATE THEORIES. 
1. ... in failing to effectively cross examine Dr. Groben and rebut the State's 
presentation of evidence that the victim was hogtied and suffered a 
terrifying and tortuous death. 
The argument here is that Dr. Aiken, a Spokane pathologist, has some 
disagreement with Dr. Groben's fmdings and should have been consulted by trial counsel. 
It is the identical claim made in 01. A close reading of Dr. Groben' s testimony and a 
comparison of that testimony with Dr. Aiken's affidavit, shows that there is no material 
difference between the two and no showing of prejudice to the petitioner. 
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2. . .. in failing to effectively cross examine Kathryn Colombo and rebut the 
State's argument the petitioner was the only contributor of DNA removed 
from the victim. 
The substance of this claim is that Kathryn Colombo "downplayed" the importance 
of the existence of a 13th allele at the D5 marker by referring to it as a "stutter artifact" or 
a "technical artifact" or "contamination." Counsel uses a BSU professor, Greg 
Hampikian to opine that Kathryn Colombo downplayed the result, though Dr. Hampikian 
cites excerpts from the transcript showing that Kathryn Colombo made it clear there could 
have been a second male contributor to the sperm fraction. 
During direct and cross-examination, the question of the 13th allele was discussed 
several times, the State notes some of them as follows. 
At transcript page 4466, Ms. Colombo refers to that allele and describes it as 
being, "over the stutter cutoff, but just barely. It could be a technical artifact. It has met 
our reporting guidelines, so it is in the table. I cannot make any conclusions about that 
type because it is just so little information." 
At page 4467, Ms. Colombo states, "there was no other type observed in these 
sperm fractions where we saw secondary types that were not consistent with possible 
carryover from the nonsperm fraction. So this was the only instance." Ms. Colombo is 
referring to the 13th allele at D5. 
She points out at page 4468 that the petitioner matches at all of the markers. 
At page 4489, Ms. Colombo states unequivocally that there could be a second 
donor as follows: 
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Q. Could there be a second male there? 
R. There could be. 
Q. Okay. Now, as we go out to the - out towards the end there. The 
D5 category, Yes. Is it possible that a second male contributed the 13 
allele? 
A. That is possible. It's not consistent with the type obtained from a 
nonsperm donor, not consistent with the primary donor at that location. 
So it could either be technical artifact, it could be the true nature of the 
sample. It could have been picked up along the way. There is no way 
for me to determine where that type came from. 
Q. Okay. So it's possible that it could have come from a second male? 
A. Possible. 
The subject again came up at page 4505. 
Q. Now, if there is a difference in the time of depositing the sample, 
does that effect it? 
A. Yes. If there is a sample that was deposited, specifically in a sexual 
assault case, we see cases where an individual says that they had sex with 
another person two weeks prior to the attack and maybe that we're getting 
some residual, small amount of DNA from that partner from two weeks ago, 
so in terms of a sexual assault that could come into play. 
Q. And it's also true that if there are only hours separating, correct? 
A. Not typically, no. 
Q. It's possible? 
A. It could be possible, yes. 
The second contributor issue was again discussed at page 4521. Referring to the 
131h allele, the following occurred: 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE AMENDED PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (HALL), Page 26 
OO'lQ~ 
Q. Well, it could have come from another contributor? 
A. That is correct. 
The subject was again discussed at page 4526 as follows: 
Q. Is it possible that there was a second male contributor to the sperm 
fraction? 
A. It's possible. We've got one reading, it's the only reading, a small 
type that cannot be attributed to the nonsperm donor or the primary source 
of the sperm fraction. So I don't know where that came from. 
On page 4528 and 4529, the subject is again discussed and Ms. Colombo admits 
that she cannot account for the 13th allele. However, she does point out that Walter Us 
and Christian Johnson are categorically excluded as donors. 
For the petitioner to pretend that the jury was not aware of the possibility of a 
second sperm donor is to completely ignore the testimony. The affidavit from Greg 
Hampildan adds nothing to the knowledge that the jury already had. He suggests that the 
13th allele came from the victim being "inseminated." There is no way for him to know 
how that 13th allele got to the place that it was discovered. He can no more tell that it is a 
result of insemination than he can tell that it was "picked up along the way" during the 
testing process as indicated by Kathryn Colombo. There is nothing about this information 
that shows ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim should be dismissed. 
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3. . .. in failing to effective cross examine Norma Jean Oliver. 
The petitioner asserts that there are certain discrepancies that trial counsel should 
have examined Norma Jean Oliver about. He does not state what the discrepancies are so 
there is no factual basis to support this claim. It should be dismissed. 
4. . .. in failing to effectively cross examine Detective Daniel Hess. 
This allegation is the same as the one for Ms. Oliver. The petitioner does not 
assert what discrepancies he thinks Detective Hess should have been cross examined 
about. This claim should be dismissed. 
5. . .. in failing to effectively cross examine Jay Rosenthal. 
The petitioner asserts that the type of sentence the petitioner received for his rape of 
Norma Jean Oliver suggests that Mr. Rosenthal thought the State's case against the 
petitioner was weak or that the State did not believe Ms. Oliver's allegations of violence. 
Jay Rosenthal clearly testified that he went ahead with the plea agreement because he 
thought Ms. Oliver was too fragile to withstand cross-examination during a trial. There is 
no factual basis for this allegation. It should be dismissed. 
6. . .. in failing to effectively cross examine April Sebastian. 
The petitioner makes no suggestion of what evidence existed that trial counsel could 
have used to impeach Ms. Sebastian with. A reading of Ms. Sebastian's cross 
examination shows that trial counsel elicited a number of good things about Erick Hall 
from Ms. Sebastian. Since the petitioner asserts no factual basis to support this claim it 
should be dismissed. 
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7. . .. in failing to rebut the State's presentation of evidence that petitioner has 
a propensity to murder and probably constitutes a continuing threat to 
society through the testimony of Dr. Mark Cunningham. 
The substance of this claim is that trial counsel should have convinced the Court to 
allow Dr. Mark Cunningham to opine that the petitioner was not a continuing threat to 
society despite the Court's ruling that if he did so, the State could present evidence about 
the Hanlon murder. The petitioner makes certain assertions about the Hanlon case not 
being adequately investigated and speculates about how some DNA testing may have come 
out in the Hanlon case. However, no factual basis is shown as to what trial counsel could 
have done differently to convince the Court otherwise nor how Dr. Cunningham would 
have handled the propensity question in light of the fact that the defendant had killed 
twice. The petitioner makes no effort to explain how he thinks the jury would have 
reacted to the knowledge that the defendant was a multiple murderer when considering the 
death penalty question. This claim should be dismissed. 
Q. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR 
ELICITING AGGRAVATING EVIDENCE. 
In the State's view, there is nothing about the excerpt of testimony referred to by 
the petitioner that tends to support the claim that the petitioner was suspected of 
committing other rapes through the carelessness of trial counsel. This claim should be 
dismissed. 
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R. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
THEIR FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE GUILT PHASE 
INVESTIGATION. 
1. . .. in failing to adequately investigate and present evidence of an alternate 
perpetrator of the murder and co-perpetrator of rape. 
This is a restatement of the earlier claim that Patrick Hoffert is the murderer. This 
claim is fabricated out of the notion that the 13th allele in the DNA is Patrick Hoffert. 
Since there is no factual basis to support that, the claim should be dismissed. 
S. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
THEIR FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE SENTENCING PHASE 
INVESTIGATION. 
Beneath this heading, the petitioner claims in numbers 1, 3, and 4 that trial counsel 
should have put on more information at the sentencing phase about the defendant and the 
effect that his traumatic childhood had upon him. They do not point to the existence of 
any additional psychological or psychiatric evidence, but claim that other friends or family 
members could have offered additional information about the petitioner's abusive 
childhood. These claims should be dismissed as being cumulative since the jury heard 
hours of this type of information. As stated above, "the relevant inquiry under Strickland 
is not what defense counsel could have pursued, but whether the choices made by defense 
counsel were reasonable." Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732 at 736 (9th eirc. 1998). 
In claim number 2, the petitioner restates his theory that there is an alternate 
perpetrator of the murder and a co-perpetrator of the rape. There is no substance to this 
claim and it should be dismissed. 
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In claim number 5, the petitioner claims that Evelyn Dunaway and Wendy Levy 
would have provided evidence of the petitioner's good character as an adult. They rely 
upon an affidavit from Evelyn Dunaway that she signed in April 2006. Some of the 
statements made by Ms. Dunaway in that affidavit are directly contradictory to statements 
that she made during the trial. The fact that a year and a half after the trial she is willing 
to say some good things about his character is not an indication that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance. In the context, no showing has been made that counsel's conduct 
fell below an objective standard nor that prejudice has been shown. 
6 .... in failing to adequately investigate the State's expert's opinions by 
requesting appropriate discovery of their reports. 
As the State understands it, the substance of this claim is that the petitioner 
speculates that Dr. Michael Estess and Dr. Robert Engle made reports that contain 
eXCUlpatory material and that those reports were withheld from trial counsel. He claims 
that trial counsel should have received the reports from Dr. Estess and Dr. Engle or 
should have asked the Court to force them to generate reports. Since neither Dr. Estess 
nor Dr. Engle testified at the trial, it is unclear how the petitioner thinks trial counsel 
would have accomplished this. Additionally, since no factual basis is shown that there 
were reports nor that they contain material helpful to the petitioner, this claim should be 
dismissed. 
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